

JON BONSO AND CARLO ACEBEDO

AWS CERTIFIED

SECURITY

SPECIALTY

EXAM



Tutorials Dojo
Study Guide and Cheat Sheets



TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	5
AWS CERTIFIED SECURITY SPECIALTY EXAM OVERVIEW	6
Exam Details	6
Exam Domains	7
Exam Scoring System	9
Exam Benefits	10
AWS CERTIFIED SECURITY SPECIALTY EXAM - STUDY GUIDE AND TIPS	11
Study Materials	11
AWS Services to Focus On	12
Common Exam Scenarios	15
Validate Your Knowledge	19
Sample Practice Test Questions:	20
Question 1	20
Question 2	22
Domain 1: Incident Response	25
Overview	26
Using AWS Config Rules for Automated Checks and Remediation	27
Incident Response Management using Trusted Advisor	31
Evaluating the Impact of an Exposed AWS Access Key	35
Incident Response Using Amazon GuardDuty	37
AWS Personal Health Dashboard	42
Using Amazon Inspector for Incident Management	44
AWS Systems Manager Patch Manager	48
Securing Amazon EC2 Instances That Have Compromised SSH Private Keys	50
AWS Artifact Security Reports and AWS Compliance-Related Information	53
AWS Abuse	56
Domain 2: Logging and Monitoring	58
Overview	59
Logging and Monitoring Services in AWS	60
AWS CloudTrail	63
Central Logging Using AWS CloudTrail	66
Amazon CloudWatch Logs Agent Troubleshooting	69



Central Log Collection using CloudWatch Logs	71
Using CloudWatch Metric Filter When Too Many Unauthorized AWS API Requests are Identified	73
Amazon CloudWatch Managed Policies	78
Real-time Logging Using Kinesis Firehose and Elasticsearch	79
Domain 3: Infrastructure Security	81
Overview	82
AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) Basics	83
Importing Keys	86
Deleting Keys	87
AWS KMS API	88
Delegating Permissions and KMS Actions in AWS KMS	91
AWS KMS Customer Master Key (CMK) Rotation	95
Using Encryption Context for Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) to Support Authenticated Encryption	99
Storing Encryption Keys Using AWS CloudHSM	100
AWS WAF and AWS Firewall Manager	102
Block User Requests from Bot that Has a Distinct User-Agent HTTP Header	108
Adding HTTP Security Headers Using Lambda@Edge and CloudFront	109
Securing Amazon S3 and CloudFront Web Distributions	111
Uploading Large Sensitive Files in KMS-Encrypted S3 Bucket	115
Protecting from DDOS Attacks through AWS Shield	116
Investigating AWS Resources that are Possibly Compromised	119
User Authentication Using Amazon Cognito	122
Managing Instance Profile	129
Using VPN to Protect Employees Who are Connecting to AWS Resources	132
Penetration Testing in AWS	136
AWS Billing Permissions	138
Preventing Staff from Adding Rules to Security Groups without any Approval	141
Setting up Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) and Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Software	144
Setting up ADFS Federation Between On-premises Active Directory and AWS	146
NACL - Ephemeral Port Range	149
Minimize Potential Attack Surface	151
Using AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store and AWS Secrets Manager to Store System Credentials	153
Secure String Parameter	154
Amazon VPC Flows Logs	158
Amazon GuardDuty Multi-account Aggregation	160
Host-Based Security	164
Domain Whitelisting Using Proxy Servers	168



Certificate Management Using AWS Certificate Manager	169
Elastic Load Balancer Security	172
DynamoDB Security	175
Domain 4: Identity and Access Management	177
Overview	178
Troubleshooting Amazon QuickSight and Athena Connectivity	179
AWS IAM Basics	181
AWS IAM Identities in AWS	186
How AWS IAM Handles Conflicting IAM Policies Attached to a Resource	189
IAM Permissions Boundary	191
Using the iam:PassRole permission to pass an IAM Role to AWS Services	205
Mapping Permissions of Active Directory User Attributes to AWS Services	207
Using AWS Organizations to Provide Access to Third-Party AWS Accounts	208
Generating Credential Reports for your AWS Account Using AWS IAM	211
Choosing the Most Suitable AWS STS API for Authentication	213
Domain 5: Data Protection	226
Overview	227
Securing Data In AWS CloudFront	228
Using Elastic Load Balancer For Encrypting Traffic	232
Recovering the Data of an Encrypted Amazon EBS Volume if You Lose the CMK	235
Vault Locking in Amazon S3 Glacier	237
Data Protection in Amazon Kinesis Data Analytics	240
Protecting Your S3 Bucket	241
AWS CHEAT SHEETS	246
AWS Security & Identity Services	246
Amazon Cognito	246
Amazon Detective	251
Amazon GuardDuty	254
Amazon Inspector	259
Amazon Macie	263
AWS Artifact	266
AWS Certificate Manager	268
AWS Directory Service	271
AWS Fargate	276
AWS Identity and Access Management (AWS IAM)	277
AWS Organizations	283



AWS Resource Access Manager	285
AWS Secrets Manager	286
AWS Security Hub	289
AWS Shield	291
AWS WAF	293
Comparison of AWS Services	295
AWS Key Management Service (KMS) vs. AWS CloudHSM	295
Application Load Balancer vs Network Load Balancer vs Classic Load Balancer vs Gateway Load Balancer	297
Symmetric vs. Asymmetric CMKs	300
FINAL REMARKS AND TIPS	305
ABOUT THE AUTHORS	306



INTRODUCTION

In the fast-paced IT industry today, there will always be a growing demand for certified IT Professionals that can design highly secure AWS cloud architectures. Companies are spending millions of dollars to optimize the performance of their applications and scale their infrastructure globally to serve customers around the world. They need a reliable and skillful IT staff to build highly available, fault-tolerant, and secure applications that are safe from common web exploits or even from large-scale distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Most companies have a dedicated IT Security team to improve infrastructure security of their cloud environment, establish real-time security monitoring and encrypt their data both in transit and at rest.

This Study Guide and Cheat Sheets eBook for AWS Certified Security Specialty aims to equip you with the necessary knowledge and practical skill sets needed to pass the latest version of the AWS Certified Security Specialty exam. This eBook contains the essential concepts, exam domains, exam tips, sample questions, cheat sheets, and other relevant information about the AWS Certified Security Specialty exam. This study guide begins with the presentation of the exam structure, giving you an insight into the question types, exam domains, scoring scheme, and the list of benefits you'll receive once you pass the exam.

We used the official AWS [exam guide](#) to structure the contents of this guide, where each section discusses a particular exam domain. Various AWS concepts, related AWS services, and technical implementations are covered to give you an idea of what to expect on the actual exam.

Security Specialty Exam Notes:

Don't forget to read the boxed "**exam tips**" (like this one) scattered throughout the eBook as these are the key concepts that you will likely encounter on your test. After covering the five domains, we have added a bonus section containing a curated list of AWS Cheat Sheets to fast track your review. The last part of this guide includes a collection of articles that compares two or more similar AWS services to supplement your knowledge.

The AWS Certified Security Specialty certification exam is a difficult test to pass; therefore, anyone who wants to take it must allocate ample time for review. The exam registration cost is not cheap, which is why we spent considerable time and effort to ensure that this study guide provides you with the essential and relevant knowledge to increase your chances of passing the Security Specialty exam.

****Note:** *This eBook is meant to be just a supplementary resource when preparing for the exam. We highly recommend working on [hands-on sessions](#) and [practice exams](#) to further expand your knowledge and improve your test taking skills.*



AWS CERTIFIED SECURITY SPECIALTY EXAM OVERVIEW

The AWS Certified Security Specialty exam is intended for IT Professionals who perform a security role in their respective organizations. This exam checks your ability to effectively demonstrate knowledge and your ability to secure your resources in AWS.

Exam Details

The AWS Certified Security Specialty certification is intended for individuals who perform a security role in their organization. This exam doesn't have any prerequisites but it is recommended that you have at least two years of hands-on experience in implementing security controls to various AWS workloads. This validates your ability to demonstrate your understanding of specialized data classifications, data-encryption methods, secure Internet protocols, security operations, and risk mitigation in AWS. It also checks your working knowledge of various AWS security services and features that you can use to implement a secure production environment.


It is composed of scenario-based questions that can either be in multiple-choice or multiple response formats. The first question type has one correct answer and three incorrect responses, while the latter has two or more correct responses out of five or more options. You can take the exam from a local testing center or online from the comforts of your home.

Exam Code:	SCS-C01
Release Date:	April 2018
Prerequisites:	None
No. of Questions:	65
Score Range:	100 - 1000
Cost:	300 USD (Practice exam: 40 USD)
Passing Score:	750/1000
Time Limit:	3 hours (180 minutes)
Format:	Scenario-based. Multiple choice/multiple answers.
Delivery Method:	Testing center or online proctored exam.

Don't be confused if you see in your Pearson Vue booking that the duration is 190 minutes since they included an additional 10 minutes for reading the Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) at the start of the exam and the survey at the end of it. If you booked via PSI, the exam duration time that you will see is 180 minutes.

Exam Domains

The AWS Certified Security Specialty (SCS-C01) exam has 5 different domains, each with corresponding weight and topic coverage. The exam domains are as follows: Incident Response (12%), Logging and Monitoring (20%), Infrastructure Security (26%), Identity and Access Management (20%), Data Protection (22%):



Domain 1: Incident Response

- 1.1 Given an AWS abuse notice, evaluate the suspected compromised instance or exposed access keys.
- 1.2 Verify that the Incident Response plan includes relevant AWS services.
- 1.3 Evaluate the configuration of automated alerting, and execute possible remediation of security-related incidents and emerging issues.

Domain 2: Logging and Monitoring

- 2.1 Design and implement security monitoring and alerting.
- 2.2 Troubleshoot security monitoring and alerting.
- 2.3 Design and implement a logging solution.
- 2.4 Troubleshoot logging solutions.



Domain 3: Infrastructure Security

- 3.1 Design edge security on AWS.
- 3.2 Design and implement a secure network infrastructure.
- 3.3 Troubleshoot a secure network infrastructure.
- 3.4 Design and implement host-based security.

Domain 4: Identity and Access Management

- 4.1 Design and implement a scalable authorization and authentication system to access AWS resources.
- 4.2 Troubleshoot an authorization and authentication system to access AWS resources.

Domain 5: Data Protection

- 5.1 Design and implement key management and use.
- 5.2 Troubleshoot key management.
- 5.3 Design and implement a data encryption solution for data at rest and data in transit.



Exam Scoring System

You can get a score from 100 to 1,000 with a minimum passing score of **750** when you take the Security Specialty exam. AWS uses a scaled scoring model to equate scores across multiple exam types that may have different difficulty levels. The complete score report will be sent to you by email after a few days. Right after you completed the actual exam, you'll immediately see a pass or fail notification on the testing screen. A *"Congratulations! You have successfully passed..."* message will be shown if you passed the exam.

Individuals who unfortunately do not pass the AWS exam must wait 14 days before they are allowed to retake the exam. Fortunately, there is no hard limit on exam attempts until you pass the exam. Take note that on each attempt, the full registration price of the AWS exam must be paid.

Within 5 business days of completing your exam, your AWS Certification Account will have a record of your complete exam results. The score report contains a table of your performance at each section/domain, which indicates whether you met the competency level required for these domains or not. AWS uses a compensatory scoring model, which means that you do not necessarily need to pass each and every individual section, only the overall examination. Each section has a specific score weighting that translates to the number of questions; hence, some sections have more questions than others. The Score Performance table highlights your strengths and weaknesses that you need to improve on.



Exam Benefits

If you successfully passed any AWS exam, you will be eligible for the following benefits:

- **Exam Discount** - You'll get a 50% discount voucher that you can apply for your recertification or any other exam you plan to pursue. To access your discount voucher code, go to the "Benefits" section of your AWS Certification Account, and apply the voucher when you register for your next exam.
- **Free Practice Exam** - To help you prepare for your next exam, AWS provides another voucher that you can use to take any official AWS practice exam for free. You can access your voucher code from the "Benefits" section of your AWS Certification Account.
- **AWS Certified Store** - All AWS certified professionals will be given access to exclusive AWS Certified merchandise. You can get your store access from the "Benefits" section of your AWS Certification Account.
- **Certification Digital Badges** - You can showcase your achievements to your colleagues and employers with digital badges on your email signatures, LinkedIn profile, or on your social media accounts. You can also show your Digital Badge to gain exclusive access to Certification Lounges at AWS re:Invent, regional Appreciation Receptions, and select AWS Summit events. To view your badges, simply go to the "Digital Badges" section of your AWS Certification Account.
- **Eligibility to join AWS IQ** - With the AWS IQ program, you can monetize your AWS skills online by providing hands-on assistance to customers around the globe. AWS IQ will help you stay sharp and be well-versed on various AWS technologies. You can work at the comforts of your home and decide when or where you want to work. Interested individuals must be based in the US, have an Associate, Professional, or Specialty AWS Certification and be over 18 years of age.

You can visit the official AWS Certification FAQ page to view the frequently asked questions about getting AWS Certified and other information about the AWS Certification: <https://aws.amazon.com/certification/faqs/>.



AWS CERTIFIED SECURITY SPECIALTY EXAM - STUDY GUIDE AND TIPS

The AWS Specialty certification exams are intended for people who handle more specific responsibilities in AWS Cloud. Since these responsibilities demand a more advanced skill set with prior experience from a person, these AWS specialty exams are built so that they could reinforce and validate a person's eligibility for that role. There are no associate and professional levels in a specialty learning path, so the exams serve as the whole package already. And since they are made that way, expect no less from the specialty certification exams, as they will be as tough as the professional exams.

The name of the certificate immediately points out what to focus on — AWS Security. Although we mentioned earlier that specialty exams tackle more specific roles, security in AWS is very broad and extensive. There are a lot of topics involved when we speak about AWS security, whether it be native AWS services or other third-party tools. If you need a comprehensive review material for learning these topics then this study guide is for you.

Study Materials

Having prior knowledge and experience in handling (cloud) security will allow you to understand the concepts and strategies that appear in AWS reference materials. You will also find it easier to comprehend scenario type questions in your exam. To know more about the AWS Security specialty exam, check out the official [AWS Exam Blueprint here](#).

AWS documentations and whitepapers will be your best friends here. They are your primary source of information. We recommend reading the following papers:

1. [Introduction to AWS Security](#)
2. [AWS: Overview of Security Processes](#)
3. [AWS Well-Architected Framework](#)
4. [Security Pillar – AWS Well-Architected Framework](#)
5. [AWS Security Best Practices](#)
6. [AWS Key Management Service Best Practices](#)
7. [AWS Key Management Service Cryptographic Details](#)
8. [Encrypting File Data with Amazon Elastic File System](#)
9. [Secure Content Delivery with Amazon CloudFront](#)
10. [Use AWS WAF to Mitigate OWASP's Top 10 Web Application Vulnerabilities](#)
11. [AWS Best Practices for DDoS Resiliency](#)
12. [Security at Scale: Logging in AWS](#)
13. [AWS Security Incident Response Guide](#)
14. [Security at Scale: Governance in AWS](#)



Add-On Compliance whitepapers:

1. [Security by Design](#)
2. [AWS Risk & Compliance](#)
3. [Architecting for HIPAA Security and Compliance on AWS](#)
4. [Navigating GDPR Compliance on AWS](#)
5. [Architecting for PCI DSS Scoping and Segmentation on AWS](#)
6. <https://aws.amazon.com/compliance/fedramp/>

Optional whitepaper for configuring AWS SSO + LDAP + Shibboleth

- [Single Sign-On: Integrating AWS, OpenLDAP, and Shibboleth](#)

After you have studied the sources above, it would be wise to expose yourself with different scenarios and strategies in enforcing security in AWS. Re:Invent videos, AWS blogs, virtual classes, and even some AWS forums provide sample scenarios and strategies for you. The links below will redirect you to some of the references:

- [AWS Security Fundamentals virtual lecture](#)
- [AWS Security Essentials virtual classroom](#)
- [Architecting on AWS virtual classroom](#)
- [Security Engineering on AWS virtual classroom](#)
- [AWS Security blogs](#)
- [AWS Re:Invent 2019 sessions](#)

AWS Services to Focus On

When we talk about security as a discipline, especially in the context of cloud, we are tackling it as a combination of different domains. AWS enumerates its catalog of services and features under different domains based on their purposes. In this section, we will try to do the same and group AWS services according to their domains.

Identity and Access Control

- [AWS Identity and Access Management](#) - You must learn every detail of AWS IAM since this is AWS' primary user management and access control service. Practice writing your own IAM policies.
- [Resource-Based Policies](#) - Although resource-based policies fall under AWS IAM, they tend to be ignored compared to user-based policies. Take note of which services support this type of policy and how they are different from user-based policies.
- [S3 Presigned URLs](#) - Know what is the purpose of S3 presigned URLs and how they differ from CloudFront signed URLs.



- [CloudFront Signed URLs](#) - Know what is the purpose of CloudFront signed URLs and how they differ from S3 presigned URLs or CloudFront signed cookies.
- [Amazon Cognito](#) - Read through the benefits of AWS Cognito and how to integrate it with web and mobile applications. Differentiate user pools from identity pools.
- [AWS Single Sign-On](#) - Learn how you can use AWS SSO together with other authentication protocols to securely authenticate users in your environment. AWS SSO is commonly integrated with LDAP.
- [AWS Security Token Service](#) - Know the purpose and use cases of Amazon STS. Try building a program that utilizes temporary tokens as credentials.
- [AWS Directory Service](#) - Know the different options you have for AWS Directory Service. Each option solves a different requirement and it is up to you to figure out how you can get your directory to gain access to your users and other information.
- [AWS Organizations](#) - AWS Organizations is a very helpful service when dealing with large scale enterprises with multiple AWS accounts. Know the benefits of using this service (like consolidated billing feature) and how to build an organization hierarchy with Organization Units and Service Control Policies.
- [AWS Resource Access Manager](#) - AWS RAM allows you to securely share resources with other AWS accounts. Experiment with this service to know how to share your resources and what restrictions are involved.

Application and Infrastructure Security

- [EC2 key pairs](#) - This goes without saying, but EC2 key pairs play a very important role in protecting your EC2 instances.
- [AWS Systems Manager](#) - AWS SSM secures your applications through services like Patch Baselines, Run Command, Session Manager, and more. By utilizing automation and code, you run less risk in human error and unwanted/untracked changes to your application.
- [AWS WAF](#) - AWS WAF is essential in protecting your applications from common exploits like SQL injection or XSS attacks. Differentiate WAF from Shield and Firewall Manager.
- [AWS Shield](#) - AWS Shield complements AWS WAF since this service offers DDoS protection. Read what features are different between Shield Basic and Shield Advanced.
- [AWS Firewall Manager](#) - This service simplifies administration overhead when setting up AWS WAF, AWS Shield and VPC security groups. Best to do a hands-on on the service.

Data Security

- [AWS KMS](#) - Study the different types of KMS keys available and how you should manage them. Determine which AWS services support using AWS KMS for encryption.
- [Amazon CloudHSM](#) - Know when to use AWS KMS vs CloudHSM for your encryption needs.
- [AWS SSM Parameter Store](#) - It is important to know how AWS SSM Parameter Store can protect your referenceable information through *SecureString*.
- [Amazon Secrets Manager](#) - Secrets Manager is similar to Parameter Store wherein you can store and retrieve sensitive strings in AWS securely.



- [SSE-S3 Encryption](#) - Read when it is better to use SSE-S3 keys or KMS keys for server-side encryption. Also read how your encrypted buckets and objects are handled during operations such as replication, deletion, etc.
- [S3 Glacier Vault Lock](#) - Know the purpose of a Glacier Vault Lock and try implementing a policy yourself.
- [Amazon Macie](#) - Read how Macie automatically classifies and protects your data. This is one of those services that you will just understand better if you try it out.
- [AWS Certificate Manager](#) - Know which services integrate with your certificates stored in Certificate Manager. Try creating your own private CA and issue some custom certificates.

Network Security

- [Amazon VPC](#) - Know everything on VPCs since they are basic building blocks for a protected AWS environment. Differentiate security groups vs network ACLs. Study VPC endpoints too.
- [Amazon CloudFront](#) - Study how CloudFront protects your endpoints from being publicly accessible. Read on setting up Origin Access Identity with S3 buckets. Know which services integrate with CloudFront, such as API Gateway and WAF. CloudFront has a feature that allows content access to only selected locations.
- [AWS ELB](#) - Study how ELB protects your web traffic and endpoints from malicious attacks. Understand how SSL certificates are being handled by ELB.
- [Amazon API Gateway](#) - Similar to ELB, API Gateway also protects your endpoints from being exposed to the public internet. Commonly used in serverless applications, study how APIs can secure Lambda functions. Also know what services it integrates with, such as WAF.
- [AWS VPN](#) - Although AWS VPN is fairly new, you should have an overview of what this service is and how to set it up in your AWS environment.
- [AWS Direct Connect](#) - Read how a dedicated line from your network to AWS can protect your inbound and outbound traffic. A common way to secure your traffic in Direct Connect is by using an AWS Site to Site VPN.

Logging and Monitoring

- [Amazon CloudWatch](#) - Know everything about Cloudwatch (Logs, Alarms, Events, Metrics)
- [Amazon CloudTrail](#) - Know everything about CloudTrail, like how to store and encrypt your log files, how to monitor different regions and capture different types of data.
- [Service Logs \(VPC, ELB, API Gateway, S3, CloudFront\)](#) - Multiple AWS services support logging which they forward to an S3 bucket. It would be good to have an idea of which services support logging. Logs are crucial when conducting incident response and analysis.
- [Amazon Route 53](#) - Study how Route 53 can quickly handle network issues by performing DNS and endpoint health checks. Route 53 also helps in making your environment more resilient by performing automatic failovers.

Threat Detection, Prevention, Response and Remediation



- [Amazon GuardDuty](#) - Have an understanding of the use cases of Amazon GuardDuty.
- [Amazon Inspector](#) - Have an understanding of the use cases of Amazon Inspector.
- [Amazon Detective](#) - Know which services integrate with Amazon Detective. Also, have an understanding of the use cases of Amazon Detective.
- [AWS Security Hub](#) - Have an understanding of the use cases of AWS Security Hub.

Risk and Compliance Management

- [AWS Artifact](#) - Know the purpose of AWS Artifact and what kinds of reports it provides for you.
- [AWS Config](#) - AWS Config is an important compliance monitoring tool that you should learn about. Study the concepts and how they work. Practice writing a Config rule of your own to have a better understanding of the service.

Lastly, as we have repeatedly talked about, specialty exams are intended for experienced individuals. Therefore, you should go try out the services above in your own AWS account. Also, do not limit yourself to the Management Console. Some implementations can only be done via AWS CLI or AWS SDK. Be comfortable with them all.

Common Exam Scenarios

Scenario	Solution
AWS Config	
A company requires a solution that will automatically detect and enable disabled VPC Flow Logs.	Create an AWS Config rule that will detect disabled VPC Flow Logs. Create a CloudWatch event based on that Config Rule to trigger a Lambda Function for enabling VPC Flow Logs.
Verify if EC2 instances are using approved AMI. Create a notification if non-compliant instances are detected.	Utilize the approved-amis-by-id managed rule in AWS Config to check if running instances are using an approved AMI. Use CloudWatch Alarms for notification.
A Security Analyst needs to remediate the risks of having security groups that allow inbound traffic for the 0.0.0.0/0 CIDR range (Anywhere). The security group must only allow inbound traffic for the company's firewall IP address.	Create an AWS Config rule that will automatically detect security groups that allows inbound traffic from the 0.0.0.0/0 CIDR range. Associate a Lambda function in the Config rule to update the security group's inbound rule with the company's firewall IP address.
You need to build a solution that will allow the Security team to review the IAM policy assigned	Use AWS Config



to an IAM user before and after a security incident has occurred.	
Automatically detect and remediate an incident where API logging is disabled	Create an AWS Config rule to detect disabled CloudTrail settings. Configure the rule to use an AWS Systems Manager Automation document to automatically re-enable CloudTrail logs.
Detect if someone is using the AWS account's root access in creating new API keys without proper approval.	Set up an AWS Config rule to track the usage of the create-api-key command by the root IAM user.
AWS KMS	
A company requires a CMK that automatically rotates every year.	Create a CMK with AWS generated key material.
A company needs to rotate a CMK with imported key material	Create a new CMK with the new imported key material and point the existing alias to the new CMK.
A company has to manage the access control for hundreds of CMKs without having to edit key policies	Use grants in AWS KMS.
A Security Specialist must use additional authenticated data (AAD) to prevent tampering against the ciphertext.	Add the kms:EncryptionContext condition when defining the key policy for the CMK.
A company needs to migrate AWS resources encrypted with KMS into another region.	Use a new CMK in the target region.
AWS WAF, AWS Shield	
An application hosted on an EC2 instance needs protection from common web exploits. Also, the outgoing traffic from the instance should be restricted only to trusted URLs.	Use AWS WAF for common web exploits protection and use a third-party solution to whitelist URLs for outbound traffic.
A Security Specialist needs to block high-volume requests from specific user-agent HTTP header	Use AWS WAF rate-based rule to limit the number of requests.



Which AWS Services has direct integration with AWS WAF?	Amazon CloudFront & Application Load Balancer
A company is serving static content using Amazon CloudFront, Amazon S3, and Amazon Route53. They must respond to DDoS attacks at L7, L4, and L3.	Use AWS Shield Advanced
AWS CloudTrail	
Protect CloudTrail Logs from tampering and unauthorized access	Enable the CloudTrail log file validation
Some AWS accounts can't send CloudTrail logs in a centralized logging account. What are the steps to troubleshoot the issue?	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Check if the AWS Account IDs are included within the Central account's S3 bucket policy.2. Check if the AWS Accounts are using the correct S3 bucket name for centralized logging.3. Check if all trails are active
A Security Specialist has updated the log file prefix for a trail but encountered a "There is a problem with the bucket policy." error	First, update the new log file prefix in the S3 bucket policy, then specify the updated log file prefix in the CloudTrail Console.
A Security Engineer needs to review user activities from a specific access key within the past 3 months.	Review the user activities through the CloudTrail Console
Amazon CloudWatch	
Some EC2 instances stop sending CloudWatch logs after a security incident. What are the steps to troubleshoot this issue?	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Check if CloudWatch Logs agent is active and running in the EC2 instances.2. Check if the EC2 instances have Internet access.



	3. Check the validity of the OS Log rotation rules.
After an update to IAM policy, an application stops sending custom metrics to AWS CloudWatch.	Add the cloudwatch:putMetricData permission in the IAM policy
A Security Engineer must build a near-real time logging solution to collect logs from different AWS Accounts.	Use the Amazon CloudWatch cross-account log data sharing with subscriptions. Use Amazon Kinesis Data Firehose to deliver the logs.
A company has set up a notification system using CloudWatch and CloudTrail that will alert a Security Team when new access keys are created. The team is not receiving notifications.	Make sure that the value of consecutive periods alarm threshold is equal to or greater than 1.
Amazon GuardDuty	
A company needs a threat detection system for monitoring malicious activities in an AWS Account	Use Amazon GuardDuty
A company is using an Active Directory server to resolve DNS for EC2 instances in a VPC. A security engineer noticed that one of the instances is being used for command-and-control (C2C) operations but GuardDuty has failed to recognize it.	GuardDuty does not recognize DNS requests coming from third-party DNS servers.
A company wants to perform a network port scan against EC2 instances in VPC but does not want to get alerts for specific instances.	Add the EIP of the specific instances to the trusted IP lists in Amazon GuardDuty.
Infrastructure Security	
A company has complex connectivity rules for Amazon EC2 instances. How should they manage these connection rules with no additional cost?	Implement the rules using the built-in host-based firewall such as iptables



A Security Engineer needs to inspect packet data.	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Use a proxy software hosted on an EC2 instance.2. Use a host-based agent on an EC2 instance. <i>Note that you can only perform packet data analysis with third-party solutions.</i>
A Security Engineer has a virtual security appliance. The Engineer is using a security group and NACL to comply with security requirements. How can he allow traffic through the virtual security appliance?	Disable the Source/Destination check of the Elastic Network Interface (ENI) associated with the virtual security appliance.
A Security Engineer needs to remediate the risk of users exploiting the instance metadata service to access AWS resources in other accounts.	Restrict the access to the instance metadata service using iptables.

Validate Your Knowledge

The virtual classrooms we listed in the Study Materials section often include short quizzes at the end of each video. They will serve as guides on how to look for key terminologies in your exam questions, as well as how to break down your options to determine the most suitable answer for the question. Another virtual lecture we recommend you attending after you finished reviewing for the exam is the [Exam Readiness: AWS Certified Security - Specialty Course](#). They provide sample questions that you can follow along and answer.

AWS also provides a sample exam on the AWS Certified Security Specialty page, which you can find [here](#). Although this sample exam is not on the same level of difficulty one might expect on the real exam, it is still a helpful resource for your reviews. Lastly, [Tutorials Dojo](#) also has a set of high-quality [practice exams](#) and this study guide eBook for the [AWS Security Specialty certification](#). The practice exams and study guide eBook will help boost your preparedness for the real exam, and it will also help you determine which areas you are weak in, so you can focus your efforts on studying those areas.



Sample Practice Test Questions:

Question 1

An organization is implementing a security policy in which their cloud-based users must be contained in a separate authentication domain and prevented from accessing on-premises systems. Their IT Operations team is launching and maintaining a number of Amazon RDS for SQL Server databases and EC2 instances. The organization also has an on-premises Active Directory service that contains the administrator accounts that must have access to the databases and EC2 instances.

How would the Security Engineer manage the AWS resources of the organization in the MOST secure manner? (Select TWO.)


1. Using AWS Directory Service, set up an AWS Managed Microsoft AD to manage the RDS databases and EC2 instances.
2. Set up and configure AWS Service Catalog to manage the RDS databases and EC2 instances.
3. Set up a one-way incoming trust relationship from the existing Active Directory in the on-premises data center to the new Active Directory service in AWS.
4. Set up a one-way incoming trust relationship from the new Active Directory in AWS to the existing Active Directory service in the on-premises data center.

5. Set up a two-way trust relationship between the new Active Directory in AWS and the existing Active Directory service in the on-premises data center.

Correct Answer: 1,3

In **Active Directory**, trust relationships enable access to various resources that can be either one-way or two-way. A one-way trust is a unidirectional authentication path created between two domains. In a one-way trust between Domain A and Domain B, users in Domain A can access resources in Domain B. However, users in Domain B can't access resources in Domain A. Some one-way trusts can be either non-transitive or transitive depending on the type of trust being created.

You can configure one and two-way external and forest trust relationships between your AWS Directory Service for Microsoft Active Directory and on-premises directories, as well as between multiple AWS Managed Microsoft AD directories in the AWS cloud. AWS Managed Microsoft AD supports all three trust relationship directions: Incoming, Outgoing and Two-way (Bi-directional). When setting up trust relationships, you must ensure that your on-premises directory is and remains compatible with AWS Directory Services.



If you already have an AD infrastructure and want to use it when migrating AD-aware workloads to the AWS Cloud, AWS Managed Microsoft AD can help. You can use AD trusts to connect AWS Managed Microsoft AD to your existing AD. This means your users can access AD-aware and AWS applications with their on-premises AD credentials, without needing you to synchronize users, groups, or passwords.

For example, your users can sign in to the AWS Management Console and Amazon WorkSpaces by using their existing AD user names and passwords. Also, when you use AD-aware applications such as SharePoint with AWS Managed Microsoft AD, your logged-in Windows users can access these applications without needing to enter credentials again.

There are three trust relationship directions:



1. **One-way:incoming** - Users in the specified realm will not be able to access any resources in this domain.
2. **One-way:outgoing** - Users in this domain will not be able to access any resources in the specified realm.
3. **Two-way (Bi-directional)** - Users in this domain and users in the specified realm will be able to access resources in *either* domain or realm.

Hence, the correct answers are:

- **Using AWS Directory Service, set up an AWS Managed Microsoft AD to manage the RDS databases and EC2 instances.**
- **Set up a one-way incoming trust relationship from the existing Active Directory in the on-premises data center to the new Active Directory service in AWS.**

The option that says: **Set up and configure AWS Service Catalog to manage the RDS databases and EC2 instances** is incorrect because AWS Service Catalog simply allows organizations to create and manage catalogs of IT services that are approved for use on AWS. You have to use AWS Directory Service instead.

The option that says: **Set up a one-way incoming trust relationship from the new Active Directory in AWS to the existing Active Directory service in the on-premises data center** is incorrect because this should be the other way around. Instead, you have to set up a one-way trust relationship from the existing Active Directory in the on-premises data center to the new Active Directory service in AWS.

The option that says: **Set up a two-way trust relationship between the new Active Directory in AWS and the existing Active Directory service in the on-premises data center** is incorrect because the scenario explicitly mentioned that the cloud-based users must be prevented from accessing on-premises systems. Hence, you have to use a one-way trust relationship only.

References:

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/directoryservice/latest/admin-guide/ms_ad_setup_trust.html
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/directoryservice/latest/admin-guide/usecase5.html>
<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory-domain-services/concepts-forest-trust>

Check out this AWS Directory Service Cheat Sheet:

<https://tutorialsdojo.com/aws-directory-service/>

Question 2

A company is planning to migrate its on-premises application to AWS. The application will be hosted in Elastic Beanstalk, which uses an external RDS database and an S3 bucket configured to use Server-Side Encryption with Customer-Provided Encryption Keys (SSE-C). In this configuration, Amazon S3 does not store the


encryption key you provide but instead, stores a randomly salted hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) value of the encryption key in order to validate future requests. The Security Engineer was assigned to implement the required security measures for the application.

Which of the following is a valid consideration that the Engineer should keep in mind when implementing this architecture?

1. The salted HMAC value can be used to derive the value of the encryption key.
2. You will lose access to the S3 object if you lose the encryption key.
3. The salted HMAC value can be used to decrypt the contents of the encrypted object.
4. The salted HMAC value can be used to decrypt the S3 object in the event that you lose the encryption key.

Correct Answer: 2

Server-side encryption is about protecting data at rest. Using server-side encryption with customer-provided encryption keys (SSE-C) allows you to set your own encryption keys. With the encryption key you provide as part of your request, Amazon S3 manages both the encryption, as it writes to disks, and decryption, when you access your objects. Therefore, you don't need to maintain any code to perform data encryption and decryption. The only thing you do is manage the encryption keys you provide.



When you upload an object, Amazon S3 uses the encryption key you provide to apply AES-256 encryption to your data and removes the encryption key from memory. It is important to note that Amazon S3 does not store the encryption key you provide. Instead, it is stored in a randomly salted HMAC value of the encryption key in order to validate future requests. The salted HMAC value cannot be used to derive the value of the encryption key or to decrypt the contents of the encrypted object. That means, if you lose the encryption key, you lose the object.

When you retrieve an object, you must provide the same encryption key as part of your request. Amazon S3 first verifies that the encryption key you provided matches, and then decrypts the object before returning the object data to you.



Hence, the valid consideration that the developer should keep in mind when implementing this architecture is:
You will lose access to the S3 object if you lose the encryption key.

The option that says: **The salted HMAC value can be used to derive the value of the encryption key** is incorrect because the salted HMAC is just used to validate future encryption requests. It cannot be used to derive the value of the encryption key or to decrypt the contents of the encrypted object.

The option that says: **The salted HMAC value can be used to decrypt the contents of the encrypted object** is incorrect because just as mentioned above, the HMAC cannot be used to derive the value of the encryption key or to decrypt the contents of the encrypted object.

The option that says: **The salted HMAC value can be used to decrypt the S3 object in the event that you lose the encryption key** is incorrect because if you lose the encryption key, you will also lose access to that object. You cannot use the salted HMAC value to decrypt the object.

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/dev/UsingKMSEncryption.html>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/RESTObjectPUT.html#RESTObjectPUT-responses-examples>

<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-prevent-uploads-of-unencrypted-objects-to-amazon-s3/>

Check out these Amazon S3 and AWS KMS Cheat Sheets:

<https://tutorialsdojo.com/amazon-s3/>

<https://tutorialsdojo.com/aws-key-management-service-aws-kms/>

Click [here](#) for more **AWS Certified Security Specialty practice exam questions**.

Check out our other AWS practice test courses [here](#):



With the growing number of security attacks each day, companies are now focusing their efforts in strengthening their digital security. This responsibility requires a team effort from both AWS engineers and industry professionals, which is why we have a shared responsibility model. Professionals will have to be equipped with the right tools and knowledge to protect what is valuable to them and to their company.

We hope that our guide has helped you achieve that goal, and we would love to hear back from you after your exam. Get some well-deserved rest, and we wish you the best of results.



Domain 1: Incident Response



Overview

The first domain of the AWS Certified Security Specialty exam checks your preparedness on how well you are able to detect, automate, verify, evaluate, and remediate security incidents in your AWS infrastructure. Roughly 12% of questions in the actual Security Specialty exam revolves around this topic.


This domain will challenge your know-how in doing the following:

- Given an AWS abuse notice, evaluate the suspected compromised instance or exposed access keys.
- Verify that the Incident Response plan includes relevant AWS services.
- Evaluate the configuration of automated alerting, and execute possible remediation of security-related incidents and emerging issues.

In this chapter, we will cover all of the related topics for Incident Response Management in AWS that will likely show up in your Security Specialty exam. Take note that this domain has the least amount of weight in the exam (12%) so you make sure that you only spend an ample time understanding the concepts in this section.

Using AWS Config Rules for Automated Checks and Remediation

AWS Config helps you assess whether your AWS resources comply with your internal security policies, compliance standards such as the [CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark](#), and other industry best practices. AWS Config uses rules to evaluate resources. You can view the compliance status of these evaluations on your AWS Config Dashboard.



Config delivers information about the configuration changes in your resources to an S3 bucket, but you can also configure it to get notifications from an SNS Topic. Moreover, you can choose to send the details to Amazon CloudWatch Events to detect changes in AWS Config events' status. Configure the CloudWatch Events to invoke a Lambda Function that will restore/fix your resource's configuration whenever an event pattern matches a particular event that doesn't adhere to a compliance policy.

Delivery method

S3 bucket

☒ Create a bucket
 ☐ Choose a bucket from your account
 ☐ Choose a bucket from another account

Ensure appropriate permissions are available in this S3 bucket's policy. [Learn more](#)

S3 bucket name

SNS topic

☐ Stream configuration changes and notifications to an Amazon SNS topic.
If you choose email as the notification endpoint for your SNS topic, this can cause a high volume of email. [Learn more](#)

Amazon CloudWatch Events rule

AWS Config sends detailed information about the configuration changes and notifications to Amazon CloudWatch Events. To create rules, visit the [Step 1: Create Rule](#) page in the Amazon [CloudWatch Events](#) console.



There are two types of Config rules where you can check your compliance against:

- **AWS-Managed Rules** - These are rules that are defined and maintained by AWS. They require minimal to no configuration. You can use this to bring up some common security concerns such as:
 - *Do all of my security groups in use allow unrestricted incoming SSH traffic?*
 - *Is the account password policy for IAM users secure enough to meet the specified requirements?*
 - *Are all EBS volumes that are in an attached state encrypted?*
- **Custom Rules** - AWS-Managed rules are great, but it does not solve every problem as every business is built differently. If you want to check compliance against your company's internal security rules that are not readily defined in AWS, you can use Custom Rules. These are rules that use AWS Lambda functions, which are created and maintained by the customer. The Lambda function contains the logic that will determine whether a resource is compliant or non-compliant.

AWS Config is an essential part of your incident response plan as it could detect potential security threats and automatically respond to it by executing the appropriate remediation action. To further understand how it works, let's consider the scenario below:


You are managing your development account where several teams are using it to test their applications. All VPCs created on the account should have VPC Flow Logs enabled and the logs must be sent to a central S3 bucket for audit purposes. Since several teams created their own VPCs for testing, it is difficult for you to track all VPCs and manually enable VPC Flow Logs. The solution should easily detect the non-compliant resources and automatically enable the VPC Flow Logs.

The scenario addresses two problems: The first issue is about how we can automatically track non-compliant VPCs (VPCs with disabled VPC Flow Logs). The second issue is about implementing the remedial action to take when Config detects a non-compliant VPC.

We can solve the problem by doing the following steps:

1. Create an AWS Config rule that will flag a VPC if the VPC Flow Logs is disabled.
2. Create a Lambda function that will enable the VPC Flow Logs on a specific VPC.
3. Create a CloudWatch Events rule based on the event from Config and trigger the Lambda function that we have created in step 2.

Optionally, you can add an SNS topic to get notifications via SMS or Email. Below is the architecture diagram for the solution:



Using AWS Config to ensure that only approved AMIs are only launched

There are cases when you want to ensure that only the approved AMIs are used to launch EC2 instances for compliance and security reasons. Obviously, this could easily be done if you're involved in a small organization that manages two or more instances. You can just manually go through each of the instances and check their AMI IDs.

However, if you are managing hundreds of EC2 instances, that's a different situation. Let's say that you want to host a web application using a specific Linux distribution only. Manually inspecting individual instances would take you hours and is not very practical especially now that we have access to modern tools that make our lives easier.

The better solution is to use the `approve-amis-by-id` managed rule in AWS Config. This is already pre-defined for you so you don't have to create and maintain your own code to evaluate AMIs. This rule will detect any non-compliant AMIs, and you could automate the remediation action by following the same architecture that we previously discussed using Amazon CloudWatch Events.



Select rule type

☒ **Add AWS managed rule**
Customize any of the following rules to suit your needs.

☐ **Create custom rule**
Create custom rules and add them to AWS Config. Associate each custom rule with an AWS Lambda function, which contains the logic that evaluates whether your AWS resources comply with the rule.

AWS Managed Rules (1)

× < 1 > ⚙

	Name		Description
☒	approved-amis-by-id	EC2	Checks whether running instances are using specified AMIs.

Cancel Next

Security Specialty Exam Notes:

You can use the AWS Config to monitor and assess non-compliant configurations in your resources. Send the event's status to CloudWatch Events so it can trigger a Lambda Function that will fix the non-compliant configuration.

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/how-does-config-work.html>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/monitor-config-with-cloudwatchevents.html>


<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/approved-amis-by-id.html>

Incident Response Management using Trusted Advisor

Tracking a few AWS resources in your account is no sweat, but as your business grows, the number of resources you manage will eventually add up. This could pose a severe security problem for you as it'll be challenging to keep tabs on various resources in terms of how permissive and restrictive they are.

Here is where Trusted Advisor comes into play. Trusted Advisor is a service that will analyze your AWS environment and provides best practice recommendations for you in five categories:

- Cost Optimization
- Performance
- Security
- Fault Tolerance
- Service Limits



Note: Unlike AWS Config, Trusted Advisor does not allow users to specify resources to be assessed. AWS controls the resources and attributes to be inspected. You can think of it as a person who examines your AWS environment and gives you recommendations based on best practices.

Since you're taking the AWS Certified Security Specialty Exam, our focus will be more on improving the security of your application on AWS. Below are some security best practices recommended to us by Trusted Advisor.

Multi-Factor Authentication on Root Account

AWS Trusted Advisor detects whether you have MFA enabled on your Root Account. It is advisable to use MFA when logging as a root user for greater security. Note that an attacker will only need access to your account's email for him to reset your password. Without MFA, you're running the risk of only securing your account with

your email's credentials. MFA requires users to type a secret code in addition to their password before they can access their account.


Amazon S3 Bucket Permissions

AWS Trusted Advisor checks if you have S3 buckets with open access permissions in your account. Confidential files stored on S3 buckets with open permissions can be exploited. Aside from storage, you also pay for requests against S3 buckets. Unauthorized users who spam S3 requests can lead to unexpected charges.

Security Groups - Unrestricted Access

AWS Trusted Advisor checks if you have security group rules that allow unrestricted access. Leaving your security groups open for other users increases your attack surface and is against the principle of least privilege access.

Here's how it looks on the Trusted Advisor Dashboard.



As you can see, there are three alert criteria shown (denoted by green, yellow, and red). These criteria reflect the current incident severity levels of your resources.



Green alert status means no problem is detected.



Yellow alert status indicates that an investigation should be done to the affected resources. You can think of this as an early warning for your resources that could create loopholes to your defense strategy.



Red alert status is the most critical alert criteria of the three. Resources tagged with red alert have the most potential security vulnerabilities which warrant an immediate solution.

Automated Monitoring of Trusted Advisor Security Checks

Like what we've discussed about AWS Config in the last section, we can also use Amazon CloudWatch Events to detect the changes in the security check of Trusted Advisor based on an event rule. You can react to these changes by writing a function that will automatically take the corrective action.

For example, let's say that you're managing an AWS account with different environments (Production, Development, UAT, etc.) with multiple EC2 instances. As part of your company's security policies, you need to restrict access to sensitive ports (e.g., port 22 for SSH, port 3306 for MySQL Database, etc.) by configuring the rules of security groups that are attached to active EC2 instances. It will be cumbersome to go through all the environments and check their security groups one by one. The Trusted Advisor can solve this dilemma.

By default, Trusted Advisor tags those security groups with access to sensitive ports as a red alert status as you can see on the screenshot below:

Alert Criteria


Green: Access to port 80, 25, 443, or 465 is unrestricted.

Red: Access to port 20, 21, 1433, 1434, 3306, 3389, 4333, 5432, or 5500 is unrestricted.

Yellow: Access to any other port is unrestricted.

We can create an event pattern in CloudWatch Events that will trigger a Lambda Function every time the Trusted Advisor identifies a security group with red alert status. The Lambda Function contains the logic that will call the appropriate EC2 API command — updating the security group's rule to deny access to said

vulnerable ports. Optionally, you can enable weekly email notifications from the Trusted Advisor to get information about your resources' status.



Security Specialty Exam Notes:

Trusted Advisor automatically checks your AWS environment against best practices. Similar to AWS Config, you can use **CloudWatch Events + Lambda Function** for incident response.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/technology/trusted-advisor/best-practice-checklist/>
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awssupport/latest/user/cloudwatch-events-ta.html>



Evaluating the Impact of an Exposed AWS Access Key

As more companies depend on AWS Cloud to sustain and modernize their operations, security concerns also increase. There is a growing problem of publicly exposed IAM credentials being stored on the Internet that anyone could have access to. There are cases when somebody sends a text file containing information about his access keys to a colleague. There are also cases when a developer gets too complacent when building applications. His or her AWS credentials are stored on the source code, and that source code gets uploaded to a public repository. These “small” things could eventually lead to big problems in the future if not addressed.

AWS access keys are powerful. They allow us to access AWS services programmatically. With just a few lines of code, the person who holds the compromised keys could terminate resources in seconds (if that individual has the necessary permissions). He or she could do anything that might jeopardize projects everyone has been working on. And in the end, it is the careless user who will take the blame.

As a Security Specialist, it is your responsibility to assess the impact of compromised AWS access keys as early as possible and respond to it by doing the proper remedial action.

Using AWS CloudTrail

You can view and track the history of activities on your account for specific IAM users, roles, and AWS access keys through AWS CloudTrail event history. By doing this, you'll get an idea of how a particular credential was misused.

In the screenshot below, you can see different types of important information, such as the AWS access key used, the associated username, the date when the event has happened, and the affected resource. You could also identify where the action was made by looking up the Source IP address on the internet.



TerminateInstances Info

Details Info

Event time	AWS access key	AWS region
August 06, 2020, 14:57:10 (UTC+08:00)	ASIA5JVP3LHEAT4XI3BQ	us-east-2
User name	Source IP address	Error code
tutorialsdojo	205.103.95.188	-
Event name	Event ID	Read-only
TerminateInstances	2fe62972-c4b5-476d-b424-930140e66af0	-
Event source	Request ID	
ec2.amazonaws.com	15e64db1-9264-421c-b4e2-a89562bbbc12	

Resources referenced (1) Info

Resource type	Resource name	AWS Config resource timeline
AWS::EC2::Instance	i-09045f7810baeee96 ↗	Enable AWS Config resource recording ↗

After identifying the compromised access key, proceed to the IAM Console and find the user that has the exposed credentials. You could either **disable the exposed credentials** or **delete the exposed access keys**.

Access keys

Use access keys to make secure REST or HTTP Query protocol requests to AWS service APIs. For your protection, you should never share your secret keys with anyone. As a best practice, we recommend frequent key rotation. [Learn more](#)

Create access key

Access key ID	Created	Last used	Status	
AKIA5JVP3LWRFCL30BAL	2020-08-18 13:34 UTC+0800	2020-09-17 17:55 UTC+0800 with dynamodb in ap-southeast-1	Active	<div>Make inactive</div> <div>✕</div>

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-for-activity/>
<https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/troubleshoot-iam-account-activity/>



Incident Response Using Amazon GuardDuty

Amazon GuardDuty is a regional service used for intelligent threat detection. It analyzes billions of events across your AWS account so you can enhance the security of your resources by quickly responding to malicious and suspicious behaviours.

Data sources

- VPC Flow logs
 - Analyzes network traffic happening on Elastic Network Interfaces (ENIs).
 - You **DO NOT have** to turn on the VPC flow logs to generate findings. GuardDuty uses an independent stream on the AWS backend.
- DNS Logs
 - GuardDuty captures DNS logs derived from queries made from EC2 instances to known suspicious domains.
 - GuardDuty access DNS logs through AWS DNS resolvers (e.g. Route 53). Like VPC Flow Logs, you don't have to use Route 53 to generate DNS based findings as GuardDuty uses an independent intern DNS resolver.
 - **DOES NOT WORK ON** 3rd Party DNS resolvers like OpenDNS, Google DNS, or Active Directory servers for domain servers.
- CloudTrail Events
 - View of the history of API calls made within your AWS Account and the user who made the call.

Finding Types

- **Backdoor** - indicates that your AWS resources are compromised and controlled by a command and control (C&C) server that is capable of doing malicious activities.
- **Behavior** - indicates that GuardDuty is detecting unusual activity patterns for a particular AWS resource.
- **Cryptocurrency** - indicates that GuardDuty is detecting a crypto mining-related activity in your AWS resource.
- **Pentest** - indicates that a penetration test is being carried out.



- **Persistence** - indicates that GuardDuty is detecting a principal in an AWS environment that is manifesting unusual behaviors.
- **Policy** - indicates that your AWS account is exhibiting behavior that goes against recommended security best practices.
- **PrivilegeEscalation** - indicates that a specific principal in your AWS environment is exhibiting behavior that can be indicative of a privilege escalation attack.
- **Recon** - indicates that there is an ongoing reconnaissance attack.
- **ResourceConsumption** - indicates when a principal in your AWS environment with no history of launching EC2 instances suddenly performs a RunInstances API action. This could be an indication of compromised IAM credentials.
- **Stealth** - indicates that an attack is attempting to hide its activities and tracks.
- **Trojan** - indicates a Trojan attack. A Trojan virus hides its real intentions by disguising itself as a harmless software, making it easy for users to trust and install it to their computers.
- **UnauthorizedAccess** - indicates that GuardDuty is detecting a suspicious activity pattern by an unauthorized individual.


Using GuardDuty to detect EC2 instances that connects to known command and control (C&C) server

Command and Control (C&C) Server is a popular networking scheme responsible for dealing malicious attacks such as Distributed Denial Of Service (DDOS), distributing malware that could mess up computer's registry entries, phishing attacks, or performing crypto mining without the user's consent.

C&C works by controlling a swarm of computers (usually called *botnets*) that perform unified, repeated harmful actions. Basically, they were built to search and destroy. They are similar to how zombies work; an infected computer infects another computer via malware.

As technology progresses, malware attacks also get smarter, which is harder to detect and deal with. It is only reasonable to leverage high-end security tools such as GuardDuty, which is easier to manage than provisioning your own "detector."


Let's say that you're managing a fleet of EC2 instances. The majority of them are infected by a malware that consumes all of your CPU workloads to participate in crypto mining without you knowing. This is a high-level security threat because it could disrupt your service that can lead to financial losses.



Enable GuardDuty to prepare your IT environment for this kind of scenario. With just one click, GuardDuty will continually monitor your AWS environment and report any findings to the AWS Console. Like the security assessment tools that we've discussed, GuardDuty can also be integrated with CloudWatch Events to automate the response to an incident.

You could automate the sending of alerts to your security team or trigger a Lambda Function to programmatically isolate the affected instances.

There are also cases when you want to identify false alarms when you're conducting internal security tests. You can achieve that by optionally adding a **suppression rule** that will filter new findings that match the filter criteria defined in the rule. The findings are automatically archived.



Findings 0 0 0

Actions Suppress Findings Create and save a suppression rule to automatically archive findings. Saved rules: No saved rules

Current Instance tag key: server Instance tag value: Pasig Add filter criteria ×

Suppression Rule
Enter filter criteria above. Resulting findings are shown in the table below. Choose "Save" to create the suppression rule, which automatically sends matched findings to archive.

Name

Description

Auto-archived findings are still generated. They are sent to archive and do not generate a Cloudwatch event.
[Learn about best practices for suppression rules](#)

Cancel Save

You can whitelist IP addresses using the suppression rule, but to further simplify the process, GuardDuty provides a feature where you can define a list of Trusted IP addresses and Threat lists.

Trusted IP lists refer to the list of whitelisted IP addresses. GuardDuty does not generate reports against activities that originate from the Trusted IP lists. You can only upload one trusted IP list per account per region.

Threat lists refer to the list of IP addresses that are known for exhibiting malicious behaviors. GuardDuty produces findings based on threat lists. You can upload six threat lists per account per region.



Trusted IP lists

Trusted IP lists consist of IP addresses that are trusted for secure communication with your AWS environment. GuardDuty does not generate findings for IP addresses that are included in trusted IP lists. [Learn more](#)

+ Add a trusted IP list

List name	List file URL	Format	Active
-----------	---------------	--------	--------



Trusted IP lists

Trusted IP lists consist of IP addresses that are trusted for secure communication with your AWS environment. GuardDuty does not generate findings for IP addresses that are included in trusted IP lists. [Learn more](#)

Threat lists

Threat lists consist of known malicious IP addresses. GuardDuty generates findings for IP addresses that are included in threat lists. [Learn more](#)

+ Add a threat list

List name	List file URL	Format	Active
-----------	---------------	--------	--------



Threat lists

Threat lists consist of known malicious IP addresses. GuardDuty generates findings for IP addresses that are included in threat lists. [Learn more](#)

References:

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/guardduty_finding-types-active.html
https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/guardduty_findings_cloudwatch.html
https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/findings_suppression-rule.html



AWS Personal Health Dashboard

AWS Personal Health Dashboard (PHD) offers a personalized view of the “health” of the AWS resources that you use to run applications. The health of your resources refers to their performance and availability. It gives you alerts and remediation guidance when AWS is experiencing events that could impact your AWS resources.

The **Personal Health Dashboard**, powered by the AWS Health API, is available to all customers. The dashboard requires no setup, and it is ready to use for authenticated AWS users. The Personal Health Dashboard organizes issues in three groups:

- Open issues - restricted to issues where the start time is within the last seven days.
- Scheduled changes - contains items that are ongoing or upcoming.
- Other notifications - restricted to issues where the start time is within the last seven days.

How is it different from Trusted Advisor?

Short Answer:

PHD monitors AWS resources (the cause of the issue is AWS' fault) while Trusted Advisor monitors your AWS environment (the cause of the issue is your fault).

Long Answer:

Have you ever experienced running into a problem with one of the AWS services, and you can't figure it out? Everything was working fine before, and all of your configuration settings are unchanged. Then, out of the blue, unexpected behavior of an AWS service suddenly occurs, which causes operational issues. And you start debugging, continually finding the root cause of the problem. You may never find it because it's highly likely that the problem comes from AWS's underlying infrastructure that you no longer have control over. It means that there is a high chance that other customers are experiencing the same issue as you.


This is where PHD can help you. Instead of wasting time debugging an issue that you have no control over, PHD can notify you and provide instructions that you can follow to alleviate the situation.

Trusted Advisor, on the other hand, analyzes your AWS environment and gives best practice recommendations. Trusted Advisor just monitors the AWS resources within your domain. It means that issues that may arise are unique to your account, and it is solely your responsibility to solve them.

Adding Alerts For Security Notifications

Like other security assessment tools that we have discussed, we can integrate Personal Health Dashboard into Amazon CloudWatch Events to automate our incident response plan.

You can view security issues that may come up, which could affect your resources in the Personal Health Dashboard. Here is an example of a security notification regarding TLS requirements on FIPS endpoints. You can also view the affected resources on the dashboard.



The screenshot shows the AWS Event Log interface. At the top, there's a filter for 'Event category: Notification'. Below this is a table with columns: Event, Status, Region/AZ, Start time, Last update time, Affected resources, and Event category. The table lists three events: 'Trustedadvisor operational ...', 'ElasticContainerService ope...', and 'Security notification'. The 'Security notification' event is selected, and its details are shown below. The details include a message about TLS requirements on FIPS endpoints, stating that AWS is updating all AWS Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) endpoints to Transport Layer Security (TLS) version 1.2 by March 31, 2021.


Event	Status	Region/AZ	Start time	Last update time	Affected resources	Event category
Trustedadvisor operational ...	-	-	September 17, 2020 at 10...	September 17, 2020 at 11...	1 entity	Notification
ElasticContainerService ope...	-	-	August 21, 2020 at 11:05...	August 21, 2020 at 11:32...	1 entity	Notification
Security notification	-	-	August 19, 2020 at 9:30:4...	August 20, 2020 at 6:44:0...	-	Notification

Security notification

This is the second notice regarding TLS requirements on FIPS endpoints.

We are in the process of updating all AWS Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) endpoints across all AWS regions to Transport Layer Security (TLS) version 1.2 by March 31, 2021. In order to avoid an interruption in service, we encourage you to act now, by ensuring that you connect to AWS FIPS endpoints at a TLS version of 1.2. If your client applications fail to support TLS 1.2 it will result in connection failures when TLS versions below 1.2 are no longer supported.

We don't have to check the dashboard every now and then to get information regarding a security issue. We can automate the notification process by setting an event rule that matches the event type and event code of interest. On the target, we choose an SNS Topic to which CloudWatch Event will deliver the information details regarding an event. SNS sends notifications if a security notification occurs.



The screenshot shows the AWS CloudWatch Event Rule configuration interface. On the left, the 'Event Source' section is configured with 'Event Pattern' selected. The 'Build event pattern to match events by service' dropdown is set to 'Health'. The 'Service Name' is 'Health', and the 'Event Type' is 'Specific Health events'. Below this, the 'Any service' radio button is selected, and the 'Specific service(s)' dropdown is set to 'EC2'. The 'Any event type category' radio button is selected, and the 'Specific event type category(s)' dropdown is set to 'accountNotification'. The 'Any event type code' radio button is selected, and the 'Specific event type code(s)' dropdown is set to 'AWS_EC2_SECURITY_NOTIFICATION'. On the right, the 'Targets' section is configured with 'SNS topic' selected as the target. The 'Topic*' dropdown is set to 'Select topic', and the 'Configure input' button is visible. The 'Add target*' button is also visible.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/technology/personal-health-dashboard/>
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/health/latest/ug/cloudwatch-events-health.html>

Using Amazon Inspector for Incident Management

Amazon Inspector is a service that can automatically assess your EC2 instances' network accessibility and the security state of your applications running on EC2 instances. Inspector uses *service-linked roles*, which are a unique type of IAM role that is linked directly to Amazon Inspector.

Features

- Inspector provides an engine that analyzes system and resource configuration and monitors activity to determine what an assessment target looks like, how it behaves, and its dependent components. The combination of this telemetry provides a complete picture of the assessment target and its potential security or compliance issues.
- Inspector incorporates a built-in library of rules and reports. These include checks against best practices, common compliance standards and vulnerabilities.

Two Types Of Assessments

Assessment Type	Assessments Performed	Inspector Agent	Pricing
Network	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Network Reachability Finds processes reachable on an instance's port (<i>If Inspector Agent is installed</i>) 	Optional	Based on monthly volume of Instance-assessments
Host	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Common vulnerabilities and exposure Center for Internet Security (CIS) Benchmarks Security best practices for Amazon Inspector 	Required	Based on monthly volume of Agent-assessments

Concepts

- Inspector Agent** - A software agent that you can install on all EC2 instances that are included in the assessment target, the security of which you want to evaluate with the Inspector.
- Assessment target** - A collection of AWS resources that needs inspection for potential security problems.



- **Assessment template** - A configuration that is used during your assessment run, which includes rules packages against which you want Inspector to evaluate your assessment target.
- **Assessment run** - The process of discovering potential security issues through the analysis of your assessment target's configuration and behavior against specified rules packages.
- **Finding** - A potential security issue discovered during the assessment run of the specified target.
- **Rule** - A security check performed during an assessment run. When a rule detects a potential security issue, Inspector generates a finding that describes the issue.
- **Rules package** - A collection of rules that corresponds to a security goal that you might have.
- **Telemetry** - EC2 instance data collected by Inspector during an assessment run and passed to the Inspector service for analysis.
- The telemetry data generated by the Inspector Agent during assessment runs is formatted in JSON files and delivered in near-real-time over TLS to Inspector where it is encrypted with a per-assessment-run ephemeral KMS-derived key and securely stored in an S3 bucket dedicated for the service.

Rules Packages and Rules

- **Rules** are used by Amazon Inspector as the baseline for running security assessments against your instance's configuration.



The screenshot displays the Amazon Inspector console for 'Assessment Runs'. The left sidebar shows navigation options: Dashboard, Assessment targets, Assessment templates, Assessment runs (selected), and Findings. The main content area shows a table of assessment runs. The first run is selected, and its details are shown below the table. A callout bubble points to the 'Rules packages' section, which lists: Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures-1.1, CIS Operating System Security Configuration Benchmarks-1.0, Network Reachability-1.1, and Security Best Practices-1.0. The bubble is labeled 'Security Assessments'.

- Rules are grouped together into several **rule packages**.
- Each rule has an assigned severity level

Severity Levels	Indication	Recommended Action
High	Extremely Urgent	Treat this as an emergency that needs immediate remediation
Medium	Somewhat Urgent	Fix the issue at the next possible opportunity (e.g. next update)
Low	Less urgent	You can fix the issue as part of your future updates.



- There is an additional severity level called *Informational*. This level simply highlights a security configuration detail of your assessment target. You can use this information to improve the security of your assessment target.
- The findings generated by **rules in the Network Reachability package** show whether your ports are reachable from the Internet through an Internet gateway, a VPC peering connection, or a VPN through a virtual gateway. These findings also highlight network configurations that allow for potentially malicious access, such as mismanaged security groups, ACLs, IGWs, and so on.

Assessment Reports

- A document that contains the result of an assessment run.
- You can view the following types of assessment reports:
 - **Findings report** - this report contains the following information:
 - Executive summary of the assessment
 - EC2 instances evaluated during the assessment run
 - Rules packages included in the assessment run
 - Detailed information about each finding, including all EC2 instances that had the finding
 - **Full report** - this report contains all the information that is included in a findings report, and additionally provides the list of rules that passed on all instances in the assessment target.

References:

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/inspector/latest/userguide/inspector_agents.html
https://docs.aws.amazon.com/inspector/latest/userguide/inspector_introduction.html



AWS Systems Manager Patch Manager

Importance Of Patching

Patches come in different forms. There are patches for applications that intend to fix performance bugs. There are patches that update your mobile phone's operating system, but most importantly, the reason behind patching is to resolve security vulnerabilities.

You may find software updates and patches annoying, but they should not be left unattended. Software vendors are constantly releasing patches in an effort to find security flaws in their product, which may affect millions of their customers. However, the decision to install the patch or not still depends on the customer's discretion.

Why Use Systems Manager Patch Manager?

Suppose you're working as a System Administrator or a Security Specialist who administers and troubleshoots security solutions. In that case, you have to ensure that the operating system where your application/service is running always has the most updated patch installed. The common theme of modern solutions is about automation. Why do all these mundane administrative tasks in a manual fashion if you can automate them?

Systems Manager Patch Manager can help you automate the process of patching your EC2 or on-premises instances. It enables you to scan instances for missing patches and apply them individually or to large groups of instances using EC2 instance tags. You can scan instances to see only a report of missing patches or check and automatically install all missing patches.

Patch Manager Concepts

- **Patch baselines**
 - Acts as rules for auto-approving patches within days of their release, as well as a list of approved and rejected patches. Basically, patch baselines define which patches are approved to be installed on your instances. Alternatively, you can create your own patch baselines for more control.
- **Patch groups**
 - Patch groups allow you to organize your instances for patching. You can create a patch group to separate instances with different operating systems or instances within different environments. This can be easily done by using EC2 tags.



- **Maintenance window**

- Set up recurring schedules for installing patches and updates without interrupting business-critical operations to your instances.

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/systems-manager-patch.html>

<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/mt/patching-your-windows-ec2-instances-using-aws-systems-manager-patch-manager/>

Securing Amazon EC2 Instances That Have Compromised SSH Private Keys

The most common way of connecting to EC2 instances from your computer is via the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol. SSH is a secure login protocol for controlling remote computers. It is the de-facto standard for securing a connection between two computers for remote administration.

SSH uses public-key cryptography (also called asymmetric cryptography) to encrypt and decrypt login information. Public key cryptography uses a public key to encrypt data, and then the recipient uses the private key for decryption. The public and private keys are known as a *key pair*. Public key cryptography enables you to securely access your instances using a private key instead of a password.

When you launch an EC2 instance, you are required to provide a key pair name (you can create one if you don't have an existing key pair yet, or if you want to make a new one). Only the public key is stored in the EC2 instance. The private key is saved to your local computer. Anyone who can get a hold of your keys can decrypt your login information and connect to your instance. It would be best if you kept the private keys securely by restricting other users from accessing it.

Select an existing key pair or create a new key pair

A key pair consists of a **public key** that AWS stores, and a **private key file** that you store. Together, they allow you to connect to your instance securely. For Windows AMIs, the private key file is required to obtain the password used to log into your instance. For Linux AMIs, the private key file allows you to securely SSH into your instance.

Note: The selected key pair will be added to the set of keys authorized for this instance. Learn more about [removing existing key pairs from a public AMI](#).

Create a new key pair

Key pair name
quickstartkeypair

Download Key Pair

You have to download the **private key file** (*.pem file) before you can continue.
Store it in a secure and accessible location. You will not be able to download the file again after it's created.

Cancel
Launch Instances




When connecting to an EC2 instance, you must specify a key pair along with the instance's hostname. At boot time, the public key content is placed on your Linux instance in an entry within `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`. When you connect to your instance using SSH, you must specify the private key that corresponds to the public key content to log in.

You can never recover a private key once you lose it. This could present a serious security issue to your managed instances. Let's say that the laptop that you use for managing multiple EC2 instances is stolen/lost. The person who stole your computer will be able to connect and do anything he likes to your instances. You might be thinking, *"I could just shut the instances down and create a new one with a new key pair."* That is possible but imagine hosting an application in a production environment or across multiple instances that can't afford downtime. That approach is not feasible.

A better solution is to use AWS Systems Manager Run Command to protect your running instances by removing all public keys (associated with the compromised SSH private keys) stored in the `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` file of all affected EC2 instances. AWS Systems Manager Run Command lets you remotely and securely manage your instances' configuration without opening an inbound port in your security group's rule.

You can use the Run Command using the AWS console, the AWS Command Line Interface, AWS Tools for Windows PowerShell, or the AWS SDKs.

Below is an image of the Run Command from the AWS Console. Here, it is used to update the software packages of an instance.



Command parameters

Description
Run a shell script or specify the commands to run.

Commands
(Required) Specify a shell script or a command to run.

```
1 sudo yum update -y
```

Working Directory
(Optional) The path to the working directory on your instance.

Execution Timeout
(Optional) The time in seconds for a command to complete before it is considered to have failed. Default is 3600 (1 hour). Maximum is 172800 (48 hours).

3600

Security Specialty Exam Notes:


AWS Systems Manager Run Command doesn't require a key pair when connecting to an instance. You just need to associate an IAM role that will give Systems Manager permission to perform actions on your instances. With this, you would still be able to login and recover a compromised EC2 instance.

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-key-pairs.html>
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/replacing-lost-key-pair.html>
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/execute-remote-commands.html>

AWS Artifact Security Reports and AWS Compliance-Related Information

AWS Artifact is a self-service central repository of AWS' security and compliance reports and select online agreements. The security and compliance documents are called audit artifacts. An audit artifact is a piece of evidence that demonstrates that an organization is following a documented process or meeting a specific requirement (business compliant).



Security, Identity, Compliance

AWS Artifact

Compliance and security in the AWS Cloud

No cost, self-service portal for on-demand access to AWS compliance reports and for entering into select online agreements.

Get started with AWS Artifact

Browse and download reports, and accept agreements with AWS Artifact.


View reports

View agreements

AWS Artifact Reports contain several compliance reports that are tested and verified by third-party auditors. It includes ISO, Service Organization Control (SOC) reports, Payment Card Industry (PCI) reports, and certifications that approve the execution and efficacy of AWS security controls.

To download a report, you can go to the AWS Artifact dashboard and click on view reports.

1. Select a report title and click on the **Download Report**.



AWS Artifact > Reports

Reports Info

Reports (66)

Copy link Download report

Search reports

Title	Reporting period	Description
ABS Cloud Computing Implementation Guide 2.0 - Workbook	June 30, 2020 to current	The ABS Cloud Computing Implementation Guide 2.0 - Workbook provides supporting details and references to assist organizations when adopting ABS Cloud Computing Implementation Guide 2.0 - Workbook for their workloads on AWS.

2. Read and agree to all the terms of the NDA and click the download button.



Accept NDA to download report

This confidential document is subject to the terms of the AWS Artifact Nondisclosure Agreement (AWS Artifact NDA). You must agree to the terms by checking the box at the end of this document before you can download the selected artifact.

The AWS Artifact NDA is not intended to replace any other NDA between you and Amazon. If you have a separate NDA with Amazon that applies to the information provided in AWS Artifact, then that separate NDA will apply instead of the AWS Artifact NDA (see Section 11 of the Artifact NDA).

AWS Artifact Nondisclosure Agreement
This AWS Artifact Nondisclosure Agreement (this "Agreement") is entered into by you or the entity you represent ("You") for the benefit of Amazon.com, Inc. and its Affiliates including Amazon Web Services, Inc. ("AWS" and collectively, "Amazon"). **If you have entered into a separate nondisclosure agreement with Amazon that covers at least the same confidential information covered by Artifact Confidential Information (as defined in this Agreement), then that separate nondisclosure agreement will apply instead of this Agreement (see Section 11 below).**

In connection with Customer's provision or acquisition of products, services, or content to or from Amazon, Customer may receive information on Amazon's operations and businesses through the AWS online audit and compliance portal currently referred to as AWS Artifact, or any successor service offered by Amazon (collectively, "AWS Artifact").

Customer and Amazon agree as follows:

- Artifact Confidential Information.** "Artifact Confidential Information" means all information made available through AWS Artifact, and related information, which is disclosed by Amazon, its Affiliates, or agents of Amazon or its Affiliates on the one hand, to You, your Affiliates, or agents of You or your Affiliates (collectively, "Customer") on the other hand, and that is designated as confidential or that, given the nature of the information or the circumstances surrounding its disclosure, reasonably should be considered as confidential, including without limitation all reports, agreement terms, and other information that AWS discloses to you through AWS Artifact. "Affiliate" means, with respect to any entity, any other entity that directly or indirectly controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, that entity.
- Exclusions.** Artifact Confidential Information excludes information that (i) is or becomes publicly available without breach of this Agreement, (ii) can be shown by documentation to have been known to Customer at the time of its receipt from Amazon, (iii) is disclosed to Customer from any third party who did not acquire or disclose such information by a wrongful or tortious act, or (iv) can be shown by documentation to have been independently developed by Customer without reference to any Artifact Confidential Information.
- Use of Artifact Confidential Information.** Customer may use Artifact Confidential Information only in connection with Customer's use of the Service Offerings as permitted under the AWS Customer Agreement, available at <http://aws.amazon.com/agreement> (as updated from time to time) or other agreement between Customer and AWS governing Customer's use of the Service Offerings (collectively, the "Customer Agreement"). The term

Print NDA

Cancel

Accept NDA and download

3. To open the downloaded report, you can use a PDF reader.

AWS Artifact Agreements allow you to review, accept, and manage agreements in your personal AWS account and all the accounts that are part of AWS Organizations. If you no longer need the accepted agreement, you can terminate it in the account agreements section.

- **Account Agreements** apply only to the individual account you used to sign into AWS.
- **Organization Agreements** apply to all accounts in an organization created through AWS Organizations, including its master account and all member accounts. Only the master account in an organization can accept agreements in AWS Artifact Organization Agreements.

Agreements Info

Account agreements

Organization agreements

Account agreements (1/3)

Download agreement

Terminate agreement

Accept agreement

Q Search agreements

< 1 > ⌕

Title	Status	Effective start	Description
<div><div></div><div>AWS Australian Notifiable Data Breach Addendum</div></div>	Inactive	-	The AWS Australian Notifiable Data Breach Addendum (AWS ANDB Addendum) is an agreement between you and AWS regarding your use of AWS Services to process personal information of Australian individuals. It is an addendum to the AWS Customer Agreement, or other agreement between you and AWS governing your use of AWS Services under this AWS account. The terms of the AWS ANDB Addendum are confidential and subject to the terms of the AWS Artifact NDA. IMPORTANT: This AWS ANDB Addendum is specific to this AWS account, and upon acceptance will apply only to this AWS account. If you have multiple AWS accounts and intend to include personal information in any other AWS accounts, you MUST log in to AWS Artifact under each of those AWS accounts individually and accept a separate AWS ANDB Addendum before using them in connection with personal information.




References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/artifact/latest/ug/downloading-documents.html>

<https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/access-artifact-soc-reports/>

AWS Abuse

AWS Abuse sends reports to customers about potentially abusive activities that are going on in their AWS environment.



The screenshot shows the AWS Abuse dashboard. On the left, there's a sidebar with 'Personal', 'Health', 'Dashboard', and 'Event log'. The main area is titled 'Dashboard' and shows '1 Open issues' (Past 7 days), '0 Scheduled changes', and '0 Other notifications' (Past 7 days). Below this, it says 'Issues that might affect your AWS infrastructure. 3 issues were resolved in the past 24 hours.' and provides a link to 'See all issues'. A table lists the issues:

Event	Region...	Start time	Last update time	Affected res
Abuse copyright dmca ...	-	August 27, 2018 at 1:...	August 27, 2018 at 1:...	1 entity

On the right, the 'Abuse copyright dmca report' is displayed. It includes a 'Details' tab and an 'Affected resources' tab. The 'Details' tab shows the report date and time (Aug 27, 08:57 PM UTC) and a message: '[URGENT: RESPONSE REQUIRED WITHIN 24 HOURS or your resources may be suspended]'. It states that a notice has been received regarding potentially infringing content and provides instructions on how to respond, including a link to the 'Affected resources' tab. The 'Affected resources' tab lists the resources affected by the report.

The AWS Abuse team can assist you when AWS resources are used to engage in the following types of abusive behavior:

- Spam
- Port scanning
- Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks
- Intrusion attempts
- Hosting objectionable or copyrighted content
- Distributing malware

Response in AWS Abuse Notice

Note that AWS takes security seriously that if you fail to respond to an abuse notice, AWS might block your resources, or your account may get suspended.

The AWS Abuse Team will send abuse reports to your security contact (if there were any) or to the email address listed on your account.



Do the following if you receive an abuse notice:

1. Review the abuse notice and determine what type of abusive behavior was reported.
2. Reply directly to the email you received from the abuse team. Your message must contain the preventive measures that you're taking to avert the abusive activity from recurring.
3. Closely monitor your email address for incoming messages as the AWS Abuse Team might ask you for additional information.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/aws-abuse-report/>

<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/mt/automating-processes-for-handling-and-remediating-aws-abuse-alerts/>



Domain 2: Logging and Monitoring



Overview

The second domain of the AWS Certified Security Specialty exam focuses on the topics related to logging and monitoring management in AWS. To be an effective AWS Security Specialist, it is important that you understand these key concepts. Roughly 20% of questions in the actual Security Specialty exam revolves around these topics.

This domain will challenge your know-how in doing the following:

- Design and implement security monitoring and alerting.
- Troubleshoot security monitoring and alerting.
- Design and implement a logging solution.
- Troubleshoot logging solutions.

In this chapter, we will cover all of the related topics for logging and monitoring management in AWS that will likely show up in your Security Specialty exam.



Logging and Monitoring Services in AWS

Related but not similar — logging and monitoring are techniques implemented to achieve a common goal. They work hand in hand to ensure the system's performance baselines and security guidelines are always met.

Logging refers to recording and storing of data events as log files. Logs contain low-level details that can give you complete visibility of how your application or system performs under certain circumstances. From a security standpoint, logging helps security admins identify red flags easily overlooked in their system.

Monitoring is the process of analyzing and collecting data to ensure optimal performance is always in effect, unauthorized access is detected, and your services' usage is always aligned with organizational security policies.

Amazon CloudWatch is the primary logging and monitoring solution in AWS. It gives you system-wide visibility to your AWS resources and applications by monitoring *aws built-in* and *custom metrics*. These metrics give you insights to the operational health of your resources and how they are being used. You can create alarms, send notifications, or automatically make changes to the resources you are monitoring when a threshold is breached.

Basic CloudWatch Concepts:

- **CloudWatch Dashboard**
 - You can create customized dashboards to visualize and monitor the metric information of your resources.
 - All dashboards are **global**, not region-specific.
 - You can add, remove, resize, move, edit, or rename a graph. You can plot metrics manually in a graph.
- **CloudWatch Events**
 - Deliver near real-time stream of system events that describe changes in AWS resources.
 - Events respond to these operational changes and take corrective action as necessary, by sending messages to respond to the environment, activating functions, making changes, and capturing state information.
 - Concepts



- **Events** - indicates a change in your AWS environment.
- **Targets** - processes events.
- **Rules** - matches incoming events and routes them to targets for processing.
- **CloudWatch Logs**
 - Features
 - Monitor logs from EC2 instances in real-time
 - Monitor CloudTrail logged events
 - By default, logs are kept indefinitely and never expire
 - Archive log data
 - Log Route 53 DNS queries
 - **CloudWatch Logs Insights** enables you to interactively search and analyze your log data in CloudWatch Logs using queries.
 - After the CloudWatch Logs agent begins publishing log data to Amazon CloudWatch, you can search and filter the log data by creating one or more metric filters. **Metric filters** define the terms and patterns to look for in log data as it is sent to CloudWatch Logs.
- **CloudWatch Agent**
 - Collect more logs and system-level metrics (e.g., memory consumption, number of TCP connections) from EC2 instances and your on-premises servers.
 - Needs to be installed.
- **Authentication and Access Control**
 - Use IAM users or roles for authenticating who can access
 - Use Dashboard Permissions, IAM identity-based policies, and service-linked roles for managing access control.
 - A *permissions policy* describes who has access to what.
 - Identity-Based Policies
 - Resource-Based Policies



- There are no CloudWatch Amazon Resource Names (ARNs) for you to use in an IAM policy. Use an * (asterisk) instead as the resource when writing a policy to control access to CloudWatch actions.

Troubleshooting

- If your EC2 instance is not sending or stops sending logs, you can log in to that instance and check if the agent is still running.
- The CloudWatch agent sends data to the CloudWatch logs over the public Internet by default. When using CloudWatch agent, verify if your EC2 instance has route access to the Internet gateway/NAT gateway.
- Make sure that the IAM permissions used by the CloudWatch Logs agent allow putting log events as well as creating log groups and log streams in CloudWatch.
- If you don't see any CloudWatch logs after executing a Lambda Function, make sure its execution role has permissions to write log data to CloudWatch Logs.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/cloudwatch/faqs/>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudWatch/latest/monitoring/troubleshooting-CloudWatch-Agent.html>



AWS CloudTrail

AWS CloudTrail is also a monitoring tool. But instead of AWS resources, it records API activities that occur in your AWS account. CloudTrail delivers one free copy of management event logs for each AWS region.

CloudTrail Concepts

Events is the record of activity in an AWS account. This activity can be an action taken by a user, role, or service that is monitorable by CloudTrail.

There are three types of events that you can record:

- **Management events** (*control plane operations*) - events that include management operations that have occurred within your AWS account, such as user logins. Management events are enabled by default
- **Data events** (*data plane operations*) - events that include resource operations performed on or within the resource itself, such as *S3 object-level API activity* or *Lambda function execution activity*. Logging data events are charged and therefore, disabled by default.
- **Insights events** - events that include unusual activity and user behavior in your account.

Log Analysis of CloudTrail Logs

Event History


Even without creating a trail, you can still view the history of API activities in your account. You can view events in **Event History** to gain immediate visibility to API activities that occur in your AWS account in the past 90 days. Searching and downloading of event records is also possible.

If you have a high API activity in a day, the number of CloudTrail events can be overwhelming. It would be difficult to look for specific events that may be helpful in troubleshooting a security incident.

In that case, you may use the event filter definitions to only view particular events (in Event history) that you're interested in:

- **Read-only events** refer to API operations that read resources. Read operations are operations that don't cause modifications to a resource. Examples of these events are Amazon S3 *ListBuckets* and Amazon CloudWatch Logs *DescribeMetricsFilters* API actions.

In the CloudTrail console, set the value of Read-only events to “true” to view Read-only events.



Event history (150+) Info


Read-only ▼ Q true X

30m 1h 3h 12h Custom

☐	Event name	Event time	User name	Event source
☐	ListBuckets	October 08, 2020, 19:...	tutorialsdojo	s3.amazonaws.com

- **Write-only events** refers to API operations that modify or may modify resources in your account. Examples are Amazon S3 *DeleteBucket* and Amazon EC2 *TerminateInstances* API operations.

To enable write-only events, set the value of Read-only to “false”.



Event history (100+) Info

Read-only ▼ Q false X

30m 1h 3h 12h Custom

☐	Event name	Event time	User name	Event source
☐	DeleteBucket	October 05, 2020, 13:...	tutorialsdojo	s3.amazonaws.com

CloudWatch Logs

CloudTrail sends logs to an S3 bucket of your choice by default, however, you can configure a trail to send logs to CloudWatch Logs to monitor log data. CloudTrail events that are sent to CloudWatch Logs can trigger alarms according to the metric filters you define.

Amazon Athena

Amazon Athena is an interactive query service that makes it easy for you to analyze data stored in an S3 bucket using SQL commands. Since CloudTrail keeps its logs to an S3 bucket, we can leverage Athena to perform analysis on our CloudTrail logs. You no longer have to download the log files on a machine and analyze them through a third party log analysis tool. Athena is serverless and is very easy to set up.



Log File Validation

File integrity validation is an important step in fortifying your security posture. It protects your system against data tampering or the altering/modifying/editing of data without authorization. Without file validation, you're inviting possible intrusions that could cause serious damage to your business/application.

CloudTrail makes it easy for us to protect the authenticity of log files with its feature: Log File Validation. CloudTrail uses SHA-256 for hashing and SHA-256 with RSA for digital signing, making data tampering virtually impossible (even with modern computers) to execute.

Log File Validation is enabled by default when you create a CloudTrail trail.

The screenshot shows the 'Additional settings' section of the AWS CloudTrail console. It contains two settings: 'Log file validation' which is set to 'Enabled' with a blue checkmark, and 'SNS notification delivery' which is set to 'Enabled' with an unchecked checkbox. Both settings have an 'Info' link next to them.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/cloudtrail/faqs/>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awsccloudtrail/latest/userguide/logging-management-events-with-cloudtrail.html>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awsccloudtrail/latest/userguide/monitor-cloudtrail-log-files-with-cloudwatch-logs.html>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/athena/latest/ug/cloudtrail-logs.html>



Central Logging Using AWS CloudTrail

Imagine auditing different accounts that have resources in different AWS regions. Auditing API activities in CloudTrail would be time consuming and complex. One would have to log into each account for each region for who knows how many times. This approach doesn't really scale well especially in big organizations. As it turns out, we can configure CloudTrail to enable us to analyze log files from a central location.


Multi-Region Trail

You can aggregate all log files from different regions into a single bucket using the multi-region trail feature. This feature is automatically enabled when you create a trail on the CloudTrail console. You can also change an existing single-region trail into multi-region by appending the `--is-multi-region-trail` parameter in the `update-trail` command.

```
aws cloudtrail update-trail --name main-trail --is-multi-region-trail
```

Multiple Accounts

Aside from multi-region, CloudTrail is also capable of accepting log files in a single S3 bucket from different accounts. Let's say you have three accounts: *main account*, *DevOps*, and *Security*. Each account has CloudTrail enabled, which generates a considerable amount of API event logs. Instead of analyzing log files separately, you can deliver the DevOps and Security account logs to the main account's bucket. This way, log analysis would be more manageable.



To enable logging from different accounts, you have to modify the default bucket policy that is created along with your trail (in the main account) upon its creation. As you can see on the sample bucket policy below, you must grant access to the DevOps and Security account by adding another S3 resource (should be the same S3 bucket that is used by the main account) with their respective account IDs. After which, head over to the DevOps account and re-configure its trail by selecting the main account's bucket for storing log files. Do the same with the Security Account.



```
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [{
    "Sid": "AWSCloudTrailAclCheck20150319",
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Principal": {
      "Service": "cloudtrail.amazonaws.com"
    },
    "Action": "s3:GetBucketAcl",
    "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::main-cloudtrail-tdojo"
  },
  {
    "Sid": "AWSCloudTrailWrite20150319",
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Principal": {
      "Service": "cloudtrail.amazonaws.com"
    },
    "Action": "s3:PutObject",
    "Resource": [
      "arn:aws:s3:::main-cloudtrail-tdojo/AWSLogs/111111111111/*",
      "arn:aws:s3:::main-cloudtrail-tdojo/AWSLogs/222222222222/*",
      "arn:aws:s3:::main-cloudtrail-tdojo/AWSLogs/333333333333/*"
    ],
    "Condition": {
      "StringEquals": {
        "s3:x-amz-acl": "bucket-owner-full-control"
      }
    }
  }
]
```

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/receive-cloudtrail-log-files-from-multiple-regions.html>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/create-s3-bucket-policy-for-cloudtrail.html>



Amazon CloudWatch Logs Agent Troubleshooting

Amazon CloudWatch Logs Agent (*awslogs agent*) is a service you can use to push log files from your EC2 instance to CloudWatch Logs. Using the *awslogs agent* is the older way of doing things. AWS recommends using the newer CloudWatch agent (*unified agent*), which is the successor of *awslogs* that offers more functionalities. Despite being old-fashioned, you still need to have an idea about the *awslogs agent* as it may appear on the exam.

You have to install the agent to your host before you can begin collecting log data. Since AWS has no control over your operating system, having a basic knowledge on troubleshooting issues that might occur is important.

Coming into the exam, most of the problems regarding troubleshooting that you'll encounter will involve three things: **Misconfiguration**, **Insufficient permissions**, **Connection problems**. So even if you can't exactly pinpoint the answer to an item, you would still be able to eliminate distractors as long as you remember these three things.

Misconfiguration

- Open the *awslogs* log file on `/var/log/awslogs.log`. Check for the following errors:
 - **NocredentialsError**
 - Make sure you attach an IAM role to your EC2 instance.
 - Alternatively, you can update the IAM user credentials in the `/etc/awslogs/awscli.conf` file.
 - **AccessDeniedError**
 - Ensure that you have the right permissions for CloudWatch Logs.
- Check if your OS log rotation rules are supported.
- Check for duplicates in the `[logstream]` section of the agent configuration file.

Insufficient Permissions

- Check if you have the required permissions for the instance's IAM role:
 - **logs:CreateLogGroup** - creates a log group that contains the log stream.
 - **logs:CreateLogStream** - creates a log stream. The log stream is the sequence of log events generated from a resource.



- `logs:PutLogEvents` - uploads a batch of log events to the log stream.
- `logs:DescribeLogStreams` - this operation lists all the log streams for a particular log group.

Connection Problems

- Check your security group and network access control list's configuration and verify if it has access to the public Internet.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/push-log-data-cloudwatch-awslogs/>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudWatch/latest/logs/UsePreviousCloudWatchLogsAgent.html>



Central Log Collection using CloudWatch Logs

In an on-premises setup, keeping log files in one place runs the risk of losing them. AWS helps alleviate this risk. Instead of just using your local disk for storing log data, you can offload some or all of them to a cloud-based storage solution, which is far more durable and scalable. In CloudWatch Logs, you don't have to worry about setting up and maintaining an EBS or an S3 bucket to achieve this as it uses Amazon S3 as its storage internally.

CloudWatch Logs enables you to collect log data from multiple sources and access them in a central location. The log files are not dumped as it is. They are systematically organized using CloudWatch's grouping convention. CloudWatch Logs uses the concept of *log groups* and *log streams* to compartmentalize log files conveniently. You choose the retention policy of your log data. By default, the retention setting is set to "never expire." But you can expire log data in 24 hours up to 10 years.

Effective Application Logging using CloudWatch Logs:

- **Unified CloudWatch Agent**
 - The Unified CloudWatch agent is basically a program for collecting system-level metrics and logs from your EC2 instances and on-premises servers. The code for the CloudWatch agent is open-source and under MIT license.
 - AWS recommends using the Unified CloudWatch agent over awslogs agent or traditional shell scripts.
 - If you're hosting the agent on an on-premises server, you must configure that server to use an IAM user with programmatic access (access key & secret access). Make sure your IAM user has the correct CloudWatch Logs permissions.
 - Unified CloudWatch agents can retrieve custom metrics from your applications using the *StatsD* and *collectd* protocols.
 - You need to have permission to use the ***cloudwatch:putMetricData*** operation to publish metrics to Amazon CloudWatch.
- **Using CloudWatch Logs to view streaming logs**
 - Instead of using the "tail -f" command in your computer to print new lines in your log file as they get added, you'll get more when you view the streaming of log events on the CloudWatch Logs dashboard.



- Viewing logs on CloudWatch Logs enables you to perform interactive queries and analysis on log events through CloudWatch Logs Insights.

- **Log Rotation**

- Log rotation is the process of modifying or moving an existing log file to a new file. This approach makes processing of log files more manageable and can help save disk space.
- CloudWatch Logs supports the following log rotation rules:
 - Renaming of existing logs with a numerical suffix then re-creating the original empty log file. For example, changing the name of the log file `syslog.log` to `syslog.log.1`.
 - Creating a new log file with the same pattern as the original file. For example, changing the name of the log file `syslog.log.2020-11-01` to `syslog.log.2020-11-02`.
 - Trimming the original log by copying its contents to a new file. This is not recommended as it may introduce data loss.

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudWatch/latest/monitoring/Install-CloudWatch-Agent.html>
<https://aws.amazon.com/cloudwatch/faqs/>
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudWatch/latest/logs/WhatIsCloudWatchLogs.html>

Using CloudWatch Metric Filter When Too Many Unauthorized AWS API Requests are Identified

We know that AWS CloudTrail monitors API calls that are being made within our account. Sure we can view who made the call and when it was made, but how can we know if a service is being spammed? Suppose we want to be alerted when a high volume of unauthorized API requests occurs — how do we do that?

CloudTrail delivers trail logs to an S3 bucket by default, but we can optionally configure CloudWatch Logs to monitor our trail logs so we can create an alarm when a certain activity happens.

CloudWatch Logs - optional

Configure CloudWatch Logs to monitor your trail logs and notify you when specific activity occurs. Standard CloudWatch and CloudWatch Logs charges apply. [Learn more](#)

CloudWatch Logs [Info](#)

☐ Enabled

► [Policy document](#)

First, you must create a CloudWatch metric filter. The metric filter will search for the match terms, phrases, and values in your log events. In our case, we want CloudWatch to alarm when it detects a high number of unauthorized requests.

Define pattern

Create filter pattern

You can use metric filters to monitor events in a log group as they are sent to CloudWatch Logs. You can monitor and count specific terms or extract values from log events and associate the results with a metric. [Learn more about pattern syntax.](#)

Filter pattern


Specify the terms or pattern to match in your log events to create metrics.

{ (\$.errorCode = "*UnauthorizedOperation") || (\$.errorCode = "AccessDenied*")}

This filter pattern simply tells CloudWatch to detect error codes with an *UnauthorizedOperation* or *AccessDenied* error.

We said earlier that we could configure CloudWatch to alarm whenever a high number of unauthorized requests occurs, but there's no built in feature in CloudWatch that will intelligently tell us if a certain number is deemed "high". So it means that the number is subjective and it has to depend on your input.

You can set a **threshold value**, which refers to the maximum number that must be breached for the alarm to go into the alarm state.



Conditions

Threshold type

☒ Static
Use a value as a threshold

☐ Anomaly detection
Use a band as a threshold

Whenever AuthorizationFailureCount is...
Define the alarm condition.

☒ Greater
> threshold

☐ Greater/Equal
>= threshold

☐ Lower/Equal
≤ threshold

☐ Lower
< threshold

than...

Define the threshold value.

10000

Must be a number

► Additional configuration

Cancel Next

You could choose to trigger an SNS topic to notify you or your security team when an alarm state is in action.

Monitoring security group where the inbound rule is frequently updated

There are also cases when you want to monitor a security group where the inbound rule is always being updated and could be a security risk.

You can create a CloudWatch Alarm that is triggered when configuration changes that involve security groups happen. Below are the Security Group API call event types that you can add in the Filter Pattern of your CloudWatch Alarm:

- *CreateSecurityGroup* - Create a Security Group
- *DeleteSecurityGroup* - Delete a Security Group



- *AuthorizeSecurityGroupEgress* - Add an Outbound Rule
- *AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress* - Add an Inbound Rule
- *RevokeSecurityGroupEgress* - Remove an Outbound Rule
- *RevokeSecurityGroupIngress* - Remove an Inbound Rule

In this case, our point of interest is the security group's inbound rule. Again, we need to define a metric filter.

First, we need to ensure that the Filter Pattern includes the *AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress* event in CloudWatch Alarm.

Create filter pattern

You can use metric filters to monitor events in a log group as they are sent to CloudWatch Logs. You can monitor and count specific terms or extract values from log events and associate the results with a metric. [Learn more about pattern syntax.](#)

Filter pattern

Specify the terms or pattern to match in your log events to create metrics.

X

After that, we need to set the metric to 1 so we'll be notified immediately whenever a security group inbound rule changes.



Metric details

Metric namespace
Namespaces let you group similar metrics. [Learn more](#)

☒ Create new

Namespaces can be up to 255 characters long; all characters are valid except for colon(:), asterisk(*), dollar(\$), and space().

Metric name
Metric name identifies this metric, and must be unique within the namespace. [Learn more](#)

Metric name can be up to 255 characters long; all characters are valid except for colon(:), asterisk(*), dollar(\$), and space().

Metric value
Metric value is the value published to the metric name when a Filter Pattern match occurs.

Valid metric values are: floating point number (1, 99.9, etc.), numeric field identifiers (\$1, \$2, etc.), or named field identifiers (e.g. \$requestSize for delimited filter pattern or \$.status for JSON-based filter pattern - dollar (\$) or dollar dot (\$) followed by alphanumeric and/or underscore (_) characters).

Default value – optional
The default value is published to the metric when the pattern does not match. If you leave this blank, no value is published when there is no match. [Learn more](#)

Cancel

Previous

Next

Monitoring root account activities using the RootAccountUsage filter

Your root account has full access to all of its AWS resources. Unlike IAM users, you cannot disable or minimize the privilege access that comes with it. That is why AWS does not recommend logging with a root account for everyday use unless necessary. Changing account settings, changing of support plans, and restoring IAM permissions are some of the AWS activities that require root account access.

IAM best practices require you to enable MFA when signing to your root account. You can use Trusted Advisor to detect disabled MFA for root accounts. On top of that, you can also get notified whenever your root account is used to access AWS by using CloudTrail and CloudWatch Alarms.

We learned in section 2 that CloudTrail produces management events which includes IAM user and root user sign-in attempts. We use these events to trigger a CloudWatch Alarm. The method is similar to what we did in monitoring the security group inbound rule. You need to give permission to CloudWatch Logs to monitor your trail logs before creating a CloudWatch Alarm. This time, you have to input a different filter expression:



```
{ $.userIdentity.type = "Root" && $.userIdentity.invokedBy NOT EXISTS && $.eventType != "AwsServiceEvent" }
```

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awsccloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudwatch-alarms-for-cloudtrail.html#cloudwatch-alarms-for-cloudtrail-security-group>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awsccloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudwatch-alarms-for-cloudtrail.html#cloudwatch-alarms-for-cloudtrail-authorization-failures>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awsccloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudwatch-alarms-for-cloudtrail-additional-examples.html>



Amazon CloudWatch Managed Policies

A managed policy is a policy that is created and predefined by AWS for different services. This type of policy is intended for common use cases, so you don't have to write the policy from scratch. You can not modify the statements inside a managed policy. If managed policies do not support your application demands, you can create a customer-managed policy that you need to administer and write yourself.

Amazon CloudWatch has several managed policies, but you don't have to know them all. This section only covers the relevant policies that may appear in the actual exam.

Types

CloudWatchFullAccess - this type of managed policy allows the use of all CloudWatch operations. This should only be given to Administrators. This is not a good use case if you're strictly implementing the least privileged access for users in production.

CloudWatchReadOnlyAccess - this type of managed policy only allows read operations like getting metrics data or listing a dashboard's details. Any operations that don't modify configuration settings or data is under this policy.

CloudWatchActionsEC2Access - this type of managed policy gives read-only access to CloudWatch alarm and metrics. You can also view EC2 metadata and perform *stop*, *reboot*, and *terminate* to EC2 instances.

Reference:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudWatch/latest/monitoring/iam-identity-based-access-control-cw.html#managed-policies-cloudwatch>



Real-time Logging Using Kinesis Firehose and Elasticsearch

Amazon Kinesis Firehose is a fully managed service that allows you to load streaming data into data stores and analytics tools. It can batch, compress, and transform the data before sending it to its destination.

Security

- Kinesis Data Firehose provides you the option to have your data automatically encrypted after it is uploaded to the destination.
- Manage resource access with IAM.

Amazon Elasticsearch (Amazon ES) lets you search, analyze, and visualize your data in real-time. This service manages the capacity, scaling, patching, and administration of your Elasticsearch clusters for you, while still giving you direct access to the Elasticsearch APIs.


Security

- Amazon ES is **HIPAA eligible** and compliant with **PCI DSS, NOC and ISO** standards.
- You can securely connect your applications to your managed Elasticsearch environment from your VPC or via the public Internet, configuring network access using VPC security groups or IP-based access policies.
- Securely authenticate your users and control access using Amazon Cognito and AWS IAM.
- Has built-in encryption of data at-rest and in-transit to protect your data both when it is stored in your domain or in automated snapshots, and when it is transferred between nodes in your domain.

Web server logs like Apache logs generate log data in an unstructured raw format, making it difficult to extract valuable information. Oftentimes, these schemaless log files need to be converted in a form that is easier to understand. A structured format will improve indexing and searching of data, which is essential to log analysis.

If you need to set up a real-time logging solution, Amazon Kinesis Firehose and Amazon Elasticsearch are the way to go. These two services are both fully managed. It means that AWS abstracts all the operational workloads needed to maintain a server, allowing you to focus more on what is necessary for your application.

The architecture below illustrates the flow of data as it passes through Kinesis Firehose down to Elasticsearch.



A data source can be a web server, mobile device, or an IoT device. The data source continually pushes unstructured logs to the Kinesis Firehose. The log files ingested through the Kinesis Firehose are processed and transformed into a structured format (e.g., JSON, CSV) by a Lambda Function. After a successful data transformation, the new structured log file is delivered to Elasticsearch. If something terrible happens to the delivery process, Kinesis Firehose will send the data to a backup S3 bucket to prevent any data loss.

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticsearch-service/latest/developerguide/es-aws-integrations.html>
<https://aws.amazon.com/kinesis/data-firehose/>
<https://aws.amazon.com/elasticsearch-service/>



Domain 3: Infrastructure Security



Overview

The third exam domain of the AWS Certified Security Specialty test is all about the process of securing your AWS infrastructure. About 26% of questions in the actual Security Specialty exam revolves around infrastructure security, which is the largest domain in the exam. Thus, you have to focus and spend more time studying these topics.

This domain will challenge your know-how in doing the following:

- Design edge security on AWS.
- Design and implement a secure network infrastructure.
- Troubleshoot a secure network infrastructure.
- Design and implement host-based security.

In this chapter, we will cover all of the related topics for edge, network, and server security in AWS that will likely show up in your Security Specialty exam.



AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) Basics

AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) is a managed service that enables you to easily encrypt your data. KMS provides a highly available key storage, management, and auditing solution for you to encrypt data within your own applications and control the encryption of stored data across AWS services.

Features

- KMS is integrated with CloudTrail, which provides you the ability to audit who used which keys, on which resources, and when.
- Customer master keys (CMKs) are used to control access to data encryption keys that encrypt and decrypt your data.
- You can choose to have KMS automatically rotate master keys created within KMS once per year without the need to re-encrypt data that has already been encrypted with your master key.
- To help ensure that your keys and your data are highly available, KMS stores multiple copies of encrypted versions of your keys in systems that are designed for 99.999999999% durability.

Concepts

- **Customer Master Keys (CMKs)** - You can use a CMK to encrypt and decrypt up to 4 KB of data. Typically, you use CMKs to generate, encrypt, and decrypt the data keys that you use outside of KMS to encrypt your data. Master keys are 256-bits in length.
- There are three types of CMKs:

Type of CMK	Can view	Can manage	Used only for my AWS account
Customer managed CMK	Yes	Yes	Yes
AWS managed CMK	Yes	No	Yes
AWS owned CMK	No	No	No

- **Customer managed CMKs** are CMKs that you create, own, and manage. You have full control over these CMKs, including establishing and maintaining their key policies, IAM policies, and grants, enabling and



disabling them, rotating their cryptographic material, adding tags, creating aliases that refer to the CMK, and scheduling the CMKs for deletion.

- **AWS managed CMKs** are CMKs in your account that are created, managed, and used on your behalf by an AWS service that integrates with KMS. You can view the AWS managed CMKs in your account, view their key policies, and audit their use in CloudTrail logs. However, you cannot manage these CMKs or change their permissions. And, you cannot use AWS managed CMKs in cryptographic operations directly; the service that creates them uses them on your behalf.
- **AWS owned CMKs** are not in your AWS account. They are part of a collection of CMKs that AWS owns and manages for use in multiple AWS accounts. AWS services can use AWS owned CMKs to protect your data. You cannot view, manage, or use AWS owned CMKs, or audit their use.
- **Data keys** - Encryption keys that you can use to encrypt data, including large amounts of data and other data encryption keys.
 - You can use CMKs to generate, encrypt, and decrypt data keys. However, KMS does not store, manage, or track your data keys, or perform cryptographic operations with data keys.
 - Data keys can be generated at 128-bit or 256-bit lengths and encrypted under a master key you define.
- **Encryption Context** - All KMS cryptographic operations accept an encryption context, an optional set of key-value pairs that can contain additional contextual information about the data.
- **Key Policies** - When you create a CMK, permissions that determine who can use and manage that CMK are contained in a document called the key policy.

What is a Hardware Security Module (HSM)?

A Hardware Security Module is a dedicated tamper-resistant computing device that uses physical processes to generate strong encryption keys. It can also store encryption keys and perform cryptographic operations like encryption and decryption. HSM comes in the forms of a Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI), rackmount device, or a USB device that attaches to a network server.

HSMs are really expensive. An enterprise-level HSM would typically cost you around \$25,000. In the Cloud, we don't have to buy it as it is offered as a service. In AWS KMS, you share tenancy access to HSM with other customers. If you wish to procure an exclusive, single-tenant access to HSM, use AWS CloudHSM instead.

What is Envelope Encryption and why do we use it?

Encryption is a reliable way of protecting our private information against malicious intents. It works by converting the plaintext version of a data into a ciphertext format using an encryption key — which makes it impossible to be read by a human. It's always a good thing to have the assurance of having our data safeguarded and kept private for peace of mind. But security doesn't have to end there.



Our data is secured, but what about the key that we've used to encrypt it? Anyone can view your encrypted data as long as they're using the right key for decryption. In most movies, the plot usually revolves around the protagonists searching for some kind of "key" to unlock a treasure chest, open vaults, or enter a secure establishment. Likewise, in cryptography, hackers are generally more interested in your keys or passwords. It is only rightful to also protect our encryption keys.

Envelope encryption is an encryption technique where you encrypt data with a data key, then encrypt that data key under another key. You can go as deep as you want to achieve multiple layers of security by encrypting a data key under another key, and encrypting that key under another encryption key, and so on. The catch is, there should always be a top-level key that remains in plaintext so you can eventually decrypt your data keys and your data. This top-level key is called the **master key**.

AWS KMS assures its customers that the master key is securely stored in hardware security modules that they manage and doesn't leave unencrypted.

Advantage of using Alias

When you want to perform cryptographic operations programmatically, you have to pass a key ID — a long string of numbers and letters that identifies a CMK in your account. Unless you have photographic memory or a unique ability for memorizing things, we generally do not want to remember key IDs. Also, as the keys that you manage increases, you'll find it more challenging to keep track of which keys are used for what purpose.

An *alias* is an optional display name for a CMK. Each CMK can have multiple aliases, but each alias points to only one CMK. The alias name must be unique in your AWS account and region.

Consider the Key ID below. That's too much to memorize, isn't it? Would it be great if we can have a nickname for this ID that we can reference to?

```
Key ID = 2e3ef989-a491-417d-98d9-3682156cae1f
```

Luckily, we can create an alias for this ID by using the *CreateAlias* command.

```
aws kms create-alias --alias-name alias/dojo-key --target-key-id  
2e3ef989-a491-417d-98d9-3682156cae1f
```


Then, we can perform a cryptographic operation by passing this alias to the `--key-id` parameter. This alias simply points to our original CMK. By doing this, managing different keys would be easier as you could easily determine the owner of the keys or the purpose it serves by creating a descriptive alias.

```
aws kms encrypt --key-id alias/dojo-key --plaintext fileb:///ExamplePlaintextFile
```

Note: Not all KMS API operations support alias. For the list of the supported KMS API operations, refer to the [KMS API documentation](#)

AWS KMS and AWS Regions

CMK is a regional resource. It can only be used in the region where it was created. If you want to migrate an encrypted AWS resource like EBS or RDS snapshots to another region, you have to create a new CMK on that region or use the AWS managed keys for that particular service.



Copy Snapshot

This snapshot, **snap-0bda549b11d896ee9**, will be copied to a new snapshot. Set the new snapshot settings below:

Destination Region Asia Pacific (Tokyo) ⓘ

Description [Copied snap-0bda549b11d896ee9 from us-east-2] EBS-Singap ⓘ

Encryption ☒ Encrypt this snapshot ⓘ

Master Key (default) aws/ebs ⓘ

Key Details

Description	Default master key that protects my EBS volumes when no other key is defined
Account	This account (888123066666)
KMS Key ID	eb3e8339-80f0-4c5b-afb1-bc7a121f1121
KMS Key ARN	arn:aws:kms:ap-northeast-1:888123066666:key/eb3e8339-80f0-4c5b-afb1-bc7a121f1121

Cancel Copy

Importing Keys

- A CMK contains the **key material** used to encrypt and decrypt data. When you create a CMK, by default AWS KMS generates the key material for that CMK. But you can create a CMK without key material and then import your own key material into that CMK.



- When you import key material, you can specify an expiration date. When the key material expires, KMS deletes the key material and the CMK becomes unusable. You can also delete key material on demand.

Deleting Keys

- Deleting a CMK deletes the key material and all metadata associated with the CMK. Take note that this is irreversible. You can no longer decrypt the data that was encrypted under that CMK, which means that data becomes unrecoverable.
- You can temporarily disable keys so they cannot be used by anyone.
- KMS supports custom key stores backed by AWS CloudHSM clusters. A key store is a secure location for storing cryptographic keys.
- You can connect directly to AWS KMS through a private endpoint in your VPC instead of connecting over the Internet. When you use a VPC endpoint, communication between your VPC and AWS KMS is conducted entirely within the AWS network.

Security Specialty Exam Notes:

If you are migrating an encrypted AWS resource from one region to another, you have to create a new CMK in the target AWS Region.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/kms/faqs/>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/rotate-keys.html#rotate-keys-how-it-works>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/kms-alias.html>



AWS KMS API

Users and developers who manage security can interact with AWS KMS programmatically via the CLI or SDK. These utilize the AWS KMS API for all of the transactions. You also do not use your standard username and password when interacting with the KMS API, so be sure to enter your access keys and secret access keys instead. Once you have configured your AWS profile in your local machine, you can start executing API calls. If you encounter any errors during API calls, check if your IAM User has been granted the necessary permissions to perform that action.

List of Commonly Used AWS KMS APIs

Below are the important KMS API commands that you should know when going to the exam:

- ***Encrypt***
- ***Decrypt***
- ***GenerateDataKey***
- ***GenerateDataKeyWithoutPlaintext***

Encrypt

To encrypt plaintext into ciphertext using your CMK, run the *Encrypt* command. Enter the key ID that you'd like to use and the data you'd like to encrypt. After running it, the API will return your ciphertext in blob format, the key ID used and the encryption algorithm used.

```
aws kms encrypt --key-id alias/dojo-key --plaintext fileb://ExamplePlaintextFile
```

Decrypt

To decrypt your ciphertext, run the *Decrypt* command and enter your ciphertext blob. If you used an asymmetric CMK to encrypt this text then you need to specify a key ID parameter. You should also specify the encryption algorithm and encryption context if the defaults were not used. After running it, the API will return your plaintext, key ID used for decryption, and the encryption algorithm used.

```
aws kms decrypt --key-id alias/dojo-key  
--ciphertext-blob fileb://ExampleCiphertextFile
```



GenerateDataKey

We talked about envelope encryption and how it works in the previous article. And I have mentioned about using a data key to encrypt a file instead of encrypting directly using the CMK. AWS KMS simplifies the process of envelope encryption for us by providing an API that will generate a data key that we can use to encrypt a file or another encryption key.

You can specify your data key's length by using either the `--key-spec` or `--number-of-bytes` parameter.

In this example, we used the `AES_256` parameter to generate a 256-bit symmetric key.

```
aws kms generate-data-key --key-id alias/dojo-key --key-spec AES_256
```

The resulting output returns the encrypted data key (`CiphertextBlob`), Plaintext data key, and the `KeyId` used to generate the data key.

```
{
  "CiphertextBlob":
  "AQIBAHgMxXGERpLXTIIM54OPUp/dXeRYW2ALjX6EVz3skLXeBwG6AEIFFTyHrw6EXSuZxf7gAAAAfjB
  8BgkqhkiG9w0BBwagbzBtAgEAMGgGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBg1ghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQMqsMiCfXkoxHsHbx
  fAgEQgDunMIIdAhgNqLaI6QtKnw5UrqQhrPezpLSE0fvkUD4yVpkJp1594C8DV6wBohptgrmSVA8B16xU
  9VK+cWA==",
  "Plaintext": "s7hbvvuIm0Dg2ZMNpXPWqZq5cKjv1bPj23HYA4d/syM=",
  "KeyId":
  "arn:aws:kms:ap-southeast-1:123456789123:key/c7181401-5441-447e-a019-4dd4b5f39ab
  a"
}
```

Use the plaintext data key when encrypting and decrypting data. After an encryption or decryption operation, you should delete the plaintext data key and only keep the encrypted data key. When the time comes where you have to decrypt data, you must call the `Decrypt` command to decrypt the encrypted data key first. The output will return the plaintext data key that you can use to decrypt the data finally.

GenerateDataKeyWithoutPlaintext

This KMS API command is almost similar to the previous API command that we have discussed. Their aim is to generate a data key that we can use for envelope encryption. Their only difference is that



GenerateDataKeyWithoutPlaintext, as its name implies, will only generate a data key that returns the encrypted data key.

```
aws kms generate-data-key-without-plaintext --key-id alias/dojo-key --key-spec  
AES_256
```

The resulting output returns the encrypted data key and the key ID used to generate the data key.

```
{  
  "CiphertextBlob":  
  "AQIDAHgMxXGERpLXTIIM54OPUp/dXeRYW2ALjX6EVz3skLXeBwGsYnYEmxiS9joF09WJDLioAAAAfjB  
8BgkqhkiG9w0BBwagbzBtAgEAMGgGCSqGSIB3DQEHATAeBglgghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQM9g2SrPclDG0c52L  
qAgEQgDt6SKU3Wp4R8+qDvNBjq6IWbrXmxUfhnlOaTqAZBeYZ8UtaHf2kWoPOVA4jBjmsGaOtakTQvsr  
MLKAbNw==",  
  "KeyId":  
  "arn:aws:kms:ap-southeast-1:123456789123:key/c7181401-5441-447e-a019-4dd4b5f39eb  
e"  
}
```

Note that we can't use this encrypted data key for data encryption. We must first decrypt the data key by calling the *Decrypt* command. The output will return the plaintext version of the data key. Only then can we proceed by encrypting data with this plaintext data key.

Why use *GenerateDataKeyWithoutPlaintext*?

It is better to use *GenerateDataKeyWithoutPlaintext* than *GenerateDataKey* when dealing with distributed systems that use containers that store encrypted data and encrypted data keys. Imagine that one of your components creates and saves data to each of your containers. That component could simply call the *Decrypt* command to decrypt the encrypted data key on a container, use the resulting plaintext data key to decrypt the data, and delete the plaintext data key. In this case, the component never sees the plaintext data key.

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/programming-keys.html>https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/APIReference/API_Operations.html<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/kms/>

Delegating Permissions and KMS Actions in AWS KMS

In AWS KMS, you can control the access to your master keys by using **key policies** and **grants**. Key policies are JSON-based documents that describe who is allowed to do what KMS operations (e.g., Encrypt, Decrypt) to your master keys.

Key Policy

Key policies help protect your CMKs by defining specific requirements that must be fulfilled before an action is permitted. The policy structure is similar to IAM policies, and it also uses JSON formatting. Here is a basic example of a key policy:

```
{
  "Sid": "Allows Encrypted Multipart Upload",
  "Effect": "Allow",
  "Principal": {"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::123456789123:user/ExampleUser"},
  "Action": ["kms:GenerateDataKey*", "kms:Decrypt"],
  "Resource": "*",
  "Condition": {"Bool": {"kms:GrantIsForAWSResource": true}}
}
```

To create your key policy, you must first indicate the policy version that you will be using. Then in the statement body, you must include the following parameters:

- Effect - indicates whether the policy will allow or deny actions
- Principal - the identity to which the policy will grant or deny permissions to
- Action - the permissions that you want to grant/deny to the principal
- Resource - the list of objects that your policy will be applied to

You can also include the following optional parameters in your statement body:

- Sid - a unique identifier for your policy
- Conditions - conditions that need to be met before your policy takes effect

When you create a CMK with the AWS Management Console, you can choose the IAM users, IAM roles, and AWS accounts that should be given access to the CMK, and these will be added to a default key policy that the console creates for you. On the other hand, when you create a CMK via the `CreateKey` command and you do not provide a key policy in the parameters, AWS automatically creates and assigns a default key policy for your CMK.

Either way, you should see the first statement of your default key policy similar to this:

```
{
  "Sid": "Enable IAM User Permissions",
  "Effect": "Allow",
  "Principal": {"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::123456789123:root"},
  "Action": "kms:*",
  "Resource": "*"
}
```

Take a look at the value of the Principal. At first glance, one could naturally assume that the policy is granting access to the *root* user. However, this is not the case. Keep in mind that the “root” does **NOT** pertain to the root user of the account. What it actually implies is that it allows IAM entities (e.g., IAM Users, IAM Roles) in 123456789123 AWS Account to gain full access to the CMK. Simply put, the first statement is allowing IAM to further manage the permissions to your CMK.

kms:ViaService Condition Key

In situations where you need to limit the use of your CMK for requests from specific AWS services, you can add the *kms:ViaService* condition key to your key policy statement as follows:

```
{
  "Effect": "Allow",
  "Principal": {"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::123456789123:user/Carlo"},
  "Action": [
    "kms:Encrypt",
    "kms:Decrypt"
  ],
  "Resource": "*",
  "Condition": {
    "StringEquals": {
      "kms:ViaService": [
        "ec2.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com",
        "ses.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com"
      ]
    }
  }
}
```



The preceding policy means that the CMK can be used for encryption and decryption if the requester is IAM User Carlo, and the request comes from either Amazon EC2 and Amazon SES in the ap-southeast-1 region. So even if you're using the correct principal to use a certain CMK, you still need to ensure that the service and region of the request match the values defined in the `kms:ViaService` condition key. Otherwise, the request will be denied.

Grants

There can only be one key policy for each CMK, which means that if you manage hundreds of CMKs, you're also responsible for managing hundreds of key policies. As one would expect, the complexity level of editing each key policy increases with the number of master keys you're administering.

Fortunately, we can associate KMS permissions to a CMK without even touching the key policy associated with it. We can programmatically delegate permissions to a principal by using *grants*. To create a grant, we call the **CreateGrant** operation.

```
aws kms create-grant --key-id [KEY_ID or KEY ARN] --grant-principal
arn:aws:iam::123456789123:user/josephine --retiring-principal
arn:aws:iam::123456789123:user/rizal --operations Decrypt
```

The *CreateGrant* operation does not support the use of aliases, so you must pass the key ID or the key ARN instead. The `--grant-principal` parameter defines the grantee or the person whom you are delegating access to. The `--retiring-principal` parameter designates the principal that can retire or revoke the access to the CMK. The `--operations` defines the operations the grantee is allowed to do.

The *CreateGrant* operation returns a grant token and grant Id. You can retire a grant anytime when you're done using it. Simply call the *RetireGrant* command with the grant token that you received when you created the grant. Note that a grant can only allow access, but not deny.

```
aws kms retire-grant --grant-token [GRANT TOKEN]
```

Security Specialty Exam Notes:

The **"root"** in the "Principal": `{"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::123456789123:root"}` statement of your key policy pertains to IAM and **NOT** the root user.

Use the `kms:ViaService` if you want to limit CMK access against requests coming from specific AWS resources.

Always think of *grants* when you are required to programmatically create and revoke CMK access.



References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/determining-access-key-policy.html>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/policy-conditions.html>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/grants.html>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/policy-conditions.html>


AWS KMS Customer Master Key (CMK) Rotation

AWS Managed Key has an automatic rotation feature enabled by default. This feature is optional for Customer Managed Key. However, automatic key rotation is not supported by the following:

- Asymmetric CMK where public and private key pair are used to encrypt/decrypt or sign/verify operations
- CMKs in custom key stores where the key material is stored on AWS CloudHSM cluster
- CMKs that have imported key material which is supported only for symmetric CMKs in AWS KMS key stores

Automatic CMK Rotation

The diagram below illustrates the process of automatic CMK Key Rotation.



When automatic key rotation is enabled, the properties of the CMK (e.g., key id, key ARN, aliases, region, etc.) do not change when the key is rotated. Only the *backing key*, a cryptographic material that is used in encryption operations, is altered in the event of key rotation. You do not have to update the aliases or CMK ID that's previously included in your scripts or application code.

You may not have an automatic key rotation available on these CMK types, but you can still do a rotation manually.

Manual Key Rotation

In case you need to rotate your CMK frequently to comply with your requirement, you can manually replace your current CMK with a new CMK. This process is called manual key rotation. This is also a good option when you need rotation for asymmetric CMKs, CMKs in custom key stores, and CMKs with imported key material.


When you change CMKs, you also need to update CMK ID or ARN references on your applications, and this can be a lot of work. Instead of using CMK ID and ARN, use aliases to refer to a CMK in your application. After that, change the target CMK of the alias.

AWS Managed CMK Rotation

You can't manage the key rotation for AWS Managed Keys. The automatic key rotation is handled by AWS KMS and is automatically rotated every three years.

AWS Customer Managed CMK Rotation

Unlike AWS Managed CMK, you have full control over Customer Managed CMK, including key rotation. You can set this using AWS console in KMS>Customer Managed Key then clicking your preferred CMK.



Go to the Key Rotation tab and check **Automatically rotate this CMK every year** then click Save.



KMS > Customer managed keys > Key ID: 05bacef6-2fed-4d2c-8ad4-2f046436ecde

05bacef6-2fed-4d2c-8ad4-2f046436ecde Key actions ▾ Edit

▼ General configuration

Alias kms53cmk	Status Enabled	ARN arn:aws:kms:ap-southeast-1:947117271373:key/05bacef6-2fed-4d2c-8ad4-2f046436ecde
Description -	Creation date Sep 21, 2020 03:43 GMT+8	

► Cryptographic configuration

Key policy | Tags | **Key rotation**

Key rotation Save

☒ Automatically rotate this CMK every year. [Learn more](#)

By default, Customer Managed CMK can be rotated every year. Once a CMK is renewed, whether it's AWS Managed or Customer managed, it writes a KMS CMK Rotation event on Amazon Cloudwatch events and RotateKey event on AWS Cloudtrail.

Customer Managed vs. AWS Managed vs. AWS Owned CMKs

CMK Automatic Key Rotation				
TYPE OF CMK	Can view CMK metadata	Can manage CMK	Used only for your AWS account	Automatic Rotation
Customer Managed CMK	Yes	Yes	Yes	Optional. Every 365 days
AWS Managed CMK	Yes	No	Yes	Required. Every 1095 days
AWS Owned CMK	No	No	No	Varies

Tutorials Dojo



References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/concepts.html>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/rotate-keys.html>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/rotate-keys.html#rotate-keys-manually>



Using Encryption Context for Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) to Support Authenticated Encryption

We talked about envelope encryption before and how it protects our CMK. This time, we'll see how we can preserve the authenticity and integrity of our encrypted data. Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) is a non-secret data that we can pass when calling the KMS **Encrypt** and **Decrypt** command to prevent data tampering.

On AWS KMS, to implement AAD, we pass the encryption context parameter when initiating an *Encrypt* API call. The encryption context is a set of name-value pairs that cryptographically bind to the encryption's resulting ciphertext. You can think of the encryption context as your digital signature for your requests. Make sure that you create them as unique as you can. By doing this, we can prevent confused deputy attacks.

```
aws kms encrypt --plaintext fileb://ExamplePlaintext.txt --key-id alias/dojo-key  
--encryption-context password=mysecurepassword123,Department=IT
```

To decrypt the ciphertext data, you must pass the exact name-value pairs that you've used for encryption. Failure to do so will result in an **InvalidCiphertextException** error.

References:

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/concepts.html#encrypt_context

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/crypto/latest/userguide/cryptography-concepts.html#term-aad>



Storing Encryption Keys Using AWS CloudHSM

Before we discuss CloudHSM, it is essential to know what HSM is. In the first section, we defined the Hardware Security Module or HSM as a dedicated tamper-resistant computing device that uses physical processes to generate strong encryption keys. It can also store encryption keys and perform cryptographic operations like encryption and decryption.

So what is CloudHSM?

Like any other “as-a-service” Cloud Services, AWS CloudHSM is basically an HSM that lives in the Cloud or an HSM-as-a-Service model. Unlike KMS, you **do not share** tenancy with other AWS customers. CloudHSM lets you run and manage a dedicated FIPS 140-2 Level 3 validated HSM. You have full control over your encryption keys including their lifecycle management. To interact with your HSM, you need to use the CloudHSM Client – a software package that lets you communicate directly to CloudHSM over a secured, mutually authenticated channel. There are also available CloudHSM API actions that you can use, but they’re limited in terms of what they can do.

Advantages Of Using AWS CloudHSM

- **Highly Available**
 - Instead of using HSM in a single physical location, AWS CloudHSM manages HSMs in a cluster across availability zones to achieve high availability. You can create a cluster of HSM in one subnet for each availability zone per region. AWS CloudHSM keeps the individual HSM in the cluster in sync, so if you change a configuration of an HSM inside AZ- 1, the change will be reflected on the HSM inside AZ -2.
- **Only Accessible By Using VPC**
 - AWS CloudHSM only allows creating a CloudHSM cluster in a VPC to isolate your AWS CloudHSM from other customers. It is **important to note** that you **can only** operate the CloudHSM Client on an EC2 instance inside a VPC. You can securely connect to the EC2 instance from on-premises via VPN connection, or Direct Connect.
- **Tamper-evident Control**
 - HSMs are purposely built to be tamper-resistant. If you use AWS CloudHSM, you are just essentially using HSMs in a remote data center – the Cloud, instead of on-premises. The nature and physical properties of an HSM do not change.
- **Has access logging available**



- You can obtain the AWS CloudHSM Client's logs on the EC2 instance where you run the CloudHSM Client. The path of the log files varies depending on the operating system used. AWS CloudHSM API calls are captured by CloudTrail.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/cloudhsm/faqs/>

<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/aws-cloud-hsm-secure-key-storage-and-cryptographic-operations/>

AWS WAF and AWS Firewall Manager

AWS Web Application Firewall (WAF) helps protect web applications from attacks by allowing you to configure rules that allow, block, or monitor (count) web requests based on the conditions that you define. These conditions filter web requests based on IP addresses, HTTP headers, HTTP body, or URI strings, to block common attack patterns, such as SQL injection or cross-site scripting.

WAF Rules:

1. Custom Rules:
 - **Regular rules** - use only conditions to target specific requests.

Rule Validate

Name

tutorialsdojo

The name must have 1-128 characters. Valid characters: A-Z, a-z, 0-9, - (hyphen), and _ (underscore).

Type

Regular rule 

If a request

matches the statement

Statement

Inspect

Originates from a country in

Country codes

Choose country codes

Philippines - PH 

- **Rate-based rules** - are similar to regular rules, with a rate limit. Rate-based rules count the requests that arrive from a specified IP address every five minutes. The rule can trigger an action if the number of requests exceeds the rate limit.

Rule

Validate

Name

The name must have 1-128 characters. Valid characters: A-Z, a-z, 0-9, - (hyphen), and _ (underscore).

Type

Rate-based rule

Request rate details

Rate limit

The rate limit is the maximum number of requests from a single IP address that are allowed in a five-minute period. This value is continually evaluated, and requests will be blocked once this limit is reached. The IP address is automatically unblocked after it falls below the limit.

Rate limit must be between 100 and 20,000,000.

- WAF Managed Rules** are an easy way to deploy pre-configured rules to protect your applications' common threats like application vulnerabilities. All Managed Rules are automatically updated by AWS Marketplace security Sellers.

Add managed rule groups

Info

Close

Managed rule groups are created and maintained for you by AWS and AWS Marketplace sellers.

▶ AWS managed rule groups

▶ Cyber Security Cloud Inc. managed rule groups

▶ F5 managed rule groups

▶ Fortinet managed rule groups

▶ GeoGuard managed rule groups

▶ Imperva managed rule groups

Cancel
Add rules

AWS Firewall Manager simplifies your AWS WAF administration and maintenance tasks across multiple accounts and resources. You set up your firewall rules just once, and the service automatically applies your rules across your accounts and resources.

Here are the steps to get started with AWS Firewall Manager:

1. You need to set an account in AWS Organizations first and enter the administrator account ID in AWS Firewall Manager.

Set Firewall Manager administrator account

AWS Firewall Manager administrator account

To use AWS Firewall Manager, you need to set an account in your AWS Organization as the AWS Firewall Manager administrator account. The administrator account will be able to create and manage AWS WAF rules, security group, Shield Advanced across all accounts within the organization. This administrator can be either the AWS Organization master account, or a member account in the organization.

Administrator account ID

Enter the AWS account that you want to set as Firewall Manager administrator

Cancel Set administrator account

2. Go to the AWS Firewall Manager dashboard and click create policy.

Security, Identity, and Compliance

AWS Firewall Manager

Centralized security management

Centrally configure and manage firewall rules across accounts and applications.

Create security policy

Define security policies for your existing and new resources across your organization.

Create policy

3. Select AWS WAF in the policy type and select your preferred region. Click next.



Choose policy type and region

Policy details

Policy type

- ☒ **AWS WAF**
Manage protection against common web exploits using AWS WAF.
- ☐ **AWS WAF Classic**
Manage protection against common web exploits using AWS WAF Classic.
- ☐ **AWS Shield Advanced**
Manage protection against layer 3 and layer 4 DDoS attacks.
- ☐ **Security group**
Manage security groups across your organization in AWS Organization.

Region

Asia Pacific (Singapore) ▼

Cancel

Next

4. Fill out the policy name and add rule groups in the policy rules section. Select the type of policy action and click next.

Describe policy

Policy name

Policy name

tutorialsdojo

The name must have 1-128 characters. Valid characters: a-z, A-Z, 0-9, -(hyphen), and _(underscore).

Region

Asia Pacific (Singapore)

Policy rules

Policy rules

Associate all resources that are within the scope of this policy with the web ACL that's contained in this policy.

Web ACL configuration

Firewall Manager creates this web ACL in all accounts that are within the policy scope. Define the rule groups to run first and the rule groups to run last when the web ACL inspects a web request. Then, in the individual accounts, the account owner can only add rule groups to be run in between these first and last rule groups.

First rule groups

Move up
Move down
Edit
Delete
Add rule groups

Order	Rule group name	Capacity	Action
No rule groups			
You haven't added any rule groups.			

Last rule groups

Move up
Move down
Edit
Delete
Add rule groups

Order	Rule group name	Capacity	Action
No rule groups			
You haven't added any rule groups.			

- Define the scope of your policy. Configure the policy tag (optional) and click create policy.

Define policy scope

Policy scope

Policy scope defines the accounts and resources covered by this policy.

AWS accounts this policy applies to

- ☒ Include all accounts under my AWS organization
- ☐ Include only the specified accounts and organizational units
- ☐ Exclude the specified accounts and organizational units, and include all others

Resource type

- ☐ API Gateway Stage
- ☐ Application Load Balancer

Resources

- ☒ Include all resources that match the selected resource type
- ☐ Include only resources that have all the specified resource tags
- ☐ Exclude resources that have all the specified resource tags, and include all other resources

Cancel
Previous
Next

6. You can verify the created policy in the Security Policies section of AWS Firewall Manager.

AWS Firewall Manager policies (1)			
<input type="text" value="Find policies"/>			
	Name ▼	Policy type ▲	Automatic remediation ▼
☐	tutorialsdodo	WAF	⚠ Disabled

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/waf/latest/developerguide/how-aws-waf-works.html>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/waf/latest/developerguide/fms-chapter.html>



Block User Requests from Bot that Has a Distinct User-Agent HTTP Header

The User-Agent HTTP header is a request header that lets the server determine the browser, browser engine, application, device, program, and vendor of the requesting user. By knowing all of this information, the server will know which version of a web page, or what data is compatible with the requesting device/application before sending. For example, some websites may have a different user-experience if you're using an Android mobile phone than if you're browsing from an iPhone or a desktop computer.

An example of a user-agent HTTP header:

```
Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 8_3 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/600.1.4 (KHTML, like Gecko) FxiOS/1.0 Mobile/12F69 Safari/600.1.4
```

You can use the user agent string's information to block excessive requests coming from suspicious IP addresses. The AWS version of implementing such a filter mechanism is by using the rate-based rule of AWS WAF. The rate-based rule counts the rate of requests coming from a specific IP address for a 5-minute interval. A rule action is triggered to block abusive requests when the rate exceeds the configured threshold limit.

To look for a specific string of an agent-user HTTP header, we have to nest the ***string match statement*** inside the *rate-based statement* of the rate-based rule. This nested statement lets AWS WAF only count the requests that meet the specified string included.

Suppose you have a rate-limit of 1,000. If the user-agent string of a request coming from a specific IP address passes the limit but doesn't match the value defined in the *string match statement*, AWS WAF will not block the request. However, if the user-agent header contains the string that you set in the *string match statement*, the request will be counted and blocked once it exceeds the rate limit.

References:


<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/waf/latest/developerguide/waf-rule-statement-type-rate-based.html>
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/waf/latest/developerguide/ddos-get-started-rate-based-rules.html>

Adding HTTP Security Headers Using Lambda@Edge and CloudFront

HTTP security headers are a staple when it comes to securing websites. When implemented, they'll provide you countermeasures and protection against common attacks like MIME sniffing, clickjacking, and cross-site scripting. Today, It isn't easy to find websites that don't use security headers. These headers are a part of the server response that you receive when visiting your favorite websites on your browser.

Some of the most commonly used security headers are:

- **X-Content-Type-Options**
- **X-Frame-Options**
- **X-XSS-Protection**




```

X Headers Preview Response Initiator >>
'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval';
Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2020 02:44:00 GMT
Expires: Wed, 11 Jan 1984 05:00:00 GMT
Fastcgi-Cache: BYPASS
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Server: nginx
Set-Cookie: wfwa-authcookie-7c5f67a9fc0a19361f6c
dc18036=8346%7C%7C418968095d9629ef7ef0e0a2caa088
391e32bb332a0abcb95d7b7ecc16af; expires=Tue, 29-
2020 14:44:00 GMT; Max-Age=43200; path=/; secure
tpOnly
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
X-Robots-Tag: noindex
X-Xss-Protection: 1; mode=block
  
```

If you're running your site with static files from S3 bucket, it is challenging to add security headers as Amazon S3 only supports adding custom headers with the prefix "x-amz-meta." A workaround for that is by using either a proxy server or Lambda@Edge. Because we love to make our life simpler, Lambda@Edge is the better solution.

Lambda@Edge is CloudFront's feature that lets you run Lambda functions closer to your end-users. This could improve your application's performance by reducing network latency. But aside from that added benefit, Lambda@Edge could also do intelligent processing of HTTP requests. We can use Lambda@Edge to add HTTP security headers to the response on the fly.

The diagram depicts the triggering of the Lambda function as CloudFront forwards requests to the origin server.



First, the client will request objects (e.g, HTML, CSS, JS Files, images, etc.) from CloudFront. If the requested items are found on the edge cache, the client's request won't reach the origin server, and the requested objects will be immediately returned to the client. In the event of a cache miss, CloudFront will forward the client's request to the origin server. The origin server will respond by returning the requested files to CloudFront. The event by which the origin server responds to a request is called the origin response. And with the event-driven nature of AWS Lambda, we can use the origin response event to trigger a Lambda function running on edge locations to generate and add the HTTP security headers needed. All of this process requires zero server administration.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/networking-and-content-delivery/adding-http-security-headers-using-lambdaedge-and-amazon-cloudfront/>
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudFront/latest/DeveloperGuide/lambda-requirements-limits.html#lambda-header-restrictions>

Securing Amazon S3 and CloudFront Web Distributions

Amazon S3 and CloudFront gels together when it comes to distributing files over the Internet. If you have a web application that serves many static assets, picking S3 as your storage solution is a no-brainer.

An S3 bucket provides an S3 endpoint that you can use to distribute your files. That works, but in a typical web application set-up, you'll need more than that. Usually, you have to add an extra layer or two to make your application more performant and responsive. That can be achieved by caching the files or serving them from a content delivery network. It is good to know that CloudFront can do both.

CloudFront has two excellent features called *Signed URLs* and *Signed Cookies* that we can use to restrict access to sensitive files originating from an S3 bucket. For example, you have an application that sells high-definition photos. It is only right that paid users are the only ones that could view and download your images. And you can have that functionality by having your paid users access a Signed URL instead of the default CloudFront URL.

Why use Origin Access Identity (OAI)?

I have mentioned earlier that you can retrieve objects from an S3 bucket using its S3 endpoint. That is the same endpoint that CloudFront uses as the origin domain name when creating a web distribution to serve files from S3. CloudFront provides you a default domain name that you can use to access your content.


Create Distribution

Origin Settings

Origin Domain Name	<input type="text" value="tutorialsdojo.s3.amazonaws.com"/>
Origin Path	<input type="text"/>
Origin ID	<input type="text" value="S3-tutorialsdojo"/>

So if you have a file named *privateFile.jpg*, you can get that file by visiting either of the following endpoints:


- tutorialsdojo.s3.amazonaws.com/privateFile.jpg (**S3 endpoint**)
- <https://d2908q01vomqc3.cloudfront.net/privateFile.jpg> (**CloudFront endpoint**)



This is a problem because:

- Even if your Amazon S3 is already using CloudFront, the users can still bypass the CloudFront web distribution and access the S3 bucket directly.
- Users can bypass your Signed URL /Signed Cookies, effectively defeating its purpose.
- Users can directly request from the S3 bucket and you'd have to pay for those GET requests. This can incur additional costs.

You can easily fix those aforementioned problems by using an Origin Access Identity (OAI). Basically, OAI is used to restrict access only from CloudFront. By using OAI, CloudFront would completely deny any users from accessing your S3 bucket directly.



To implement OAI, you perform the following tasks:

- Create a special CloudFront user called an **origin access identity**.
- Give the origin access identity permission to read the files in your bucket.
- Remove permission to use Amazon S3 URLs to read the files from anyone else (through bucket policies or ACLs).



Create Distribution

Origin Settings

Origin Domain Name

Origin Path

Origin ID

Restrict Bucket Access ☒ Yes
☐ No

Origin Access Identity ☒ Create a New Identity
☐ Use an Existing Identity

Comment

Grant Read Permissions on Bucket ☒ Yes, Update Bucket Policy
☐ No, I Will Update Permissions

Origin Connection Attempts

References:


<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudFront/latest/DeveloperGuide/private-content-overview.html>
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudFront/latest/DeveloperGuide/private-content-restricting-access-to-s3.html>

Uploading Large Sensitive Files in KMS-Encrypted S3 Bucket

When using the `aws s3 cp` to copy/upload large files, S3 implicitly uses the multipart upload feature. The multipart upload works by splitting up large data into individual parts that get uploaded in parallel, making the upload speed faster. Amazon S3 will then reconstruct the uploaded parts into the original data.

A CMK can not directly encrypt a file larger than 4KB. You have to use envelope encryption, which makes use of a data key. The data key is used to encrypt the data. In the case of SSE-KMS, the envelope encryption is automatically handled by Amazon S3; you just need to have the necessary permissions for S3 to do its job. Let's say you have a 20MB file and you want to upload it to an S3 bucket using an AWS KMS CMK that you manage. You need to confirm first that you have the permissions required to perform actions on that AWS KMS key that you're using to encrypt the file.

If you upload large files with SSE-KMS, you'll need the `kms:Decrypt` and `kms:GenerateDataKey*` permissions. The reason for that is because parts that get uploaded to S3 are server-side encrypted. Therefore, Amazon S3 needs to decrypt the parts first before they can be assembled.



References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/s3-large-file-encryption-kms-key/>
<https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/s3-multipart-kms-decrypt/>
<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/amazon-s3-multipart-upload/>



Protecting from DDOS Attacks through AWS Shield

AWS Shield is a managed DDoS protection service that safeguards applications running on AWS. This service has two tiers: Standard and Advanced.

- **Shield Standard** provides always-on network flow monitoring which inspects incoming traffic to AWS and detects malicious traffic in real-time.
- **Shield Advanced** provides enhanced detection, inspecting network flows, and also monitoring application layer traffic to your Elastic IP address, Elastic Load Balancing, CloudFront, or Route 53 resources.

A **Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)** attack comprises multiple systems that target a single system. The target system will be bombarded with packets from multiple locations. If the system cannot accommodate the large volume of requests, this will result in service unavailability.

DDoS attacks can be generated at different layers of the OSI model. The most common attacks are in the Network, Transport, Presentation, and Application Layers.

#	Layer	Application	Description	Vector Example
7	Application	Data	Network process to application	HTTP floods, DNS query floods
6	Presentation	Data	Data representation and encryption	SSL abuse
5	Session	Data	Interhost communication	N/A
4	Transport	Segments	End-to-end connections and reliability	SYN Floods, UDP Floods,
3	Network	Packets	Path determination and logical addressing	Smurf Attacks, ICMP Floods
2	Datalinks	Frames	Physical addressing	N/A
1	Physical	Bits	Media, signal, and binary transmission	N/A

To mitigate these kinds of attacks, we can classify DDoS attacks into two groups:

1. Infrastructure Layer Attacks (Layers 3 and 4)

- The generated attacks in these layers are in a large volume of packets or requests to overload the servers' capacity. Examples of DDoS attacks in this category are smurf attacks, SYN and UDP floods.

2. Application Layer Attacks (Layers 6 and 7)



- Unlike the attacks in the infrastructure layer, the generated attacks in the application layer are in a small volume. The focus of the generated attack in this group is to make your application unavailable to your users. An example of these attacks is the flooding of HTTP requests or search API and WordPress pingback attacks.

DDoS Protection Techniques

- **Reduce Attack Surface Area**

- Exposure of application ports and protocols will result in possible points of attack. By minimizing the surface area, we can limit the attackers' options and focus on building protections in our infrastructure. We can implement this solution using Content Distribution Networks, Load Balancers, Firewalls, and Access Control Lists to restrict the access directly to our servers or applications.

- **Plan for Scale**

- **Transit capacity** is also known as bandwidth capacity. To prevent this kind of attack, your hosting provider must have redundant Internet access when handling large volumes of requests. The primary goal of a DDoS attack is to affect the availability of your applications. Using CDNs and smart DNS resolution services, we can create an additional layer of protection in our infrastructure. This will help us serve content and resolve DNS queries from locations that are closer to your users.
- **Server capacity** is the most common type of attack that comes in our mind when we hear DDoS attacks. These are volumetric attacks that overwhelms the capacity of your resources. To resolve this problem, we need to have an elastic compute resource or a larger capacity to handle a large volume of attacks. You can also use a load balancer to shift the loads between resources to prevent overloading in one resource.

- **Know what is normal and abnormal traffic**

- To protect us from different kinds of attacks, we must ensure that our traffic is always at the baseline level. This is known as rate limiting. Analyzing individual packets can help us accept legitimate traffic. To do this, we must understand the difference between normal and abnormal traffic.

- **Deploy Firewalls for Sophisticated Application attacks**

- Always remember: when deploying an application, you must associate it with a Web Application Firewall. This will mitigate the different kinds of attacks in the application layer, such as SQL injection and cross-site scripting, that will exploit our application's vulnerability. You can easily reduce these illegitimate requests by studying traffic patterns and creating customized protections.

References:



<https://aws.amazon.com/shield/ddos-attack-protection/>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/waf/latest/developerguide/shield-chapter.html>

Investigating AWS Resources that are Possibly Compromised

AWS Security Hub provides a comprehensive view of your security state within AWS and your compliance with security industry standards and best practices. It has integrated dashboards that consolidate your security findings across accounts to show you their current security and compliance status. All findings are stored for at least 90 days within AWS Security Hub.

Here are the steps for this setup:

1. Go to the AWS Security Hub service and click on “Enable Security Hub”.

Welcome to AWS Security Hub

Security standards

Enabling AWS Security Hub grants it permissions to conduct security checks. [Service Linked Roles \(SLRs\)](#) with the following services are used to conduct security checks: Amazon CloudWatch, Amazon SNS, AWS Config, and AWS CloudTrail.

- ☒ Enable AWS Foundational Security Best Practices v1.0.0
- ☒ Enable CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark v1.2.0
- ☐ Enable PCI DSS v3.2.1

AWS Integrations

Enabling Security Hub grants it permissions to import findings from:

- Amazon GuardDuty
- Amazon Inspector
- Amazon Macie
- AWS IAM Access Analyzer
- AWS Systems Manager Patch Manager
- AWS Firewall Manager

Cancel
Enable Security Hub

2. You will be redirected to the Security Hub summary page. Click Insights.

Summary

Insights

	Results
1. AWS resources with the most findings	0
2. S3 buckets with public write or read permissions	0
3. AMLs that are generating the most findings	0
4. EC2 instances involved in known Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)	0
5. AWS users with the most suspicious activity	0

- To view the findings in your AWS resources, click “AWS resources with the most findings”.

Insights (31)

An insight is a saved filter that shows related findings.

1. AWS resources with the most findings

Security Hub managed insight

90-day finding trend

0

current result

- We can now verify if there are any findings in our AWS resources. You can use filters to narrow down the match findings.



Security Hub > Insights > 1. AWS resources with the most findings

Insight: 1. AWS resources with the most findings
Security Hub managed insight

Actions ▼ Workflow status ▼ **Create insight**

Workflow status *is* NEW ✕ Workflow status *is* NOTIFIED ✕ Record state *is* ACTIVE ✕ ✕
Group by: ResourceId ✕ Add filters

Resource ID	Findings
No results found for applied filters	

📘 Searches are case sensitive

Reference:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/latest/userguide/securityhub-insights.html>



User Authentication Using Amazon Cognito

Amazon Cognito is a user management and authentication service that can be integrated into your web or mobile applications. Cognito allows you to authenticate users through an external identity provider and provides temporary security credentials to access your app's backend resources in AWS or any service behind Amazon API Gateway.

Amazon Cognito works with external identity providers that support:

- SAML or OpenID Connect
- Social identity providers (Facebook, Amazon, Google, Apple)
- Integration of your own identity provider

Instead of using AWS IAM for web identity federations, we suggest that you use Amazon Cognito since it can act as an identity broker. Cognito also provides additional features such as unauthenticated (guest) access and synchronization of user data across mobile devices and web applications.

For example, if you are not using Amazon Cognito as an authentication service, you need to write several lines of code to interact with a web identity provider just to call the **AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity** API. The token you got from the IdP will be traded for AWS temporary security credentials. The credentials you received from AWS will enable you to access AWS resources. But with Amazon Cognito, the service will handle all the federation work for you and you only need to sign in using the supported external identity providers.

How Does Amazon Cognito Work?

1. A user started to use the application on a mobile device.
2. The user signs in using the supported identity provider.
3. The application will use a Cognito API to exchange the credentials for a Cognito token.
4. The application will exchange the Cognito token for temporary AWS security credentials.
5. The assigned policy in the temporary security credentials will determine what AWS resources can be accessed by the user.

Amazon Cognito User Pools vs Identity Pools

With the proliferation of smartphones in our connected world, more and more developers are quickly deploying their applications on the cloud. One of the first challenges in developing applications is allowing users to log in and authenticate on your applications. There are multiple stages involved in user verification and most of these are not visible from the end-user. AWS provides an easy solution for this situation.


User Identity verification is at the core of Amazon Cognito. It provides solutions for three key areas of user identification:

1. **Authentication** – provides users sign-up and sign-in options. Enables support for federation with Enterprise Identities (Microsoft AD), or Social Identities (Amazon, Facebook, Google, etc.)
2. **Authorization** – sets of permission or operations allowed for a user. It provides fine-grained access control to resources.
3. **User Management** – allows management of user lifecycles, such as importing users, onboarding users, disabling users, and storing and managing user profiles.

In this article, we'll talk about Cognito User Pools and Identity Pools, including an overview of how they are used to provide authentication and authorization functionalities that can be integrated on your mobile app.


Amazon Cognito User Pools

Amazon Cognito User Pools are used for authentication. To verify your user's identity, you will want to have a way for them to login using username/passwords or federated login using Identity Providers such as Amazon, Facebook, Google, or a SAML supported authentication such as Microsoft Active Directory. You can configure these Identity Providers on Cognito, and it will handle the interactions with these providers so you only have to worry about handling the Authentication tokens on your app.




With Cognito User Pools, you can provide sign-up and sign-in functionality for your mobile or web app users. You don't have to build or maintain any server infrastructure on which users will authenticate.

This diagram shows how authentication is handled with Cognito User Pools:



1. Users send authentication requests to Cognito User Pools.
2. The Cognito user pool verifies the identity of the user or sends the request to Identity Providers such as Facebook, Google, Amazon, or SAML authentication (with Microsoft AD).
3. The Cognito User Pool Token is sent back to the user.
4. The person can then use this token to access your backend APIs hosted on your EC2 clusters or in API Gateway and Lambda.

If you want a quick login page, you can even use the pre-built login UI provided by Amazon Cognito which you just have to integrate on your application.



The image shows a screenshot of the Amazon Cognito User Pool sign-in interface. It features a white card with a light gray header. The header text reads "Sign in with your username and password". Below this, there are two input fields: "Username" and "Password", each with a placeholder text of the same name and a small eye icon for toggling visibility. A blue link "Forgot your password?" is positioned below the password field. At the bottom of the card, there is a prominent blue "Sign in" button and a link "Need an account? Sign up" in blue text.


On the Amazon Cognito User Pool page, you can also manage users if you need to. You can reset the password, disable/enable users, and enroll/delete users or other actions needed for User Management.

Amazon Cognito Identity Pools

Cognito Identity Pools (Federated Identities) provides different functionality compared to User Pools. Identity Pools are used for User Authorization. You can create unique identities for your users and federate them with your identity providers. Using identity pools, users can obtain temporary AWS credentials to access other AWS services.

Identity Pools can be thought of as the actual mechanism authorizing access to AWS resources. When you create Identity Pools, think of it as defining who is allowed to get AWS credentials and use those credentials to access AWS resources.

This diagram shows how authorization is handled with Cognito Identity Pools:



1. The web app or mobile app sends its authentication token to Cognito Identity Pools. The token can come from a valid Identity Provider, like Cognito User Pools, Amazon, or Facebook.
2. Cognito Identity Pool exchanges the user authentication token for temporary AWS credentials to access resources such as S3 or DynamoDB. AWS credentials are sent back to the user.
3. The temporary AWS credentials will be used to access AWS resources.

You can define rules in Cognito Identity Pools for mapping users to different IAM roles to provide fine-grain permissions.

Here's a table summary describing Cognito User Pool and Identity Pool:



Cognito User Pools	Cognito Identity Pools
Handles the IdP interactions for you	Provides AWS credentials for accessing resources on behalf of users
Provides profiles to manage users	Supports rules to map users to different IAM roles
Provides OpenID Connect and OAuth standard tokens	Free
Priced per monthly active user	

Guest User Authentication

If you have an application that serves media files like images or videos from Amazon S3, you may want to have some control over what your users can and cannot do. For example, you want to allow registered users to upload their own photos so they can share it with their friends. And guest users are only allowed to view photos of a registered profile, similar to how Facebook and Instagram works. You can achieve that functionality on your application via Identity Pool.

AWS Cognito Identity Pool supports two types of identities: *authenticated* and *unauthenticated*. Authenticated identities are users who are authenticated by a trusted public provider (Amazon, Facebook, Twitter, Cognito User Pool). Unauthenticated identities simply refer to the “guest users” or users who don’t have to be logged in to access your application.

You can enable unauthenticated identities upon the creation of an Identity Pool or by modifying the setting of an existing Identity Pool.

Create new identity pool

Identity pools are used to store end user identities. To declare a new Identity pool, enter a unique name.

Identity pool name*

TutorialsDojo

Example: My App Name

▼ Unauthenticated identities

Amazon Cognito can support unauthenticated identities by providing a unique identifier and AWS credentials for users who do not authenticate with an identity provider. If your application allows customers to use the application without logging in, you can enable access for unauthenticated identities. [Learn more about unauthenticated identities.](#)

☒

Enable access to unauthenticated identities

Enabling this option means that anyone with internet access can be granted AWS credentials. Unauthenticated identities are typically users who do not log in to your application. Typically, the permissions that you assign for unauthenticated identities should be more restrictive than those for authenticated identities.

Cognito Identity Pool with unauthenticated access works by providing a unique identifier and AWS credentials for your guest users. You can control their permissions by defining the policy associated with your unauthenticated identities' role. For example, you can define a read only access inside the role's policy so any guest users can only view media files from your S3 bucket.

Role Summary ?

Role Description	Your authenticated identities would like access to Cognito.
IAM Role	Create a new IAM Role ▾
Role Name	Cognito_AuthenticatedUsers_Role
▶ View Policy Document	

Role Summary ?

Role Description	Your unauthenticated identities would like access to Cognito.
IAM Role	Create a new IAM Role ▾
Role Name	Cognito_GuestUsers_Role
▶ View Policy Document	

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cognito/latest/developerguide/cognito-user-identity-pools.html>
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cognito/latest/developerguide/identity-pools.html#authenticated-and-unauthenticated-identities>
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cognito/latest/developerguide/cognito-identity.html>

Managing Instance Profile

We use IAM Roles to define permissions to make requests to AWS services. And we do this by attaching them to authorized entities such as IAM users or AWS services such as AWS Lambda and Amazon EC2. If we want to limit the actions of a Lambda function, we usually modify its execution role's policy, or create a new IAM role and modify its underlying policy. Then, we directly attach that role to the Lambda function.

An EC2 instance, however, is a unique one. We can't just create a role and directly attach it to the instance. We have to create an instance profile first. An instance profile is like a container for an IAM role that you want to associate with an EC2 instance so it can make API calls to other AWS services.

You can attach an instance profile to an instance via the EC2 console or AWS CLI. By doing this, we can make API calls without storing any AWS credentials on the EC2.

Modify IAM role [Info](#)

Attach an IAM role to your instance.

Instance ID

 **i-085677a57f88562f8**

IAM role

Select an IAM role to attach to your instance or create a new role if you haven't created any. The role you select replaces any roles that are currently attached to your instance.

↻
[Create new IAM role](#)

No IAM Role

Choose this option to detach an IAM role

AmazonSSMRoleForInstancesQuickSetup

arn:aws:iam:: instance-profile/AmazonSSMRoleForInstancesQuickSetup

aws-elasticbeanstalk-ec2-role

arn:aws:iam: instance-profile/aws-elasticbeanstalk-ec2-role

tdojo

arn:aws:iam:: instance-profile/tdojo

Cancel

Save


Switching IAM Roles

In some cases, you may want to use a combination of IAM roles and AWS key credentials to give permissions to your EC2 instance for making requests to AWS services via AWS CLI. You might want to take this route to provide yourself with more flexibility in managing different environments with different policies.

Consider the scenario below:

A developer is writing a shell script that calls the AWS CLI to upload objects in an S3 bucket of the development environment. The EC2 instance that is being used contains the access keys and the IAM role used to run the AWS CLI. The Security Administrator gave the developer a new set of access key credentials with another IAM role that allows access to the production environment. How can the developer easily switch from one IAM role to another ?

In the scenario, we are given access to two environments (production and development) that have different permissions defined in their respective roles. In this case, we can easily switch from one role to another by adding the production profile in the config file of our CLI profile. You can find the file on `.aws/config` in Linux or `C:\Users\<your-user-name>\.aws\config` in Windows.




```
Config - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
[default]
output = json
region = ap-southeast-1

[profile prodaccess]
role_arn = arn:aws:iam:123456789123:role/ProductionAccessRole
source_profile = prodaccess
region = ap-southeast-1

[profile developmentaccess]
role_arn = arn:aws:iam:123456789123:role/DevelopmentAccessRole
source_profile = developmentaccess
region = ap-southeast-1

Ln 18,
```

We will then define the new set of access key credentials for the production environment on the credentials file. The credentials file is located on the same directory as the config file.



```
File Edit Format View Help
[default]
aws_access_key_id = AKIA5JVP3LWRFCL2OZAL
aws_secret_access_key = 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

[prodaccess]
aws_access_key_id = AKIA5JVP3LWRIRQZDSXM
aws_secret_access_key = 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

[developmentaccess]
aws_access_key_id = AKIA5JVP3LWRHIU2BSNN
aws_secret_access_key = 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
```

Save the file. You can now run any AWS CLI command that is allowed within the `--profile` parameter. In this case, the `prodaccess` profile will inherit all permissions associated with the `ProductionAccessRole`.

```
aws s3 ls --profile prodaccess
```

It is important to note that we can only use one profile at a time. It means that whenever we use the `prodaccess` profile, we temporarily lose access to the permissions defined in the `developmentaccess` profile.

References:

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_use_switch-role-ec2.html


https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_use_switch-role-ec2_instance-profiles.html

Using VPN to Protect Employees Who are Connecting to AWS Resources

A Virtual Private Network (VPN) is used to establish an encrypted connection between computer devices through the public Internet. VPN aims to emulate the privacy of a network connection that exists in a private network.

In AWS, you can establish a VPN connection between your VPC and remote servers in four (4) ways.

AWS Site-to-Site VPN




AWS Site-to-Site VPN provides an *IPsec VPN connection* between your VPC and your remote network. First, you need to create and set up a Virtual Private Gateway/Transit Gateway and a Customer Gateway on AWS. Then, you need to download the configuration file from AWS and use that to configure the settings of your customer gateway device (physical device on your end).

Use Case:

- Given the fact that IPsec is more complicated and secure than SSL VPN, consider using AWS Site-to-Site VPN if you prefer a more secure connection.
- If your users/employees only work within a site/building confines, use AWS Site-to-Site VPN. Note that users outside your on-premises network can't access your AWS VPC because they need to be connected to the Customer Gateway Device.

AWS Client VPN




AWS Client VPN is a managed client-based VPN that is offered as a service. Like any managed services, things like high-availability and scalability are already taken care of by AWS. You just have to expose a Client VPN Endpoint that your users can use to establish a secure TLS VPN session.

Use Case:

- Unlike Site-to-Site VPN, users from any location can connect and access resources from your Amazon VPC or on-premises network using an OpenVPN-based VPN client. So, if you like to trade the more secure IPsec connection over the flexibility of having a connection from anywhere in the world then use AWS Client VPN.
- If you want less operational management.

AWS VPN CloudHub




AWS VPN CloudHub is a hub-and-spoke VPN that allows communication between two or more on-premises networks situated at different locations. You must create multiple customer gateways with the public IP address of your gateway. And use a unique Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Autonomous System Number (ASN) for each customer gateway.

Use case:

- If you want to establish a secure communication between multiple private networks that use Site-to-Site VPN connections via your Virtual Private Gateway.

Third Party Software VPN Appliance



Optionally, you can spin up an EC2 instance where you can run a third party software VPN appliance. Unlike AWS Client VPN, you have full control over the software, instance, and the responsibilities that come with it, like installing updates and patches. You can find a software VPN appliance from open source communities, AWS partners, or AWS Marketplace.

Use Case:

- If you prefer a particular software VPN appliance and want full control over it.
- If you have users who access your AWS resources from different locations (office, home, employees on travel).

References:

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpn/latest/s2svpn/VPC_VPN.html

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/vpn-connections.html>



Penetration Testing in AWS

Penetration testing or pen testing is an authorized simulated cyberattack against a computer system. It is done to evaluate the system's security level and check for potential bugs or vulnerabilities that could harm the system.

Pen testing is vital to Security Specialists because it helps them expose the weak points of their newly implemented or existing security controls. By determining those weak points, they could right away tell what adjustments should be made and identify whether a security solution is viable or not for a particular event.

"Can I conduct penetration testing in my AWS environment?" - Yes, but it depends.

Pen testing in the Cloud might be slightly different than what you're used to in your on-premises environment. By now, you should already have a good grasp of the [shared responsibility model](#), which basically explains the relationship between the Cloud Provider and its customer in terms of which of the two have control over what resources. Because of this shared responsibility, you are limited to security assessments/pen-testing strategies that you can carry out.

According to AWS, customers are **permitted** to perform penetration tests on these services **without prior approval** (*you do not need to submit any penetration test request form*):

- Amazon EC2 instances, NAT Gateways, and Elastic Load Balancers
- Amazon RDS
- Amazon CloudFront
- Amazon Aurora
- Amazon API Gateways
- AWS Lambda and Lambda Edge functions
- Amazon Lightsail resources
- Amazon Elastic Beanstalk environments

Customers are **prohibited** from doing the following tests:

- DNS zone walking via Amazon Route 53 Hosted Zones
- Denial of Service (DoS), Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), Simulated DoS, Simulated DDoS
- Port flooding
- Protocol flooding
- Request flooding (login request flooding, API request flooding)

Note that the simulation of a DDoS attack is prohibited for regular customers. However, It is still possible to conduct DDoS tests as long as you're an AWS Partner Network (APN) Partner, and you have approval from AWS to conduct DDoS tests.



If you have other simulation events that you want to run, you can submit a request to AWS. A reply may take up to 7 days after a security team has reviewed your request. Lastly, it is imperative to know that any damages done to AWS or other AWS customers are under your responsibility.

Security Specialty Exam Notes:

You don't have to submit a request form to conduct penetration tests on permitted AWS resources.

Reference:

<https://aws.amazon.com/security/penetration-testing/>



AWS Billing Permissions

AWS Organizations enables you to set up a single payment method for all the AWS accounts in your organization through **consolidated billing**. With consolidated billing, you can see a combined view of charges incurred by all your accounts, as well as take advantage of pricing benefits from aggregated usage, such as volume discounts for EC2 and S3.

AWS Billing (service prefix: `aws-portal`) provides the service-specific resources, actions, and condition context keys for use in IAM permission policies. You can specify the following actions in the Action element of an IAM policy statement:

- **ModifyAccount** - Allow or deny IAM users permission to modify Account Settings.
- **ModifyAccount** - Allow or deny IAM users permission to modify Account Settings.
- **ModifyBilling** - Allow or deny IAM users permission to modify billing settings.
- **ModifyPaymentMethods** - Allow or deny IAM users permission to modify payment methods.
- **ViewAccount** - Allow or deny IAM users permission to view account settings.
- **ViewBilling** - Allow or deny IAM users permission to view billing pages in the console.
- **ViewPaymentMethods** - Allow or deny IAM users permission to view payment methods.
- **ViewUsage** - Allow or deny IAM users permission to view AWS usage reports.

Suppose your company is handling multiple AWS accounts. In that case, it is preferable to use AWS Organizations so you can aggregate the bill of each account into a single master account that pays the bill of all its member accounts. Not only does it make the life of financial auditors easier, but implementing the principle of least privilege also becomes a whole lot simpler.

To understand what I mean, consider the following scenario:


A company has 50 AWS accounts that are consolidated using AWS Organizations. The accountants from the finance department log in as IAM users in the AWS Finance account. The finance team members need to read the consolidated billing information in the AWS master account that pays the charges of all the member (linked) accounts. The required IAM access to the AWS billing services has already been provisioned in the master account. The Security Officer should ensure that the finance team is not able to view any other resources in the master account.

Essentially, the scenario requires the application of the principle of least privilege when granting access for the accountants from the finance department. To properly implement this, you must first need to determine the minimum set of actions needed for the accountants to do their job properly.

According to the scenario, the finance department should be allowed to read consolidated billing information in the Master Account. From the list of AWS Billing permissions that we saw earlier, the **ViewBilling** permission will fulfill the required permissions to do the task.

We can delegate access to the Finance Account by doing the following steps:

1. Set-up an IAM role **in the master account** with the ViewBilling permission.



Create role 1 2 3 4

Select type of trusted entity


AWS service
EC2, Lambda and others


Another AWS account
Belonging to you or 3rd party


Web identity
Cognito or any OpenID provider


SAML 2.0 federation
Your corporate directory

Allows entities in other accounts to perform actions in this account. [Learn more](#)

Billing (1 action) Clone Remove

Service: Billing

Actions: Specify the actions allowed in Billing Switch to deny permissions

Manual actions (add actions)

☐ All Billing actions (aws-portal:*)


Access level

☒ Read (1 selected) Expand all Collapse all

- ☐ ViewAccount
- ☒ ViewBilling
- ☐ ViewPaymentMethods
- ☐ ViewUsage

☐ Write

2. Grant the finance users from the Finance account the permission to assume the role.



Reference:

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/list_awsbilling.html

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awsaccountbilling/latest/aboutv2/billing-permissions-ref.html>


<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awsaccountbilling/latest/aboutv2/billing-example-policies.html>

Preventing Staff from Adding Rules to Security Groups without any Approval

In a scenario where you don't have firewall software installed in your instance, Security Groups act as the last line of defense of your VPC. For this reason, it is of utmost importance to restrict the connections to your instances to only authorized users. Security Groups are stateful. It means that return traffic is automatically allowed, regardless of any rules. For example, a security group with an inbound rule that permits connection on port 80 within a specific CIDR range will also allow the corresponding outbound traffic (response) regardless of the security group's outbound rule.


According to Shred-It, an information security company, the most common cause of security issues comes from employee negligence. As a case in point, a developer who needs to do some quick code testing might carelessly add an inbound rule that allows SSH connection from anywhere. It might sound like a simple matter, but it could cause grave consequences if not addressed, especially if done habitually. As a Security Specialist, you have to anticipate that kind of scenario to mitigate the risks that come with it.

An attacker could take advantage of a port exposed to the Internet. For instance, if you leave an SSH port open, botnets could exhaust your instance's resources through brute-force attacks. If they're lucky, they might even figure out your SSH credentials and have access to your instance.



Bad Way To Fix it

Since the problem is at the network level, it is tempting to fix the issue through direct network configuration. For example, the exam might trick you into choosing Network Access Control List (NACL) to filter out source IP addresses matching the 0.0.0.0/0 CIDR range. Although it is possible, it is not practically correct. By doing that, you will block all of the incoming requests from the Internet to your entire VPC. This will affect your other applications hosted in AWS, and the solution doesn't automatically remediate the security risk.




Right Way To Fix it

To solve this and to prevent any users from adding a 0.0.0.0/0 source IP address to your security group in the future, we'll have to be more creative. The appropriate solution is to use AWS Config.

There is an AWS Config managed rule called **vpc-sg-open-only-to-authorized-ports** that checks whether the security group with 0.0.0.0/0 of any Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPC) allows only specific inbound TCP or UDP traffic. The rule is COMPLIANT if there is a security group with inbound 0.0.0.0/0 with no ports provided in the parameters.

The image below illustrates the simplified diagram of the solution. AWS Config will detect security groups that allow 0.0.0.0/0 access to specific ports (in this case, port 22). A Lambda function is triggered when such an event happens. The function is programmed to update the security group's source IP for SSH to your organization's firewall IP address.



References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/vpc-sg-open-only-to-authorized-ports.html>
https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/evaluate-config_develop-rules_nodejs-sample.html
<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-monitor-aws-account-configuration-changes-and-api-calls-to-amazon-ec2-security-groups/>
<https://www.shredit.com/en-us/about/press-room/press-releases/sacking-employees-for-data-breach-negligence>



Setting up Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) and Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Software

Intrusion Detection System (IDS) monitors network and system traffic for suspicious activity. The identified threats are reported to systems administrators or a security information and event management (SIEM) system.

Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) provides an additional security layer by proactively denying network traffic from known security threats or dropping malicious packets.

IPS/IDS solutions help protect your EC2 instances by detecting vulnerabilities and responding to attacks. It could also protect your applications by using next-generation firewalls, which inspects and prevents malicious traffic at an application level.

How is it different from GuardDuty?

Amazon GuardDuty is only a threat detection service. Therefore, it is not a true IPS/IDS solution. However, you still could implement your own “IPS” with GuardDuty by triggering a Lambda Function that will execute your own set of remedial actions. An IPS/IDS solution does a little bit more than that. Its main selling point is its automated response. You can save time stopping an attack since an IPD/IPS solution can carry out automatic mitigation. Also, it can help you prevent brute-force attacks from hundreds of sources. With configuration management tools like Ansible or AWS OpsWorks, you can easily manage the IPS/IDS software installation in several instances.

In AWS, you can buy custom IPS/IDS software from the AWS Marketplace that fits your needs. You can save on costs by leveraging on the pay-as-you-go pricing model of AWS.

Search AWS Marketplace products

×

ips/ids (38 results) showing 1 - 10

<
1
2
3
4
>
⚙️



Trend Micro Deep Security [↗](#)

By [Trend Micro](#) [↗](#) | Ver Deep Security 20.0.174
Linux/Unix, Amazon Linux Amazon Linux 2 - 64-bit Amazon Machine Image (AMI)

★★★★☆ 3 AWS reviews [↗](#) | 16 external reviews [↗](#)

Security built to fit DevOps with robust API's and automated protection. Lock down servers with Application Control, protect Docker containers, and increase malware protection with behavioral analysis, and predictive machine learning. Get proactive protection for EC2 workloads with Trend Micro Deep...



MetaFlows Network IDS IPS for AWS [↗](#)

By [MetaFlows, Inc.](#) [↗](#)

Our award-winning malware detection and prevention software is deployed in your VPCs to analyze the behavior and the content of your Internet traffic. It reliably finds and stops malware from threatening your network. False positives are virtually eliminated by correlating multiple independent...



Trend Micro Deep Security as a Service | Annual + Pay as You Go [↗](#)

By [Trend Micro](#) [↗](#)

16 external reviews [↗](#)

Protect cloud workloads and containers with Trend Micro Deep Security as a Service. Build secure. Ship fast. Run anywhere. This hosted solution means there's no set up or configuration, we handle all the...


Reference:

<https://aws.amazon.com/mp/scenarios/security/ids/>

Setting up ADFS Federation Between On-premises Active Directory and AWS

Instead of creating IAM users or accounts for corporate users, you can leverage an existing on-premises Active Directory as an Identity Provider to provide access to AWS services. This approach is beneficial to organizations that already have their password policies and groups.


IAM supports external users authenticated by a SAML-compliant Idp to access the AWS Management Console or execute programmatic calls to AWS services. To establish federated access, you need to configure your on-premises Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS) to add a relying party trust between Active Directory and AWS. Then, create an IAM role that will be assumed by the federated users. Attach the corresponding permissions for the roles accordingly, and don't forget to add the **AssumeRoleWithSAML** permission in STS to generate the temporary credentials. The temporary credentials are like your username and password whenever you sign in to your account. AWS recognizes these credentials for a specified time-limit only.



The screenshot shows the 'Add role' page in the AWS IAM console. At the top, there are four tabs: 'AWS service' (EC2, Lambda and others), 'Another AWS account' (Belonging to you or 3rd party), 'Web identity' (Cognito or any OpenID provider), and 'SAML 2.0 federation' (Your corporate directory). The 'SAML 2.0 federation' tab is selected. Below the tabs, there is a text box that says 'Allows users that are federated with SAML 2.0 to assume this role to perform actions in your account. [Learn more](#)'. Below this, the heading 'Choose a SAML 2.0 provider' is displayed. A sub-note states: 'If you're creating a role for API access, choose an Attribute and then type a Value to include in the role. This restricts access to users with the specified attributes.' The form includes a 'SAML provider' dropdown menu, a 'Create new provider' link with an external link icon, and a 'Refresh' button. There are two radio button options: 'Allow programmatic access only' and 'Allow programmatic and AWS Management Console access'. Below these are an 'Attribute' dropdown menu, a 'Value*' text input field, and a 'Condition' section with a '+ Add condition (optional)' button.

For example, you have a Development and an Admin Group in your Active directory that needs access to AWS. You can create two IAM roles with the names: Development and Admin. The naming convention is arbitrary but it would be convenient if you give them names similar to your Active Directory Group names. You may add a full access permission to the Admin role and a more restrictive permission to the Development role. These two roles will be assumed by the Development and Admin groups, allowing them to inherit the permissions contained in the roles for a limited time.

The diagram below illustrates the process of federated authentication through an external Identity Provider.



Trust Relationship For Active Directory

The Trust Relationship describes how the users in one domain can access resources in another domain.

There are three trust relationship directions:

- 1. One-way:incoming** - Users in the specified realm will not be able to access any resources in this domain.
- 2. One-way:outgoing** - Users in this domain will not be able to access any resources in the specified realm.
- 3. Two-way (Bi-directional)** - Users in this domain and users in the specified realm will be able to access resources in *either* domain or realm.

Since the exam focuses on AWS Services, you'd likely encounter questions about setting up the trust relationship between an on-premises active directory and the AWS active directory. In that case, to access resources on the AWS domain, you must configure a one-way trust relationship from your on-premises domain to the AWS domain.

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/amp/latest/userguide/install-option-saml.html>



<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/enabling-federation-to-aws-using-windows-active-directory-adfs-and-saml-2-0/>


https://docs.aws.amazon.com/directoryservice/latest/admin-guide/ms_ad_setup_trust.html

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory-domain-services/concepts-forest-trust>

NACL - Ephemeral Port Range

Ephemeral ports are temporary ports that are generally used for outbound connections when a **client** makes a request to a server. These ports are automatically allocated by the TCP/IP stack upon establishing a connection. Since we can't control or choose the port number that will be used, we must provide an ephemeral port range to the NACL rule.

Let's say that you want to connect to your EC2 instance via SSH from your local computer. In this case, your local computer is the client, and the EC2 instance is the server. When your computer initiates an SSH connection to the server, the client IP stack assigns a random port number from the available ephemeral port range and uses that as the source port. The server accepts inbound traffic on the listening port (port 22). When the server has to respond to the client's request, it uses the same ephemeral port that the client used to initiate the connection.



On AWS, the ephemeral port range for EC2 instances and ELBs is **1024-65535**. To implement the diagram above, we need to configure the NACL's inbound rule to allow traffic from the Client's IP on port 22.

Inbound Rule

Rule #	Type	Protocol	Port Range ⓘ	Source ⓘ	Allow / Deny
100	SSH (22) ▼	TCP (6) ▼	22	130.200.233.98/32	ALLOW ▼



For the server to utilize the Client's source port (ephemeral port) for responding, you must set the ephemeral port range on the port range field and set the destination to the Client's public IP address.

Outbound

Rule #	Type	Protocol	Port Range ⓘ	Destination ⓘ	Allow / Deny
100	Custom TCP Rule ▼	TCP (6) ▼	1024 - 65535	130.200.233.98/32	ALLOW ▼

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/vpc-network-acls.html>

<https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/resolve-connection-sg-acl-inbound/>

Minimize Potential Attack Surface

Businesses primarily rely on Internet communication for fast financial transactions, customer feedback surveys, digital advertising, and many more. Because of the nature of activities on the Internet, it has become an attractive place for cyber criminals. It is full of predators always hunting for victims to prey on for their own gain. And failure to take preventive measures could cost you resources, time, and money.

One effective way of protecting your business from attackers is by reducing the attack surface of your application. The attack surface refers to the number of possible ways an attacker could enter your network. Attack surface reduction is a strategy that aims to limit the opportunities an attacker might have to target your application.

Ways To Reduce Attack Surface on AWS

- **Create a security group that only allows specific ports and authorized servers.**

If you have a web application that uses an ELB and EC2 instance as its web server, instead of sharing a security group, create one security group for ELB and another for EC2. Add an inbound rule inside the EC2's security group. Configure the rule to only allow traffic from the ELB. You can achieve that by referencing the ELB's security group as the traffic source. Then, point the traffic coming from the public Internet to your ELB. By placing the ELB between the public Internet and your instance, you're preventing direct communication between the Internet users and your web server.

- **Set up Network Access Control Lists (ACLs) that only allow the required ports and network addresses in your network.**

NACLs are useful in mitigating DDoS Attacks coming from known source IP addresses because it allows you to deny traffic to your subnet explicitly. If you only used TCP traffic, you can stop UDP flood attacks by denying all UDP traffic.

- **Protect your origin server by putting it behind a CloudFront web distribution.**

The success of a DDoS attack depends on the number of compromised computer systems that target a specific server. You can protect your server from such attacks by putting it behind a CloudFront web distribution. CloudFront has multiple edge locations spread across the globe that serves content to users. Executing a DDoS attack on an extensive distributed system such as CloudFront is nearly impossible.

- **Enable AWS Shield Advanced for enhanced DDoS attack detection and monitoring for application-layer traffic to your AWS resources.**



You can register an Elastic IP (EIP) Address as a protected resource when you enable AWS Shield Advanced. AWS resources attached to the registered EIP are automatically identified. AWS Shield Advanced detects protected resources quickly, which results in faster mitigation of infrastructure-layer DDoS attacks.

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/whitepapers/latest/aws-best-practices-ddos-resiliency/attack-surface-reduction.html>

<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface>



Using AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store and AWS Secrets Manager to Store System Credentials

Managing the security of your applications is an integral part of any organization especially for infrastructures deployed in the cloud. One aspect of application security is how the parameters such as environment variables, database passwords, API keys, product keys, etc. are stored and retrieved. As a best practice, secret information should not be stored in plain text and not be embedded inside your source code. It is also recommended to set up an automated system to rotate passwords or keys regularly (which is easy to forget when you manage keys manually).


Managing and securing these types of data can be troublesome so Amazon provides the AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store and AWS Secrets Manager services for this purpose. Parameter Store and Secrets Manager are two distinct services but offer similar functionalities that allow you to centrally manage and secure your secret information.

AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store

Parameter Store is part of the application management tools offered by the AWS Systems Manager (SSM) service. Parameter Store allows you to create key-value parameters to save your application configurations, custom environment variables, product keys, and credentials on a single interface. It also allows you to secure your data by encryption, which is integrated with AWS KMS.

After you create your parameters in Parameter Store, you can then have these parameters retrieved by your SSM Run Command, SSM State Manager, or reference them on your application running on EC2, ECS, and Lambda or even on applications running your on-premises data center. This eliminates the need to hardcode variables or embed plain text credentials on your code. Parameter Store makes it easy to update these variables without modifying your source code, as well as eliminate the need to embed confidential information such as database passwords in your code.

Here's an overview of how applications can retrieve information on Parameter Store.



- Your application (on-premises servers, EC2, ECS, Lambda, etc.) sends a parameter request to SSM Parameter Store.
- If this is a plaintext parameter request, Parameter Store checks with IAM if the user/role is allowed to retrieve the parameter.
- If this is an encrypted parameter request, Parameter Store checks with IAM if the user/role is allowed to both retrieve and decrypt the parameter with AWS KMS. Decryption requires that the IAM has KMS Decrypt permission.
- If the IAM verification is successful, Parameter Store sends back the parameter value to the application.

Secure String Parameter

Parameter Store supports a lot of use cases, from saving unencrypted plaintext to more sensitive information such as database passwords. You can also store configuration data and secure strings in hierarchies and track versions. During parameter creation, you specify the data type of your string:

- String - Any string value.
- StringList - Separate strings using commas.
- SecureString - Encrypt sensitive data using the KMS keys for your account

For parameters that should not be retrieved or referenced in plaintext, it is best to use the `SecureString` data type.

Sensitive information, such as passwords and secrets, should never be left exposed in plaintext. Parameter Store solves this problem by offering the `SecureString` data type, which uses AWS KMS to encrypt your information. AWS KMS uses either a customer managed CMK or an AWS-managed CMK when encrypting the parameter value. Then in the application that references the parameter, you must set `WithDecryption` to "True" to use the original parameter value.

AWS Secrets Manager

AWS Secrets Manager enables you to rotate, manage, and retrieve database credentials, API keys, and other secrets throughout their lifecycle. It also makes it really easy for you to follow security best practices such as encrypting secrets and rotating these regularly.

If you are a security administrator responsible for storing and managing secrets, and ensuring that your organization follows regulatory and compliance requirements, you can use Secrets Manager to perform these tasks from one central location. Secrets Manager can offload the management of secrets from developers such as database passwords or API keys, so they don't have to worry about where to store these credentials.

AWS Secret Manager also follows the same process flow like Parameter Store shown above. With descriptions laid out for both services, we'll take a look at their similarities and differences next.

Similarities and Differences

Both services offer similar web interfaces on which you can declare key-values pairs for your parameters and secrets.

Both services accept values of up to 4096 characters (4KB size) for each entry. And they both offer the option to encrypt these values. Encryption for both services is integrated on AWS KMS, so your application referencing these parameters or secrets needs to have KMS Decrypt permission when retrieving encrypted values.

However, Parameter Store was designed to cater to a wider use case, not just secrets or passwords, but also application configuration variables like URLs, DB hostnames, custom settings, product keys, etc., which is why



the default selection for creating a parameter is a plain text String value. You can enable encryption if you explicitly choose to.

Secrets Manager was designed specifically for confidential information that needs to be encrypted so the creation of a secret entry has encryption enabled by default. You can also choose to store in plaintext if you explicitly want to.

Secrets Manager also provides a built-in password generator through the use of AWS CLI. This can be helpful when you want to create an RDS instance with a CloudFormation template. You can create a randomly itemized password and later reference it on your RDS configuration.

Both services have a versioning feature. This allows you to view previous versions of your parameters in case you needed them. You can choose to restore the older version of the parameter. Parameter Store only allows one version of the parameter active at any given time. Secrets Manager on the other hand, allows you to have multiple items active at the same time. Secrets Manager distinguishes between different versions by the staging labels. You can check out staging labels [here](#).

The next point of difference is the ability to rotate the secret. AWS Secrets Manager offers the ability to switch secrets at any given time and can be configured to regularly rotate depending on your requirements.

Another feature available for Secrets Manager is cross-account access. Secrets can be accessed from another AWS account. For example, you can have an application with an IAM role to retrieve secrets from another AWS account. This is useful if your secrets are centrally managed from another AWS account.

One advantage of SSM Parameter is that it costs nothing. You can store up to 10,000 parameters and you won't get billed. AWS Secret Manager costs \$0.40 for every secret per month and \$0.05 in every 10,000 API calls.



	SSM Parameter Store	AWS Secrets Manager
Store values up to 4096 Characters	Yes	Yes
Values can be encrypted with KMS	Yes	Yes
Can be referenced in CloudFormation	Yes	Yes
Built-in password generator		Yes
Automated secret rotation		Yes
Cross-account access		Yes
Additional Cost	Free	Yes

As an additional note, Parameter Store is now integrated with Secrets Manager so that you can retrieve Secrets Manager secrets when using other AWS services that already support references to Parameter Store parameters. This is helpful if your application is configured to use Parameter Store APIs, but you want your secrets to be stored in Secrets Manager.

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/systems-manager-parameter-store.html>
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/integration-ps-secretsmanager.html>
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/specifying-sensitive-data-secrets.html>

Amazon VPC Flows Logs

VPC Flow Logs is a feature in AWS that allows you to capture information about the incoming and outgoing IP traffic of the network interfaces in your Amazon VPC. Flow logs can assist you to properly monitor and log the activities in your VPC. It can diagnose an overly restrictive security group or network ACL rules, monitor the incoming traffic to your EC2 instances, and determine the flow of traffic to and from the network interfaces. After you've created a flow log, you can retrieve and view its data in the chosen destination.

A flow log data can be published to these destinations:

- Amazon CloudWatch Logs
- Amazon S3

Storing all the log data to Amazon S3 is a strategy that you can adopt to consolidate every flow log from across all VPCs that you own. The flow logs of your VPC can be published to an Amazon S3 bucket that you specify. The collected flow log records for all of the monitored network interfaces are sent to a series of log file objects stored in the S3 bucket. In this way, all of your logs are in one place which lessens the management overhead.

Both VPC Flow Logs and Traffic Mirroring are used to monitor the traffic in your VPC. VPC Flow Logs enables you to collect, store, and analyze network flow logs, while Traffic Mirroring gives you deeper insights into the network traffic.

VPC Flow Logs	Traffic Mirroring
Captured information: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Allowed and denied traffic• IP addresses (Source and Destination)• Ports• Protocol number• Packet and byte counts• Action taken (Accept or Reject)	Use case: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Analyze the packets to perform a root-cause analysis.• Reverse engineering a network attack• Detect and stop compromised workloads

How to know if the issue is in the network ACL or in the security group?

You can easily differentiate the issues between the two by reviewing the VPC flow log display.

- If the network ACL permits the outbound ICMP traffic, the flow logs will display two **ACCEPT** records (originating ping and response ping).
- But if the security group denies an inbound ICMP traffic, the flow logs will display a **REJECT** record. This means that the traffic did not reach the instance.

References:



<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/flow-logs.html>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/mirroring/flow-log.html>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/flow-logs-records-examples.html#flow-log-example-security-groups>


Amazon GuardDuty Multi-account Aggregation

Imagine running an organization with multiple AWS accounts for different workloads, teams, and projects. With every account, you need to monitor GuardDuty findings individually. It will be quite difficult for your security team to monitor these findings with their constant switching between AWS accounts.


Amazon GuardDuty supports the consolidation of these findings to one AWS account. For example, your organization has 10 AWS accounts. All you have to do is create a “GuardDuty” AWS account with the sole purpose of ingesting all the findings from the 10 AWS accounts. With the help of this article, you should be able to aggregate your GuardDuty findings from multiple AWS accounts to a single AWS account.

In this scenario, we’ll be using two AWS accounts: first is the master account where all the findings will be sent to, and a secondary AWS account which will send its findings to the master account.


1. To start, we need to “Enable GuardDuty” for both the master and secondary accounts.



2. Once enabled, you will be redirected to the GuardDuty console. Head over to the “Accounts” section and click “Add accounts”. For multiple accounts, you can add accounts by using the “Upload List (.csv)”



3. Enter the 12-digit account number and the email address associated with the secondary account. Click “Add” then “Next”



4. Once you have filled in the details of the secondary account, you should see it under the accounts tab. During this stage, the status of the account is “invite”. Click on invite and a pop up message will appear.

- I. You can send an optional message to the receiver.
- II. Tick the “also send an email notification” to ensure that the associated email of the secondary account will receive the email.
- III. Once done, click “Send Invitation”
- IV. During the invitation process, AWS will check if the account ID and the email address associated with the account is valid.

Invitation to GuardDuty (1 account selected)

Any text you provide is appended to the message that GuardDuty sends to the invited accounts on your behalf.

Message

Hi,

Adding your AWS account for the consolidation of GuardDuty findings.

Thank you.

Invitees are always notified about the invitation in their GuardDuty console.

☒ Also send an email notification to the root user on the invitee's AWS account and generate an alert in the invitee's Personal Health Dashboard

Cancel
Send Invitation

5. You have two options to accept the invitation:

- Head over to your secondary account's GuardDuty and accept the invitation.
- Click the URL sent by AWS over the email.

****Note:** Remember that you need to enable GuardDuty on the secondary account before accepting the invitation.

GuardDuty

Welcome to GuardDuty

GuardDuty is now enabled


Invitations

The following AWS accounts have requested permission to view and manage GuardDuty findings on your behalf. You can accept only one invitation. Approval is optional. [Learn more](#)


ACCOUNT ID	ACCEPT
30	☒

Accept invitation
or skip for now

6. Once you have accepted the invitation, all of the findings in the secondary account will now be sent to the master account.



7. Once the secondary account has accepted the invitation, the status will now be "Enabled"



References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/what-is-guardduty.html>
https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/guardduty_accounts.html


Host-Based Security

Security Groups and Network Access Control Lists (ACLs) are network-based virtual firewalls that AWS provides to help us manage and control the network traffic that reaches our instances. Security Groups operate at the instance-level, while Network ACLs operate at the subnet level. With their combined efforts, you can design and achieve the same granularity level that a traditional firewall gives.

Because of the AWS Shared Responsibility Model, some of the security burdens are offloaded from the AWS customers. However, AWS still encourages users to install host-based firewalls in addition to the virtual firewalls that they serve. Also, there may be cases where security groups and Network ACLs might not support a large complicated network. A security group can only have 60 inbound and outbound rules. A Network ACL can only have 20 ingress rules for IPv4 traffic. With these given limitations, you might have to introduce a host-based firewall on your network.

Using Network-based and Host-based Firewall For Ultimate Protection

A network-based firewall only allows or denies network traffic based on IP addresses and ports that you state in your rules. This can pose a problem since you don't know what kind of data a user is sending to your instance. If there are exposed entry points to your network, an adversary may take advantage of that by sending packets that contain virus or malware that could disrupt critical applications running on your instance.



OS-level software like IPtables, Windows Firewall, and third-party IPS/IDS solutions provide customized protection and functionality like threat detection and deep packet inspection. Because they operate on the host level, they can also control access at an application level — something that a network-based firewall can't do. It is recommended to implement a security solution that comprises a network-based firewall and a host-based firewall.



Packet Data Inspection

Imagine you are in a library. You are instructed to weed out children's books from adult books. It should be an easy task. You just need to take a quick look at the book cover or the book title to know what it is for. But what if someone has decided to write an inappropriate book with a misleading title and cover, which could be easily mistaken for a playful kids' book?

The book title is not enough; you should also examine its contents.

The packets are the books, and its content is the packet's payload. The Security Groups and Network ACLs work similarly to how you filter books by title. They can only make a policy decision based on the packet's header: *source and destination IP address, port number, and protocol type*. These are just surface-level of network traffic filtering.

To augment the level of your security, you need to have a way to examine the contents of the packets that enter your network. This is the job of a deep packet inspection software – to protect your applications against sophisticated attacks such as injection of malware or shellcode on the packet's payload. In AWS, you could set up your own DPI solution by installing a host-based agent or a proxy-based deep packet inspection software.

Detecting whether a file stored on an Amazon EC2 instance has been modified.

Sometimes, even a restrictive permission to an instance is not enough as human nature bounds us to make mistakes. Modifications of file, accidental deletion of important data, mistyping of commands that may cause harm – these are just some of the risks that come with privileged access.


It can't be helped, though. Every administrator in an organization needs superuser access to fulfill their job. That is why we need a security control that can help us detect such scenarios so that immediate action can be carried out.

In AWS, we rely on host-based IDS software for detecting modified files on an EC2 instance. This software can analyze and check the integrity of important system files by comparing their current state to a trusted state. You can configure the software to alert your security team whenever it detects irregularities or modifications to the files.

Disabling Source/Destination Check

When launching an EC2 instance, an elastic network interface is automatically allotted to it by AWS as *eth0*. However, if you spin up an instance from a virtual security appliance AMI, you might need additional elastic network interfaces. You can create and attach secondary ENIs with their own IP addresses (public and private) and security groups to your instance.

An ENI has an attribute called Source/Destination check which is enabled by default. Instances attached with ENI that have default configuration can only be a source or a destination. It means that it can only receive or send traffic.



Since a virtual security appliance is neither a source nor destination (as it monitors both the ingress and egress traffic), you need to disable the Source/Destination check to allow an instance to pass network traffics that are not specifically intended for that instance.

Protecting your EC2 Instance Metadata Service

Instance metadata is a list of information that can be used to configure your instance. Some examples of them are IP address, hostname, security group, instance-id, and security credentials attached to the instance. You can only retrieve instance metadata through a unique IP address (<http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/>) within the AWS network.

Let's say that you have an application running on an instance that communicates to a private S3 bucket. That instance has an IAM role that permits it to do S3 API calls. When the application has to perform an S3 API action, it retrieves the IAM role's credentials from the instance metadata item `iam/security-credentials/role-name`.



This is a security risk because anyone who can log in to your instance can now exploit the sensitive data stored on your S3 bucket. What you can do as a mitigation technique is to restrict metadata services access using IPtables. You can restrict instance metadata access for specific applications, users, or groups on your instance.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/answers/networking/vpc-security-capabilities/>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/security.html>

<https://aws.amazon.com/security/>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instancedata-data-retrieval.html>

https://d1.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/Security/AWS_Security_Best_Practices.pdf



Domain Whitelisting Using Proxy Servers

Domain whitelisting is a security strategy wherein an authorized person (i.e., Security Administrator) explicitly permits egress traffic from a network, devices, or applications to specific domains that were deemed trustworthy by an organization. This is done to reduce the chance of a computer downloading a virus/malware from the Internet, communicating with malicious IP addresses, or receiving a DDoS attack.

Whitelisting is a stricter and a more secure policy than blacklisting as it denies all traffic by default. The access control wholly depends on your company's trust level to certain applications or websites outside your corporate network. This trust-centric approach effectively reduces your network's attack surface.

In real-world scenarios, hackers will not just use a single IP address to attack you. These guys will use one IP address after another. This is why it is difficult to individually block a malicious IP address or range using NACL. If you have a private web application (which is only used within your corporate network), the better solution would be a whitelist approach.

In AWS, we can use HTTP proxies such as Squid or Varnish for whitelisting approved domains or DNS blocking. To implement this, do the following:

1. Install and run the proxy software to an EC2 instance in a public subnet.
2. Open the inbound port 80 and 443 to allow HTTP and HTTPS traffic.
3. Configure the route table of the private subnet where your web application resides to use the proxy EC2 instance when communicating to the public Internet.
4. Since the EC2 instance is acting as an inline proxy server, don't forget to disable its source/destination check attribute.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-set-up-an-outbound-vpc-proxy-with-domain-whitelisting-and-content-filtering/>

<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-add-dns-filtering-to-your-nat-instance-with-squid/>



Certificate Management Using AWS Certificate Manager

AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) is a service that lets you easily create and manage public domain validation (DV) certificates that you use to establish an SSL/TLS encrypted connection between a client and a server. You can request a public certificate directly from ACM, free of charge, or import your own. The managed renewal of certificates is only limited to ACM certificates and does not apply to imported certificates.

You can not export and install ACM certificates to an EC2 instance, as you would have with free SSL/TLS certificates like Let's Encrypt. Instead, you would have to integrate it with other AWS services like *Amazon CloudFront* or *AWS Elastic Load Balancer*. Then, use these services to interface with your backend server.

You must issue a certificate in the **US East (N. Virginia)** region if you want to set up an HTTPS connection between **viewers and CloudFront**. However, you can issue a certificate **in any region** if you wish to create an encrypted communication between **CloudFront and an ELB origin**.

ACM Private Certificate Authority (CA) is a managed private CA service that enables you to procure a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) without the operational expenses of running your own infrastructure like buying a dedicated HSM for storing CA keys.


A private CA handles the issuance, validation, and revocation of private certificates within a private network. It comprises two major components: The first is the **CA certificate**, a cryptographic building block upon which certificates can be issued. The second is **a set of run-time services** for maintaining revocation information through the **Certificate Revocation List (CRL)**.

Unlike ACM-issued certificates, ACM Private CA can customize the usage of certificates. You can create *certificate extensions* to modify the purpose of a digital certificate that caters to your needs. These extensions are used for applications like *code signing certificates*, *OCSP signing certificates*, and *mutual authentication*.

CA Hierarchy

A CA hierarchy provides strong security and restrictive access controls for the most-trusted root CA at the top of the trust chain, while allowing more permissive access and bulk certificate issuance for subordinate CAs lower in the chain.

The image below is an example of a public CA hierarchy. We can quickly determine the root CA by merely looking at the top-level value of the certification path. In this case, the **"Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority"** is the root CA. The certificates below it are its subordinate CAs. The bottommost **"tutorialsdojo.com"** certificate, which is also the domain name that it protects, is the end-entity certificate.



When you connect to google.com, the google's server informs your browser which certificate should be used to start an HTTPS connection. Your browser will search for the server's certificate from its list of public trusted certificate authorities (e.g., Comodo SSL, GeoTrust SSL, Go Daddy) like the one above. These trusted CAs are already stored on your browser. If your browser fails to recognize the server's certificate, it will report an insecure connection even if it uses a valid certificate. This usually happens for servers that use self-signed certificates.

With private certificates, the hierarchy doesn't change except for the fact that you're self-hosting the root CA and subordinate CA. In this case, the trusted authority is the entity that issued the root CA.

Select the certificate authority (CA) type ?

ACM helps you create a private subordinate CA.

☒
Root CA

Create a root CA. Choose this option if you want to establish a new CA hierarchy.

☐
Subordinate CA

Create a subordinate CA. Choose this option if you want to make a CA that is subordinate to an existing CA. You can use this option to create issuing CAs as well as intermediate CAs.

Cancel
Next



Mutual (two-way) Authentication in AWS

Most websites that you're familiar with use one-way SSL. The process begins when a client sends a request to a server. As a response, the server will send its public certificate to the client. The client will verify the authenticity of the server's public certificate based on known trusted authorities. Both parties will start communicating via SSL/TLS connection after the successful verification of the client. In this case, the client is the only one responsible for authenticating the request.

On the other hand, mutual authentication is when both the client and the server authenticate each other's requests by sharing their public certificates. They can begin exchanging information in an encrypted channel once their certificates have been successfully verified at both ends. This authentication type is popular with the Internet Of Things (IoT) and business-to-business (B2B) applications.

In AWS, you can use the AWS ACM Private CA to implement a mutual authentication. Let's say that you want to create a mutual authentication between two containers in a VPC. You can begin by first creating a subordinate CA using the root CA. Then, you can use OpenSSL to generate a CSR and a private key in the machines. After generating, sign them by using the `aws acm-pca issue-certificate` command. The output returns the certificate ARN. You can retrieve the certificate by specifying that certificate ARN when calling the `aws acm-pca get-certificate` command.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/certificate-manager/>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/acm-pca/latest/userguide/PcaWelcome.html>

<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-create-certificates-with-custom-extensions-using-aws-certificate-manager-private-ca/>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/acm-pca/issue-certificate.html>


Elastic Load Balancer Security

The Elastic Load Balancer (ELB) is advertised as a service that automatically distributes traffic across multiple targets. But aside from load balancing, it has security features that we can use to enhance network security; or at least make it easier to implement secured connections.

Integration with WAF

Suppose you want to use AWS WAF to protect your EC2 instances against common web exploits. In that case, you're going to have to use the Application Load Balancer (ALB) in front of your instances. The reason for that is because Amazon EC2 does not directly integrate with AWS WAF. In this type of set-up, the ALB sits in between your web application and AWS WAF.

AWS WAF filters incoming web requests (according to rules that you set) that goes to your ALB. Then, the ALB load balances the traffic to your web application.



The screenshot shows the AWS Management Console interface for an Elastic Load Balancer named 'tutor-Appli-12Q66A'. The 'Integrated services' tab is selected, showing a list of services that can be integrated with the load balancer. The 'Config' service is highlighted with a green box, indicating it is currently monitored. The 'AWS WAF' service is also highlighted with a green box, showing it is not enabled, with a 'Create Web ACL' button below it.

Name	DNS name	State	VPC ID	Availability Zones	Type
tutor-Appli-12Q66A	tutor-Appli-12Q66A	active	vpc-0b48b	us-east-2b, us-east-2a	application

Load balancer: tutor-Appli-12Q66A

Integrated services


You can integrate the following AWS services with your load balancer. Integration status and details are displayed below. You set up and configure integration through these services.

- Config** Records configuration changes to your load balancer and provides visibility into its integration with other resources. [Learn more](#) [Refresh](#)
This load balancer is currently monitored in Config.
AWS Config timeline: Recording is ON [View timeline](#)
- AWS WAF** Protects your web applications by enabling AWS WAF directly on your load balancer. [Learn more](#) [Refresh](#)
This load balancer is not WAF enabled.
[Create Web ACL](#)

SAN/SNI

Subject Alternative Name (SAN) allows you to issue a single SSL/TLS certificate for different subdomains. Suppose I have a root domain called mywebsite.com and two other subdomains, namely blog.mywebsite.com and mail.mywebsite.com. Instead of issuing three separate certificates for each of them, I can secure these

domains under a single SAN certificate. To use SAN with ALB, you simply have to choose the certificate to be used from IAM or ACM when creating your load balancer.



Server Name Indication (SNI) is a TLS protocol that lets you consolidate multiple certificates to handle different domains in a single location. These domains are served from a single IP address — in our case, it is the ALB's endpoint. Let's say that we have two domains: `domain1.com` and `domain2.com`. Naturally, we want to securely serve these domains via HTTPS. We provision two certificates for each of the domains. Now, instead of using two load balancers to serve the domain, we can just add the domain's certificates in a single ALB. The ALB will intelligently choose the correct certificate to use.

Perfect Forward Secrecy

Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) is a protocol that uses an ephemeral key to encrypt data for each communication exchange. These ephemeral keys are discarded once the session ends. By introducing PFS, even if an attacker has managed to steal the key that was used in a session, he can only decrypt the data in transit that was encrypted by that key — effectively reducing the blast radius of a breach.

To start using PFS in ELB, you need to configure your load balancer to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECDHE) cipher suites. This algorithm allows the client and server to create shared ephemeral keys.

Deregistering compromised EC2 instances

When something bad happens to a machine on an on-premises set up, we usually shut it down, detach it from the main network, and send it to forensics for investigation. In the AWS Cloud, we can't physically unplug a compromised EC2 machine. You can do the following actions to isolate a compromised EC2 instance:

1. If you have multiple EC2 instances running on an ALB target group, you must first capture the metadata from the instance before making any changes.
2. Detach the instance from an auto scaling group if it belongs to any. Then, deregister the compromised instance from its target group.



3. Change its security group rule to a more restrictive one, only allowing authorized users to access it. This way, you can safely isolate it from other instances, preventing further damage to it.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/aws-web-application-firewall-waf-for-application-load-balancers/>

<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/new-application-load-balancer-sni/>

<https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2014/02/19/elastic-load-balancing-perfect-forward-secrecy-and-more-new-security-features>



DynamoDB Security

You can implement data encryption of a DynamoDB database in two ways:

DynamoDB Encryption Client

- DynamoDB Encryption Client is a software development kit that provides end-to-end encryption (EE2E) – data is encrypted at both ends of a secure communication channel (source & destination.)
- DynamoDB Encryption Client uses signing to protect your data against unauthorized changes. It transparently encrypts data as you add them to your table, and decrypts data as you retrieve them after verifying.
- **Only** selected attribute values in an item can be encrypted. The table name, partition key, sort key, and some attributes that you didn't encrypt remains in plaintext.

Example:

For the sake of simplicity, imagine we have a DynamoDB table called “Song Table.” And for some reason, you’d like to encrypt an entire item. DynamoDB Encrypted Client will not allow you to do that. However, you can encrypt the value of the “Song_Price” attribute since it is not a primary key. DynamoDB needs the primary keys to remain in plaintext to look for an item so it’ll not waste resources scanning the entire table.

Song Table

Artist (Partition Key)	Song_Title(Sort Key)	Song_Price
Beethoven	Für Elise	\$1.00

After encryption, the result will look something like this:

Song Table

Artist (Partition Key)	Song_Title(Sort Key)	Song_Price
Beethoven	Für Elise	Binary(b" 'b\xd3\xb9+e\x11")

- DynamoDB Encryption Client can be used with encryption keys from AWS KMS, AWS CloudHSM, or any cryptographic service that you prefer.



- AWS or any third-party services cannot view your data.

Server-side encryption at rest

- Server-side encryption is a DynamoDB feature that transparently encrypts data as it saves to disk, and automatically decrypts them when you access your table.
- You can use an Amazon DynamoDB owned key, your own CMK, or AWS managed CMK.

Encryption At Rest

Select Server-side encryption settings for your DynamoDB table to help protect data at rest. [Learn more](#)

☒ **DEFAULT**

The key is owned by Amazon DynamoDB. You are not charged any fee for using these CMKs.

☐ **KMS - Customer managed CMK**

The key is stored in your account that you create, own, and manage. AWS Key Management Service (KMS) charges apply. [Learn more](#)

☐ **KMS - AWS managed CMK**

The key is stored in your account and is managed by AWS Key Management Service (KMS). AWS KMS charges apply.

- Unlike DynamoDB Encryption Client, **all table data is encrypted** in server-side encryption.

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/dynamodb-encryption-client/latest/devguide/client-server-side.html>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/amazondynamodb/latest/developerguide/EncryptionAtRest.html>



Domain 4: Identity and Access Management



Overview

The fourth exam domain of the AWS Certified Security Specialty exam deals with Identity and Access Management in AWS. Expect to see a lot of advanced concepts in AWS IAM and its various IAM Entities. This domain will test your knowledge on the following:

- Designing and implementing a scalable authorization and authentication system to access AWS resources.
- Troubleshoot an authorization and authentication system to access AWS resources.

We will cover a lot of IAM policies and troubleshooting topics in this chapter. Just like Domain 2, this section also covers 20% of the exam.



Troubleshooting Amazon QuickSight and Athena Connectivity

Amazon QuickSight is a business analytics service that you can use to compile and visualize data in dashboards. Quicksight is equipped with different themes that you can choose from to accentuate the analytics experience.

Security

- Offers role-based access control, Active Directory integration, CloudTrail auditing, single sign-on, private VPC subnets, and data backup.
- FedRamp, HIPAA, PCI PSS, ISO, and SOC compliant.
- Row-level security enables QuickSight dataset owners to control access to data at row granularity based on permissions associated with the user interacting with the data.

Amazon Athena is a serverless, interactive query used for analyzing large-scale datasets in an S3 bucket using the Structured Query Language (SQL). Athena does not require any complex Extract, Transform, Load (ETL) jobs to run. You just need to point your data source in Amazon S3, define your schema, then run the SQL commands that you're familiar with.

Security

- Control access to your data by using IAM policies, access control lists, and S3 bucket policies.
- If the files in the target S3 bucket is encrypted, you can perform queries on the encrypted data itself.

Amazon QuickSight natively integrates with Athena. This integration allows you to visualize queries that you made in Athena. You can start by simply pointing Athena as your data source and selecting the database that you want to visualize.

The Exam won't focus too much on the inner workings of those two services. You just need to have a basic knowledge on how to troubleshoot certain errors that arises when integrating Athena with QuickSight.

Athena uses the IAM credentials of whoever is running the queries against an S3 bucket. Consequently, users who don't have the permissions to read data in the bucket will receive an "Access Denied" error. Likewise, in Amazon QuickSight, you'll run into an "insufficient permissions" error when you attempt to access the same bucket where Athena has made the query.

If you receive an "insufficient permissions" error, try these steps to resolve the problem:

1. Make sure that Amazon QuickSight can access the S3 buckets used by Athena.
2. If your data file is encrypted with an AWS KMS key, grant permissions to the Amazon QuickSight IAM role to decrypt the key. The easiest way to do this is to use the AWS CLI. You can run the create-grant command in AWS CLI to do this.



References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/quicksight/latest/user/troubleshoot-athena-insufficient-permissions.html>


<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/quicksight/latest/user/troubleshoot-connect-athena.html>

AWS IAM Basics

IAM policy is used to define the permissions of an IAM principal. Most permission policies are JSON policy documents. The IAM console includes policy summary tables that describe the access level, resources, and conditions that are allowed or denied for each service in a policy.

Components of IAM Policy

- **Identity-Based Policies** - permission policies that you can attach to a principal or identity.
 - **Managed policies** are standalone policies that you can attach to multiple users, groups, and roles in your AWS account.
 - **Inline policies** are policies that you create and manage and that are embedded directly into a single user, group, or role.
- **Resource-based Policies** - permission policies that you attach to a resource such as an Amazon S3 bucket.
 - Resource-based policies are only inline policies.
 - **Trust policies** – resource-based policies that are attached to a role and define which principals can assume the role.
- **Permission boundaries** - this is used to define the maximum permissions of an IAM identity.



- Elements of a JSON policy:



- Version - a policy language version. It's best practice to use the latest 2012-10-17 version.
- Statement - the container of the elements.
- Sid - an optional statement ID for your policy.
- Effect - indicates the Allow or Deny access to your resources.
- Principal - specify the account, user, role, or federated user that will be allowed or denied.
- Action - a list of actions that the policy will use to allow and deny access.
- Resource - specify the resources in your policy where the action will be applied to.
- Condition - a policy is in effect if the condition is met.

Trust Relationships

You can find the trust relationships section in the IAM Role. The permissions to access a resource are called *trusted entities*. To customize the trust relationships of an existing role, you can go to the control policy document.

The screenshot displays the AWS IAM console interface for an IAM Role. The top section shows role details: Role ARN (arn:aws:iam::061290123096:role/tutorialsdojo), Role description (AWS Certified Security - Specialty), Instance Profile ARNs (arn:aws:iam::061290123096:instance-profile/tutorialsdojo), Path (/), Creation time (2020-09-26 10:53 UTC+0800), Last activity (Not accessed in the tracking period), and Maximum session duration (1 hour). Below this is a tabbed interface with 'Trust relationships' selected. A message states: 'You can view the trusted entities that can assume the role and the access conditions for the role. [Show policy document](#)'. There is an 'Edit trust relationship' button. The 'Trusted entities' section shows 'The following trusted entities can assume this role.' with a list containing 'The identity provider(s) ec2.amazonaws.com'. The 'Conditions' section shows 'The following conditions define how and when trusted entities can assume the role.' with the text 'There are no conditions associated with this role.'

Trusted Entity for the IAM Role

- **AWS Service**
 - This entity will grant an AWS service to perform actions on your behalf. Instead of doing it manually, you can assign a service entity based on your requirements.

Create role

1 2 3 4

Select type of trusted entity


AWS service
EC2, Lambda and others


Another AWS account
Belonging to you or 3rd party


Web identity
Cognito or any OpenID provider


SAML 2.0 federation
Your corporate directory

Allows AWS services to perform actions on your behalf. [Learn more](#)

Choose a use case

Common use cases

[EC2](#)
Allows EC2 instances to call AWS services on your behalf.

[Lambda](#)
Allows Lambda functions to call AWS services on your behalf.

- **Another AWS account**

- If you are working with a third party provider, you can delegate permissions by creating a role using their Account ID. This will allow them to access your resources using their console account.

Create role

1 2 3 4

Select type of trusted entity


AWS service
EC2, Lambda and others


Another AWS account
Belonging to you or 3rd party


Web identity
Cognito or any OpenID provider


SAML 2.0 federation
Your corporate directory

Allows entities in other accounts to perform actions in this account. [Learn more](#)

Specify accounts that can use this role

Account ID*

Options ☐ Require external ID (Best practice when a third party will assume this role)

☐ Require MFA 

- **Web identity**

- Instead of creating multiple IAM users in your AWS account, you can use a Web Identity or OpenID Connect Federation (OIDC) identity provider to give permissions on external identities to access AWS resources in your account.
- The supported web identity providers are **Login with Amazon, Amazon Cognito, Facebook, and Google.**

Create role

1 2 3 4

Select type of trusted entity


AWS service
EC2, Lambda and others


Another AWS account
Belonging to you or 3rd party


Web identity
Cognito or any OpenID provider


SAML 2.0 federation
Your corporate directory

Allows users federated by the specified external web identity or OpenID Connect (OIDC) provider to assume this role to perform actions in your account. [Learn more](#)

Choose a web identity provider

Identity provider

[Create new provider](#) [Refresh](#)

- **SAML 2.0 federation**

- Users in your corporate directory can perform an action in your AWS account using the SAML 2.0 federation. SAML consists of two policies: role trust policy and IAM permissions policy.
- Role trust policy defines who can assume the role, while the IAM permissions policy grants the federated user actions to your resources.

Create role

1 2 3 4

Select type of trusted entity


AWS service
EC2, Lambda and others


Another AWS account
Belonging to you or 3rd party


Web identity
Cognito or any OpenID provider


SAML 2.0 federation
Your corporate directory

Allows users that are federated with SAML 2.0 to assume this role to perform actions in your account. [Learn more](#)

Choose a SAML 2.0 provider

If you're creating a role for API access, choose an Attribute and then type a Value to include in the role. This restricts access to users with the specified attributes.

SAML provider

[Create new provider](#) [Refresh](#)

☐ Allow programmatic access only
☐ Allow programmatic and AWS Management Console access

Attribute

Value*

Condition [Add condition \(optional\)](#)



References:

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_create.html



AWS IAM Identities in AWS

AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) allows you to control who is authenticated (signed in) and authorized (has permissions) to use resources in your AWS account. In the previous article, we discussed what is an IAM Policy. Now, let's discuss how you can create an IAM User, IAM Role, and IAM Group.

IAM Users

- An IAM entity that represents the user who utilizes AWS services. An IAM user is capable of accessing services by logging into the AWS Console or by executing API or CLI commands. The former needs username and password while the latter needs access key and secret key.

IAM Role

- Unlike IAM users that have long-term credentials such as a password or access keys, An IAM role only has temporary security credentials for every role session. A role can be assigned to a federated user who signs in by using an external identity provider instead of IAM.

IAM Group

- A collection of IAM users. Access control policies attached to an IAM Group are inherited by IAM users. A user can belong to multiple groups but groups cannot belong to other groups.
- Also, groups do not have security credentials and cannot access web services directly.

IAM Identity Providers (IdP)

- You can use an identity provider to give external users permission to access AWS resources in your account. This is very useful if you already have a corporate user directory in your organization.

When to Create an IAM User Instead of a Role

An IAM user should be created if you are part of an organization that will use AWS resources for a long period of time. But if you just need to access a resource occasionally, you don't need long term credentials, a role with temporary security credentials could help you in your tasks.

1. You just created an AWS account and you're the only person who will use that account.

- The best practice in using an AWS account is through IAM users, and not root users. This will help you provide an additional layer of security in managing your resources since root credentials have full control over what you can do with your AWS account.



2. **A group of individuals needs to access the resources in your AWS account but they don't have any credentials to start their work.**
 - By creating an IAM user for your organization, you can give each user their own credentials and permissions in accessing your AWS resources. This will help you prevent the sharing of credentials among multiple users.

When to Create an IAM Role Instead of a User

In the previous section, we talked about IAM users. This time let's discuss when it's ideal to create an IAM role.

1. **You created an application hosted on an Amazon EC2 instance and the application needs to make requests in other AWS services.**
 - IAM user credentials shouldn't be used by an application to make a request to other AWS services. Instead, create an IAM role and attach the temporary security credentials in the running instance. The attached role will only use the policies that are generated in that IAM role.
2. **You have created an app that runs on a mobile device and needs to make a request to AWS.**
 - Instead of creating IAM users for every registration in your application, you can use an identity provider to manage users outside AWS. This will help you authenticate users faster and map them to an IAM role. The temporary credentials received by the users already have specific policies on what they can do in your application.
3. **Users in your organization are already authenticated in the corporate directory. Now, they want to use AWS without signing in again.**
 - You can configure a federation relationship between your corporate directory and AWS. SAML 2.0 enables users to do a single sign-on (SSO) to log into the AWS Console without the need to create an IAM user for every person in your organization.
 - You can also create a custom proxy server that will help you translate user identities from your organization into IAM roles.

Service-Linked Role

- This is a unique type of IAM role that is directly linked to an AWS service. It is predefined by the service and includes the permissions needed to call other AWS services. To delete a service-linked role, you must delete the related resources first.



- The ARN of this role includes a **service principal** (***SERVICE-NAME***.amazonaws.com). Take note that the service principal is case sensitive and the format varies across AWS services.

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/introduction.html>

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_create_for-service.html

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id.html>


How AWS IAM Handles Conflicting IAM Policies Attached to a Resource

A **Principal** is an entity that can request an action or operation on an AWS resource. Users, roles, federated users, and applications are all AWS principals.

A **Resource** refers to the object that exists within a service. Examples are S3 buckets or EC2 instances.

It is important to understand how AWS evaluates policies so you'll know where to put restrictions. What if you have an IAM user that explicitly allows S3 actions against a bucket? Do you still have to update its bucket policy? Can an IAM user with full administrator access request objects from an S3 bucket that explicitly denies access against that user?

Here is a stripped-down version of the [AWS flow chart](#) about the evaluation of policies. We only included the resource-based and IAM-based policy as they're the commonly used ones.



The first thing that you need to remember is that the evaluation **starts at an explicit deny** regardless of policy type. Even if an IAM user has full administrator access, that user still wouldn't be able to request from an S3 bucket with an explicit deny. The second thing to remember is that resource-based policies are **evaluated first** before IAM-based policies. In fact, AWS checks the IAM-based policies last. For example, you created an IAM user without a policy. And you modify a Key Policy to allow that IAM user to use a certain CMK. Even if that



user has an empty policy, he would still be able to use the CMK. The reason is that AWS assessed the Key Policy first. If there is no permission statement in the Key Policy, the user will get an **AccessDenied** error.


Reference:

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_evaluation-logic.html

IAM Permissions Boundary

AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) is a web service that helps you securely control access to AWS resources. This service allows you to manage your IAM identities: users, groups, roles, and permissions. You manage access in AWS by creating policies and attaching them to IAM identities or AWS resources.

A **permissions boundary** is an IAM feature that AWS introduced to set the maximum permissions that an IAM entity (user or role) could have. You can use an AWS managed policy, or a customer managed policy to set the boundary for your IAM entities. When you select a permissions boundary for an entity, the entity can perform only the actions that are allowed by both its identity-based policies and its permissions boundaries. These actions allowed by both identity-based policies and its permissions boundaries are called *effective permissions*.




Within an account, the permissions for an entity can be affected by identity-based policies, resource-based policies, permissions boundaries, Organizations SCPs, or session policies.

Note: The permissions boundary doesn't grant permission to an IAM identity; it only sets the maximum permissions that the entity can have. You can define one or more permissions boundaries using managed policies.

Permission Boundary on IAM User Account

The following steps will show you how to set a permission boundary for new and existing IAM users.

1. Define a permission boundary. Below is a sample permission boundary on JSON format. It provides full access to AWS Lambda and read access to Amazon EC2 and S3 on all resources when attached to an entity.



The screenshot shows the AWS IAM console for the **IAMBoundaryDeveloper** policy. The **Summary** tab is selected, displaying the Policy ARN `arn:aws:iam::947117271373:policy/IAMBoundaryDeveloper and the Description Permission Boundaries for Developers. Below the tabs, the Permissions section shows a table of permissions:`

Service	Access level	Resource	Request condition
EC2	Full: Read Limited: List	All resources	None
Lambda	Full access	All resources	None
S3	Limited: Read	All resources	None

IAMBoundaryDeveloper

```
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "VisualEditor0",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "ec2:Describe*",
        "s3:Get*",
        "lambda:*",
        "s3:Describe*",
        "ec2:Get*"
      ],
      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
}
```

2. You can then attach this policy on a new or existing IAM user to set its permission boundary.

For existing IAM User, go to IAM → Select a User → Permissions → Set Boundary.



Permission Boundaries for new IAM user

1. Go to IAM → Users → Add user to create a new IAM user. Click *Next: Permissions*.

- On the Permission Boundary, select Customer Managed on the filter, then select the policy we just created. Leave the User Permissions empty for now. Click Next: Tags.

Set permissions boundary

Set a permissions boundary to control the maximum permissions this user can have. This is an advanced feature used to delegate permission management to others. [Learn more](#)

☐ Create user without a permissions boundary
☒ Use a permissions boundary to control the maximum user permissions

Select policy to set the permissions boundary

Create policy

Filter policies

Search

Showing 3 results

	Policy name	Type	Used as
☐	AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole-eccdd6a9-0959-42ab-a700-0b34a9...	Customer managed	Permissions policy (1)
☒	IAMBoundaryDeveloper	Customer managed	None
☐	ReportPolicy	Customer managed	None

Cancel

Previous

Next: Tags

- Add tags.

Add user

1

2

3

4

5

Add tags (optional)

IAM tags are key-value pairs you can add to your user. Tags can include user information, such as an email address, or can be descriptive, such as a job title. You can use the tags to organize, track, or control access for this user. [Learn more](#)

Key	Value (optional)	Remove
Owner	Tutorialsdojo	✕
Add new key		

You can add 49 more tags.

- Review the details, then click Create User.

Add user

1
2
3
4
5

Review

Review your choices. After you create the user, you can view and download the autogenerated password and access key.


This user has no permissions

You haven't given this user any permissions. This means that the user has no access to any AWS service or resource. Consider returning to the previous step and adding some type of permissions.

User details

User name

dev-user

AWS access type

AWS Management Console access - with a password

Console password type

Autogenerated

Require password reset

Yes

Permissions boundary

[IAMBoundaryDeveloper](#)

Tags

The new user will receive the following tag

Key	Value
Owner	Tutorialsdojo

Cancel

Previous

Create user

To see the permission boundary in action, we attached the AdministratorAccess policy to the IAM user *dev-user*.

Users > dev-user

Summary

Delete user

User ARN

arn:aws:iam::947117271373:user/dev-user

Path

/

Creation time

2020-09-29 09:31 UTC+0800

Permissions
Groups
Tags (1)
Security credentials
Access Advisor

Permissions policies (1 policy applied)

Add permissions
Add inline policy

Policy name	Policy type
Attached directly	
AdministratorAccess	AWS managed policy


Permissions boundary (set)

Set a permissions boundary to control the maximum permissions this user can have. This is not a common setting but can be used to delegate permission management to others. [Learn more](#)

Change boundary
Remove boundary

IAMBoundaryDeveloper (Managed policy)

Log in on the AWS Console using the *dev-user* account and access different AWS Services. Notice that even though the *dev-user* has an admin-level policy attached to it, access is still bounded within the services we defined on its permission policy. Accessing other services will give us permission errors.



The screenshot displays the AWS Console interface with the *dev-user* account logged in. The top navigation bar shows the user's profile and location (Singapore). The left sidebar lists various AWS services, including Elastic File System, Identity and Access Management (IAM), and RDS. The main content area shows the Elastic File System console, which displays a message indicating that the user is not authorized to perform the `elasticfilesystem:DescribeFileSystems` action. Below this, the IAM console is visible, showing a "Welcome to Identity and Access Management" message and a list of IAM resources. The bottom section shows the RDS console with a "Create database" button and an error message stating: "Error loading resource: User: arn:aws:iam::947117271373:user/dev-user is not authorized to perform: rds:DescribeDBEngineVersions (Service: AmazonRDS; Status Code: 403; Error Code: AccessDenied; Request ID: 375edc3d-7f25-4135-8b4d-5e6813cc0bc0; Proxy: null)".

Using Permissions Boundaries as Request Condition

Another way to utilize permission boundaries is through request conditions on permission policy. Let's say Jon, one of the developers, needs to create an IAM role and policies for his AWS Lambda functions. You then give him access using the below policy, but it also allows him to create any role policies, including Administrator Access. This is a management risk since you don't want any developer to grant admin-level access to a role.



```
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "VisualEditor0",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "iam:CreatePolicy",
        "iam:Get*",
        "iam:List*",
        "iam:PassRole",
        "lambda:*",
        "iam:CreateRole",
        "iam:UpdateRole",
        "iam:AttachRolePolicy"
      ],
      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
}
```

To eliminate this risk, you can create a permission boundary and use this as a request condition for creating and updating roles. Let's use the permission boundary *IAMBoundaryDeveloper* we created in the previous demonstration.

To use the request condition, let's go to Jon's user policy and remove the **CreateRole** and **AttachRolePolicy**.



Visual editor JSON Import managed policy

Expand all | Collapse all

► Lambda (All actions) Clone Remove

▼ IAM (4 actions) Clone Remove

► Service IAM

► Actions List

ListRoles

Write

PassRole

UpdateRole

Permissions management

CreatePolicy


▼ Resources ☐ Specific ☒ All resources close

As a best practice, define permissions for only specific resources in specific accounts. Alternatively, you can grant least privilege using condition keys. [Learn more](#)

► Request conditions [Specify request conditions \(optional\)](#)


➕ Add additional permissions

Add the **CreateRole** and **AttachRolePolicy** again on separate permission. This time we set request conditions for these operations. Click request conditions, then click Add condition.



The screenshot shows the AWS IAM console's Visual editor for a policy. The 'Request conditions' section is expanded, showing options for 'MFA required' and 'Source IP'. A red arrow points to the 'Request conditions' section, and a red box highlights the 'Add condition' button.

Select the following values for condition key, qualifier, and operator. For the value, paste the ARN of the *IAMBoundaryDeveloper*. Click Add.



The 'Add request condition' dialog box is shown. The fields are filled with the following values:

- Condition key: iam:PermissionsBoundary
- Qualifier: Default
- Operator: StringEquals
- Value: arn:aws:iam::947117271373:policy/IA

The 'Add' button is highlighted in blue.



Review your policy then click Save Changes.

Review policy

Review this policy before you save your changes.

☒ Save as default

Summary

Service	Access level	Resource	Request condition
Allow (2 of 239 services) Show remaining 237			
IAM	Limited: List, Write, Permissions management	All resources	iam:PermissionsBoundary = arn:aws:iam::947117271373:policy/! AMBoundaryDeveloper
Lambda	Full access	All resources	None

* Required

Cancel

Previous

Save changes



Here's the policy on JSON format. Notice the Condition for **CreateRole** and **AttachRolePolicy** operations.

```
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "VisualEditor0",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "iam:CreateRole",
        "iam:AttachRolePolicy"
      ],
      "Resource": "*",
      "Condition": {
        "StringEquals": {
          "iam:PermissionsBoundary":
            "arn:aws:iam::947117271373:policy/IAMBoundaryDeveloper"
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "Sid": "VisualEditor1",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "iam:CreatePolicy",
        "iam:Get*",
        "iam:List*",
        "iam:PassRole",
        "lambda:*",
        "iam:UpdateRole"
      ],
      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
}
```

Let's login to the AWS Console and try to create some IAM Roles. As expected, we can't create an IAM Role without adding a permission boundary.



Create role

1234

Review

Provide the required information below and review this role before you create it.

 **You need permissions**

You do not have the permission required to perform this operation. Ask your administrator to add permissions. [Learn more](#)

User: arn:aws:iam::947117271373:user/Bob is not authorized to perform: iam:CreateRole on resource: arn:aws:iam::947117271373:role/test

Role name*

test

Use alphanumeric and '+=, @-_' characters. Maximum 64 characters.

Role description

Allows Lambda functions to call AWS services on your behalf.

Maximum 1000 characters. Use alphanumeric and '+=, @-_' characters.

Trusted entities

AWS service: lambda.amazonaws.com

Policies

 AdministratorAccess [↗](#)

Permissions boundary

Permissions boundary is not set

No tags were added.

* Required

CancelPreviousCreate role

Let's try to create a Role with *AdministratorAccess* but now defining a permission boundary using the *IAMBoundaryDeveloper* policy.



Filter policies ▼

Q Search

Showing 714 results

	Policy name ▼	Used as
☐	AccessAnalyzerServiceRolePolicy	None
☒	AdministratorAccess	Permissions policy (2)
☐	AlexaForBusinessDeviceSetup	None
☐	AlexaForBusinessFullAccess	None
☐	AlexaForBusinessGatewayExecution	None
☐	AlexaForBusinessLifesizeDelegatedAccessPolicy	None
☐	AlexaForBusinessNetworkProfileServicePolicy	None
☐	AlexaForBusinessPolyDelegatedAccessPolicy	None

▼ Set permissions boundary

Set a permissions boundary to control the maximum permissions this role can have. This is an advanced feature used to delegate permission management to others. [Learn more](#)

☐ Create role without a permissions boundary

☒ Use a permissions boundary to control the maximum role permissions

Select policy to set the permissions boundary

Create policy

↺

Filter policies ▼

Q Search

Showing 4 results

	Policy name ▼	Used as
☐	AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole-eccdd6a9-0959-42ab-a700-0b34a9de2ca5	Permissions policy (1)
☐	devpolicy	Permissions policy (1)
☒	IAMBoundaryDeveloper	Boundary (1)

* Required

CancelPreviousNext: Tags

Notice that Role creation is successful. But because a permission boundary is set, its access is only limited to the services we define on *IAMBoundaryDeveloper* though it has an admin-level policy.



Roles > test

Summary Delete role

Role ARN	arn:aws:iam::947117271373:role/test
Role description	Allows Lambda functions to call AWS services on your behalf. Edit
Instance Profile ARNs	
Path	/
Creation time	2020-09-29 11:31 UTC+0800
Last activity	Not accessed in the tracking period
Maximum session duration	1 hour Edit

Permissions | Trust relationships | Tags | Access Advisor | Revoke sessions

▼ Permissions policies (1 policy applied)

[Attach policies](#) + Add inline policy

Policy name ▼	Policy type ▼
AdministratorAccess	AWS managed policy

▼ Permissions boundary (set)

Set a permissions boundary to control the maximum permissions this role can have. This is not a common setting but can be used to delegate permission management to others. [Learn more](#)

[Change boundary](#) [Remove boundary](#)

► IAMBoundaryDeveloper (Managed policy)

References:

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html#policies_bound

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_boundaries.html

<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/delegate-permission-management-to-developers-using-iam-permissions-boundaries/>

Using the iam:PassRole permission to pass an IAM Role to AWS Services

The `iam:PassRole` can be granted to an IAM user or resource that will allow them to use an IAM role. For a user to pass a role to an AWS service, you must grant the user a `PassRole` permission first. With the help of this permission, you can limit the user to passing only the approved roles.

A user needs to pass the role to an EC2 instance. To pass the role, you must create these policies:

- The IAM **permissions policy** will determine what a role can do. You can choose between AWS managed or customer-managed policies.

```
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": {
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Action": [ "The permissions that a role is allowed to use" ],
    "Resource": [ "The resources that a role is allowed to access" ]
  }
}
```

- The **trust policy** will determine who can assume the role. In this scenario, Amazon EC2 will be the principal that allows the service to use the attached role.

```
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": {
    "Sid": "TutorialsDojoTrustPolicyStatementForEC2",
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Principal": { "Service": "ec2.amazonaws.com" },
    "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
  }
}
```

- To get the details of the role to be passed on the service, an `iam:PassRole` will be accompanied by `iam:GetRole`. The policy created will allow the user to pass the role for the name that begins with `EC2-tutorialsdojo-`



```
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [{
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Action": [
      "iam:GetRole",
      "iam:PassRole"
    ],
    "Resource": "arn:aws:iam::<account-id>:role/EC2-tutorialsdojo"
  }]
}
```

- After creating the policies, the permissions attached to the role will determine what the service can do.

References:

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_use_passrole.html

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_examples_iam-passrole-service.html



Mapping Permissions of Active Directory User Attributes to AWS Services

AD Connector is a proxy service that provides an easy way to connect compatible AWS applications to your existing on-premises Microsoft Active Directory. It also enables you to streamline identity management and reuse your existing security policies from your Active Directory.

After you configured the AD Connector, the service will allow you to:

- **Sign in to AWS applications** such as Amazon WorkSpaces, Amazon QuickSight, and Amazon EC2 for Windows Server instances using your Active Directory credentials.
- Join your EC2 Windows instances to your on-premises Active Directory domain through AD Connector using a **seamless domain join**.
- Use **Federated sign-in** to log in to the AWS applications. AD Connector forwards sign-in requests to your on-premises Active Directory domain controllers for authentication.

Remember that AD Connector is designed to establish a trusted relationship between your Active Directory and AWS. With IAM Role, you can customize trust relationships that will allow the role to access AWS resources. You must have a trust relationship with AWS Directory Service first before assigning an IAM role to your users.

After the configuration between on-premises AD and AWS, you can now assign a user or group to an IAM role that will allow your directory users to access the AWS Management Console. The role assignment that you created will define what service a user or group can access. If you successfully created a role assignment, you can now verify the user's role and Id. The next time the user signs in to the AWS Management Console, the user will be signed in under the assigned role.

In short, role mapping will define what AWS services can be accessed by Active Directory users.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-connect-your-on-premises-active-directory-to-aws-using-ad-connector/>

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_identifiers.html

<https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/enable-active-directory-console-access/>


Using AWS Organizations to Provide Access to Third-Party AWS Accounts

AWS Organizations was introduced by AWS to ease the process of managing multiple AWS Accounts. AWS defines this service as an account management service that enables customers to consolidate multiple AWS accounts into an organization that they create and centrally manage.

Customers mainly benefit from AWS Organizations in terms of billing and account management. Instead of paying bills from each AWS Account, customers can consolidate and pay all bills on their AWS Master Account. This makes the billing process simple and saves money by leveraging *Pay less by using more pricing* principles.

You can centrally manage all of your AWS Accounts from your Master Account. The master account is the account used to create the Organization. You can then create an AWS account or invite an existing AWS Account under your Organization, which are considered member accounts.

You can also have a hierarchical grouping on your AWS Organization. You can do this by creating an Organizational Units (OU), a logical group or container for your accounts. OUs may either have an AWS Account or another OU into it. You can attach policies to control permissions on any level on your Organizational hierarchy; these policies are called Server Control Policies (SCPs). When you attach a policy to one of the hierarchy nodes, it flows down and affects all the branches (OUs) and leaves (accounts) beneath it.





Using Service Control Policies (SCPs) to Restrict Permissions of Root Users in Member Accounts

Service control policies (SCPs) are a type of organization policy that you can use to manage your organization's permissions. SCPs are similar to IAM permissions policies except that they don't grant any permissions. Instead, SCPs specify the maximum permissions for an AWS Organizations entity (root, organizational unit, or account). When you attach an SCP to your organization root or an OU, the SCP limits permissions for entities in member accounts.

Since SCPs don't grant any permissions, you still need to attach identity-based or resource-based policies to IAM users, roles, or the resources in your organization's accounts to grant permissions.

SCPs affect only IAM users and roles that are managed by accounts which are part of the organization. SCPs don't affect resource-based policies directly; an example of this is Amazon S3 bucket policies. SCP also affects the root user of any member account within the organization.

Service Control Policy Limits

You can't use SCPs to restrict the following tasks:

- Any action performed by the master account
- Any action performed using permissions that are attached to a service-linked role
- Register for the Enterprise support plan as the root user
- Change the AWS support level as the root user
- Manage Amazon CloudFront keys
- Provide trusted signer functionality for CloudFront private content
- Modify AWS account email allowance/reverse DNS
- Tasks on some AWS-related services:
 - Alexa Top Sites
 - Alexa Web Information Service
 - Amazon Mechanical Turk
 - Amazon Product Marketing API

Exceptions for only member accounts created before September 15, 2017

For some accounts created before September 15, 2017, you can't use SCPs to prevent the root user in those member accounts from performing the following tasks:

- Enable or disable multi-factor authentication on the root user
- Create, update, or delete x.509 keys for the root user
- Change the root user's password



- Create, update, or delete root access keys

Note: *For all accounts created after September 15, 2017, these exceptions don't apply, and you can use SCPs to prevent the root user in those member accounts from performing these tasks.*

References:

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_manage_policies_about-scps.html

<https://aws.amazon.com/organizations/faqs/>


https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_getting-started_concepts.html

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_manage_policies_scps.html

Generating Credential Reports for your AWS Account Using AWS IAM

A Credential report is a CSV file that contains different information about all of the users in an AWS account. Some of the information includes the user creation date, ARN, the last time a key was rotated, the last time a password or an access key was used or changed.

You can generate and download a credential report programmatically or through the IAM Console. To download a report, scroll down and find the “Credential report” on the left pane of IAM. Click the “Download Report” button.



The manual method is good enough for audit purposes. However, if you need to automate a process to meet a compliance requirement like disabling an access key after a certain amount of days, you must use IAM APIs.

Let’s say you want to invalidate access keys that are more than 90 days old. First, you’ll need the required information from the credential report. The access key age can be found under the “access_key_1_last_rotated” column. The N/A values are for those IAM users that don’t have programmatic access.



	G	H	I	J	K
1	password_next_rotation	mfa_active	access_key_1_active	access_key_1_last_rotated	access_key_1_last_used_date
2	not_supported	false	false	N/A	N/A
3	N/A	false	false	N/A	N/A
4	N/A	false	true	2020-08-18T05:34:10+00:00	2020-10-08T17:11:00+00:00
5	N/A	false	true	2020-07-14T06:46:10+00:00	N/A
6	N/A	false	false	N/A	N/A
7	N/A	false	true	2020-07-09T09:22:32+00:00	2020-08-21T05:11:00+00:00
8	N/A	false	true	2020-09-30T06:58:31+00:00	2020-09-30T07:18:00+00:00
9	N/A	false	false	N/A	N/A
10					

You can automate the process by writing a script or a Lambda Function that will call the **GenerateCredentialReport**, **GetCredentialReport**, and **UpdateAccessKey** APIs. The first API command is used to tell IAM to generate a report. After generating, you execute the second API to download the report. Write a logic that will parse the CSV file to get the user with an access key age greater than 90 days. Use the third API command to modify the status of the access key to **"Inactive."**

References:

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_getting-report.html

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_GenerateCredentialReport.html



Choosing the Most Suitable AWS STS API for Authentication

AWS Security Token Service (AWS STS) is a global web service that allows you to generate temporary access for IAM users or federated users to gain access to your AWS resources. These temporary credentials are limited-privilege and are for short-term use only. Once expired, these temporary credentials can no longer be used to access your AWS resources.

AWS STS can't be accessed on the AWS console; it is only accessible through API. All STS requests go to a single endpoint at <https://sts.amazonaws.com/>, and logs are then recorded to AWS CloudTrail.

AWS STS API Operations

AWS STS currently supports the following API operations:

- AssumeRole
- AssumeRoleWithSAML
- AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
- DecodeAuthorizationMessage
- GetAccessKeyInfo
- GetCallerIdentity
- GetFederationToken
- GetSessionToken

AssumeRole - *cross-account delegation and federation through a custom identity broker*

The `AssumeRole` API operation grants your IAM users temporary credentials to your AWS resources. These temporary credentials consist of an access key ID, a secret access key, and a security token. You can use this operation within your account or for cross-account access. This API operation helps you access resources on another AWS account, like when you have AWS Organization with multiple AWS Accounts.

Calling `AssumeRole` API requires valid AWS security credentials. When you make this call, you pass the following information.

- The Amazon Resource Name (ARN) of the role that the app should assume.
- (Optional) Duration, which specifies the duration of the temporary security credentials. By default, temporary credentials from `AssumeRole` lasts for one hour, but you can use the `DurationSeconds` parameter to specify the duration of the role session from 900 seconds (15 minutes) up to the maximum session duration. This setting can have a value from 1 hour to 12 hours.
- The role session name is a string value used to identify the session. This field is viewable from AWS CloudTrail and can be used to determine who made the API call.
- (Optional) Inline or managed session policies Limits the permission from the role's identity-based policy



- (Optional) Session tags. When you assume a role and use the temporary credentials to make a request, the session's principal tags include the role's tags and the passed session tags. If you make this call using temporary credentials, the new session also inherits transitive session tags from the calling session.
- (Optional) MFA information. This is useful for cross-account scenarios to ensure that the user that assumes the role has been authenticated with an AWS MFA device.
- (Optional) ExternalId value is used when delegating access to your account to a third party. This value helps ensure that only the specified third party can access the role.

Example request

```
https://sts.amazonaws.com/
?Version=2011-06-15
&Action=AssumeRole
&RoleSessionName=Bob-session
&RoleArn=arn:aws::iam::123456789012:role/test
&Policy=%7B%22Version%22%3A%222012-10-17%22%2C%22Statement%22%3A%5B%7B%22Sid%22%
3A%20%22Stmt1%22%2C%22Effect%22%3A%20%22Allow%22%2C%22Action%22%3A%20%22s3%3A*%2
2%2C%22Resource%22%3A%20%22*%22%7D%5D%7D
&DurationSeconds=1800
&Tags.member.1.Key=Owner
&Tags.member.1.Value=TutorialsDojo
&Tags.member.2.Key=Department
&Tags.member.2.Value=Admin
&ExternalId=123ABC
&AUTHPARAMS
```

The policy value shown in the preceding example is the URL-encoded version of the following policy:

```
{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Sid":"Stmt1","Effect":"Allow","Action":"s3:*","Resource":"*"}]}
```

The `AUTHPARAMS` parameter in the example is a placeholder for your signature, which you include on the AWS HTTP API requests. You can manually create and sign API requests, or you can use AWS SDKs.

In addition to the temporary security credentials, the response includes the Amazon Resource Name (ARN) for the federated user and the credentials' expiration time.

Example response

```
<AssumeRoleResponse xmlns="https://sts.amazonaws.com/doc/2011-06-15/">
```



```
<AssumeRoleResult>
<Credentials>
  <SessionToken>
    AQoDYXdzEPT//////////wEXAMPLEtc752dbaV2SAPBSM22wDok4x4HIZ8j4FZTwdQW
    LWSKWHGBuFqwAeMicRXmxfpSPfIeoIYRqTflfKD8YUuwthAx7mSEI/qkPpKPi/kMcGd
    QrmGdeehM4IC1NtBmUpp2wUE8phUZampKsburEDy0KPkyQDYwT7WZ0wq5VSXDvp75YU
    9HFv1Rd8Tx6q6fE8YQcHNVXakiY9q6d+xo0rKwT38xVqr7ZD0u0iPPkUL64lIZbqBAz
    +scqKmlzm8FDrypNC9Yjc8fPOLn9FX9KSyvKTr4rvx3iSI1tJabIQwj2ICCR/oLxBA==
  </SessionToken>
  <SecretAccessKey>
    wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYzEXAMPLEKEY
  </SecretAccessKey>
  <Expiration>2019-07-15T23:28:33.359Z</Expiration>
  <AccessKeyId>AKIAIOSFODNK2EXAMPLE</AccessKeyId>
</Credentials>
<AssumedRoleUser>
  <Arn>arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/test/Bob</Arn>
  <AssumedRoleId>ARO123EXAMPLE123:Bob</AssumedRoleId>
</AssumedRoleUser>
<PackedPolicySize>8</PackedPolicySize>
</AssumeRoleResult>
<ResponseMetadata>
  <RequestId>c6104cbe-af31-11e0-8154-cbc7ccf896c7</RequestId>
</ResponseMetadata>
</AssumeRoleResponse>
```

AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity - federation through a web-based identity provider

The `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` API operation returns temporary security credentials for federated users who are authenticated through a public identity provider. Example providers include Amazon Cognito, Login with Amazon, Facebook, Google, or any OpenID Connect-compatible identity provider. This API call returns temporary security credentials that consist of an access key ID, a secret access key, and a security token. Applications can use these temporary security credentials to sign calls to AWS service API operations. This API operation is useful for mobile applications or client-based web applications that require access to AWS.

Calling `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` does not require AWS security credentials; this means that users don't need to have their own AWS or IAM identities.

Instead of directly calling `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity`, AWS recommends the use of Amazon Cognito and the Amazon Cognito credentials provider with the AWS SDKs for mobile development. If you are not using Amazon Cognito, you call the `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` action of AWS STS. This is an unsigned call, meaning that



the app does not need to have access to any AWS security credentials to make the call. When you make this call, you pass the following information:

- The Amazon Resource Name (ARN) of the role that the app should assume. For applications that support multiple ways of user sign in, you must define a role for each of your identity providers. The call to `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` should include the ARN of the role that is specific to the provider through which the user signed in.
- The token that the app gets from the Identity Provider (IdP) after the app authenticates the user.
- You can configure your Identity Provider (IdP) to pass attributes into your token as session tags.
- (Optional) `Duration`, which specifies the duration of the temporary security credentials. By default, temporary credentials from `AssumeRole` lasts for one hour, but you can use the `DurationSeconds` parameter to specify the duration of the role session from 900 seconds (15 minutes) up to the maximum session duration. This setting can have a value from 1 hour to 12 hours.
- The role session name is a string value used to identify the session. This field is viewable from AWS CloudTrail and can be used to determine who made the API call.
- (Optional) Inline or managed session policies limit the permission from the role's identity-based policy.

When you call `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity`, AWS verifies the authenticity of the token by calling the provider with the token that the app has passed. The identity provider will then validate this token. Once validated, AWS returns the following information to you:

- A set of temporary security credentials. These consist of an access key ID, a secret access key, and a session token.
- The role ID and the ARN of the assumed role.
- A `SubjectFromWebIdentityToken` value that contains the unique user ID.

These temporary security credentials can now be used to make AWS API calls. The process of making AWS API calls using temporary credentials is also the same when using long-term security credentials. The only difference is the token, which AWS uses to check the validity of the temporary credentials.

Your app should cache the credentials. Remember that the credentials have an expiration of one hour; you should get new credentials before they expire. You can call `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` again or use `AmazonSTSCredentialsProvider` operation in the AWS SDK.



AssumeRoleWithSAML - federation through an enterprise Identity Provider compatible with SAML 2.0

The `AssumeRoleWithSAML` returns temporary credentials to users who have been authenticated through a SAML authentication response. Through this operation, organizations can use an existing identity system like Windows Active Directory or LDAP for their applications to call AWS services.

Your application doesn't need any security credentials from AWS to make the call. Instead, the temporary security credentials returned by `AssumeRoleWithSAML` API operation are used to make a call to AWS services. These temporary credentials consist of an access key ID, a secret access key, and a security token.

When you make this call, you pass the following information:

- The Amazon Resource Name (ARN) of the role that the app should assume.
- The ARN of the SAML provider created in IAM that describes the identity provider.
- The SAML assertion, encoded in base64, that was provided by the SAML identity provider in its authentication response to the sign-in request from your app.
- You can configure your Identity Provider (IdP) to pass attributes into your SAML assertion as session tags.
- (Optional) Duration, which specifies the duration of the temporary security credentials. By default, temporary credentials from `AssumeRole` lasts for one hour, but you can use the `DurationSeconds` parameter to specify the duration of the role session from 900 seconds (15 minutes) up to the maximum session duration. This setting can have a value from 1 hour to 12 hours.
- (Optional) Inline or managed session policies Limits the permission from the role's identity-based policy

GetFederationToken - federation through a custom identity broker

The `GetFederationToken` API operation returns a set of temporary security credentials for federated users. You must call this API operation using the long-term security credentials of an IAM user. AWS recommends creating an IAM user dedicated to this operation and attaching only the policies that the federated users need. You can also use the AWS account root user, but this is not recommended.

When you call `GetFederationToken`, you pass the session policies, which have the permissions for the temporary credentials. The intersection of these session policies and IAM user policies determine the effective permission of your temporary credentials.



You can use the temporary credentials created by `GetFederationToken` in any AWS service except the following:

- You cannot call any IAM operations using the AWS CLI or the AWS API.
- You cannot call any STS operations except `GetCallerIdentity`.

`GetFederationToken` has a more prolonged default expiration of 12 hours compared to `AssumeRole` API operation, which only has one hour. Additionally, you can also use the `DurationSeconds` parameter to set the validity; the value can range from 900 seconds (15 minutes) up to 129,600 seconds (36 hours). Having a longer validity will reduce the number of calls to AWS since you don't need to get new credentials as often.

The `GetFederationToken` call returns temporary security credentials that consist of the security token, access key, secret key, and expiration. Once these credentials are used, the session's principal tags include the user's tags and the passed session tags.

This API operation can also be used to manage permissions inside your organization. See the sample application that uses this operation [here](#).

Example request

```
https://sts.amazonaws.com/  
?Version=2011-06-15  
&Action=GetFederationToken  
&Name=Bob-session  
&PolicyArns.member.1.arn==arn%3Aaws%3Aiam%3A%3A123456789012%3Apolicy%2FRole1policy  
&DurationSeconds=1800  
&Tags.member.1.Key=Owner  
&Tags.member.1.Value=TutorialsDojo  
&Tags.member.2.Key=Department  
&Tags.member.2.Value=Admin  
&AUTHPARAMS
```

The policy ARN shown in the preceding example includes the following URL-encoded ARN:

`arn:aws:iam::123456789012:policy/Role1policy`

The `AUTHPARAMS` parameter in the example is a placeholder for your signature, which you include on the AWS HTTP API requests. You can manually create and sign API requests, or you can use AWS SDKs.

In addition to the temporary security credentials, the response includes the Amazon Resource Name (ARN) for the federated user and the credentials' expiration time.



GetSessionToken - temporary credentials for users in untrusted environments

The `GetSessionToken` API operation returns a set of temporary security credentials to an existing IAM user. The temporary security credentials consist of an access key ID, secret access key, and a security token. You can set the operation to allow AWS requests only when MFA is enabled for the IAM user to provide enhanced security. IAM users can then make programmatic calls to API operations that require MFA authentication. If users provided the wrong MFA code, the API returns an access denied error. Since the credentials are temporary, you also have security from IAM users accessing your AWS resources through a less secure environment.

Example request

```
https://sts.amazonaws.com/  
?Version=2011-06-15  
&Action=GetSessionToken  
&DurationSeconds=1800  
&AUTHPARAMS
```

The `AUTHPARAMS` parameter in the example is a placeholder for your signature, which you include on the AWS HTTP API requests. You can manually create and sign API requests, or you can use AWS SDKs.

Example response

```
<GetSessionTokenResponse xmlns="https://sts.amazonaws.com/doc/2011-06-15/">  
<GetSessionTokenResult>  
<Credentials>  
<SessionToken>  
AQoEXAMPLE3H4aoAH0gNCAPyJxz4BlCFFxWNE1OPTgk5TthT+FvwqnKwRcOIfrRh3c/L  
To6UDDyJw00vEVPvLXCrrrUtdnniCEXAMPLE3/IvU1dYUg2RVAJBanLiHb4IgRmpRV3z  
rkuWJOgQs8IZZaIv2BXIa2R4OlgbBN9bkUDNCJiBeb/AXlzBBko7b15fjrBs2+cTQtp  
Z3CYWFXG8C5zqx37wnOE49mRl/+OtkIKGO7fAE  
</SessionToken>  
<SecretAccessKey>  
wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYzEXAMPLEKEY  
</SecretAccessKey>  
<Expiration>2011-07-11T19:55:29.611Z</Expiration>  
<AccessKeyId>AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE</AccessKeyId>  
</Credentials>  
</GetSessionTokenResult>  
<ResponseMetadata>  
<RequestId>58c5dbae-abef-11e0-8cfe-09039844ac7d</RequestId>  
</ResponseMetadata>  
</GetSessionTokenResponse>
```



`SerialNumber` and `TokenCode` values are included for AWS multi-factor authentication (MFA). These values are validated before AWS STS returns with temporary security credentials that include the MFA authentication state. The temporary security credentials can then be used to access the MFA-protected API operations or AWS websites for as long as the MFA authentication is valid.

The following example shows a `GetSessionToken` request that includes an MFA verification code and device serial number.

```
https://sts.amazonaws.com/  
?Version=2011-06-15  
&Action=GetSessionToken  
&DurationSeconds=7200  
&SerialNumber=MFAAuthDeviceSerialNumber  
&TokenCode=123456  
&AUTHPARAMS
```

DecodeAuthorizationMessage

`DecodeAuthorizationMessage` is used in decoding information on the authentication request status from an encoded message returned in response to an AWS request. A request returns a `Client.UnauthorizedOperation` response (an HTTP 403 response) for invalid requests. Some AWS operations provide an encoded message that has information about the authorization failure.

The message is encoded to prevent the requester from seeing the details of authorization status, which may include privileged information. You can grant user permissions through an IAM policy to allow `DecodeAuthorizationMessage` (`sts:DecodeAuthorizationMessage`) operation.

The decoded message includes the following types of information:

- Whether the request was denied due to an explicit deny or due to the absence of an explicit allow.
- The principal who made the request.
- The requested action.
- The requested resource.
- The values of condition keys in the context of the user's request.

Example request

```
POST https://sts.amazonaws.com / HTTP/1.1  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=utf-8  
Host: sts.amazonaws.com
```



```
Content-Length: 1148
Expect: 100-continue
Connection: Keep-Alive
Action=DecodeAuthorizationMessage
&EncodedMessage=<encoded-message>
&Version=2011-06-15
&AUTHPARAMS
```

The `AUTHPARAMS` parameter in the example is a placeholder for your signature, which you include on the AWS HTTP API requests. You can manually create and sign API requests, or you can use AWS SDKs.

Example response

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<DecodeAuthorizationMessageResponse
  xmlns="http://sts.amazonaws.com/doc/2011-06-15/">
  <requestId>6624a9ca-cd25-4f50-b2a5-7ba65bf07453</requestId>
  <DecodedMessage>
    {
      "allowed": "false",
      "explicitDeny": "false",
      "matchedStatements": "",
      "failures": "",
      "context": {
        "principal": {
          "id": "AIDACKCEVSQ6C2EXAMPLE",
          "name": "Dev",
          "arn": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/Dev"
        },
        "action": "ec2:StopInstances",
        "resource": "arn:aws:ec2:us-east-1:123456789012:instance/i-db08c9bd",
        "conditions": [
          {
            "item": {
              "key": "ec2:Tenancy",
              "values": ["default"]
            },
            {
              "item": {
                "key": "ec2:ResourceTag/elasticbeanstalk:environment-name",
                "values": ["Default-Environment"]
              }
            }
          ],
          (Additional items ...)
```



```
    ]
  }
}
</DecodedMessage>
</DecodeAuthorizationMessageResponse>
```

GetAccessKeyInfo

`GetAccessKeyInfo` returns the AWS account's ID for the specified access key ID. This operation also identifies if the access key IDs are long-term credentials or temporary credentials from AWS STS. Access key IDs beginning with `AKIA` are long-term credentials, while access key IDs beginning with `ASIA` are temporary credentials. If you have access to the AWS account, which `GetAccessKeyInfo` returns, you can review your root user access keys and pull a credential report from your root user account to learn which IAM user owns the keys.

Example request

```
https://sts.amazonaws.com/
?Version=2011-06-15
&Action=GetAccessKeyInfo
&AccessKeyId=AKIAI44QH8DHBEXAMPLE
```

Example response

```
<GetAccessKeyInfoResponse xmlns="https://sts.amazonaws.com/doc/2011-06-15/">
  <GetAccessKeyInfoResult>
    <Account>123456789012</Account>
  </GetAccessKeyInfoResult>
  <ResponseMetadata>
    <RequestId>6a28c46d-368e-4fc4-9143-6e8eEXAMPLE</RequestId>
  </ResponseMetadata>
</GetAccessKeyInfoResponse>
```

GetCallerIdentity

`GetCallerIdentity` returns details about the IAM user or role that is used to call the operation. These details consist of the AWS account ID number, AWS ARN, and UserID.

Example 1 - Called by an IAM user.



This is an example of a request and response made using the credentials of user Bob in the AWS account 123456789012.

Example request

```
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: sts.amazonaws.com
Accept-Encoding: identity
Content-Length: 32
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: AWS4-HMAC-SHA256
Credential=AKIAI44QH8DHBEXAMPLE/20160126/us-east-1/sts/aws4_request,
    SignedHeaders=host;user-agent;x-amz-date,

Signature=1122334455abcdef1122334455abcdef1122334455abcdef1122334455abcdef
X-Amz-Date: 20160126T215751Z
User-Agent: aws-cli/1.10.0 Python/2.7.3 Linux/3.13.0-76-generic botocore/1.3.22

Action=GetCallerIdentity&Version=2011-06-15
```

Example response

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
x-amzn-RequestId: 01234567-89ab-cdef-0123-456789abcdef
Content-Type: text/xml
Content-Length: 357
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2016 21:57:47 GMT

<GetCallerIdentityResponse xmlns="https://sts.amazonaws.com/doc/2011-06-15/">
  <GetCallerIdentityResult>
    <Arn>arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/Bob</Arn>
    <UserId>FDASG34G3DG43VEEXAMPLE</UserId>
    <Account>123456789012</Account>
  </GetCallerIdentityResult>
  <ResponseMetadata>
    <RequestId>01234567-89ab-cdef-0123-456789abcdef</RequestId>
  </ResponseMetadata>
</GetCallerIdentityResponse>
```

Example 2 - Called by federated user created with AssumeRole.

This is an example of a request and response made with temporary credentials created by `AssumeRole`. The assumed role and the `RoleSessionName` are returned as shown on the example response.



Example request

```
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: sts.amazonaws.com
Accept-Encoding: identity
Content-Length: 43
X-Amz-Date: 20160301T213302Z
User-Agent: aws-cli/1.10.0 Python/2.7.3 Linux/3.13.0-79-generic botocore/1.3.22
X-Amz-Security-Token:<REDACTED>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: AWS4-HMAC-SHA256
Credential=AKIAI44QH8DHBEXAMPLE/20160301/us-east-1/sts/aws4_request,
    SignedHeaders=host;user-agent;x-amz-date;x-amz-security-token,

Signature=1122334455abcdef1122334455abcdef1122334455abcdef1122334455abcdef

Action=GetCallerIdentity&Version=2011-06-15
```

Example response

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
x-amzn-RequestId: 01234567-89ab-cdef-0123-456789abcdef
Content-Type: text/xml
Content-Length: 438
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2020 20:12:47 GMT

<GetCallerIdentityResponse xmlns="https://sts.amazonaws.com/doc/2011-06-15/">
  <GetCallerIdentityResult>

    <Arn>arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/sampleRole/sampleRoleSessionName</Arn>

    <UserId>FAS343DG43VEXAMPLE:sampleRoleSessionName</UserId>
    <Account>123456789012</Account>
  </GetCallerIdentityResult>
  <ResponseMetadata>
    <RequestId>01234567-89ab-cdef-0123-456789abcdef</RequestId>
  </ResponseMetadata>
</GetCallerIdentityResponse>
```

Example 3 - Called by a federated user created with GetFederationToken.

This is an example of a request and response made with temporary credentials created by using `GetFederationToken`. The operation returned the `Name` parameter with the value `sampleFederatedUser`.



Example Request

```
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: sts.amazonaws.com
Accept-Encoding: identity
Content-Length: 43
X-Amz-Date: 20160301T215108Z
User-Agent: aws-cli/1.10.0 Python/2.7.3 Linux/3.13.0-79-generic botocore/1.3.22
X-Amz-Security-Token:<REDACTED>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: AWS4-HMAC-SHA256
Credential=AKIAI44QH8DHBEXAMPLE/20160301/us-east-1/sts/aws4_request,
    SignedHeaders=host;user-agent;x-amz-date;x-amz-security-token,

Signature=1122334455abcdef1122334455abcdef1122334455abcdef1122334455abcdef

Action=GetCallerIdentity&Version=2011-06-15
```

Example Response

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
x-amzn-RequestId: 01234567-89ab-cdef-0123-456789abcdef
Content-Type: text/xml
Content-Length: 437
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2020 20:12:47 GMT

<GetCallerIdentityResponse xmlns="https://sts.amazonaws.com/doc/2011-06-15/">
  <GetCallerIdentityResult>
    <Arn>arn:aws:sts::123456789012:federated-user/my-federated-user-name</Arn>
    <UserId>123456789012:sampleFederatedUser</UserId>
    <Account>123456789012</Account>
  </GetCallerIdentityResult>
  <ResponseMetadata>
    <RequestId>01234567-89ab-cdef-0123-456789abcdef</RequestId>
  </ResponseMetadata>
</GetCallerIdentityResponse>
```

References:

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_Operations.html

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_request.html



Domain 5: Data Protection



Overview

The fifth exam domain of the AWS Certified Security Specialty test focuses on data protection of your AWS infrastructure. It has the second biggest percentage representing approximately 22% of the overall exam.

This domain will test your knowledge and skills on the following:

- Designing and implementing key management and use.
- Troubleshooting key management.
- Designing and implementing a data encryption solution for data at rest and data in transit.


Securing Data In AWS CloudFront

CloudFront accelerates content delivery by serving them directly from distributed servers called *Points of Presence (POPs)*. In AWS, we refer to POPs as **edge locations**. These edge locations are stationed in different places around the globe – providing low-latency access to the end-users.

We have briefly discussed how CloudFront caches data in edge locations back in Domain 3 under the “*Adding HTTP Security Headers Using Lambda@Edge and CloudFront*” section. What we know so far is that whenever a user retrieves files from a CloudFront distribution, CloudFront will check first if that file exists in its edge location. If not, it will get the data back from the origin server, cache that data on the edge location, and return it to the user. The same file will be fetched from the edge location the next time it is requested.

That explanation is kind of incomplete. As a matter of fact, there is another cache layer in addition to the CloudFront POPs. That extra cache layer is called *Regional Edge Cache (REC)*. Files stored on POPs eventually get less popular and need to be removed to make space for popular files. This is where REC comes into play. It acts as a fallback for files that become less popular. With this setup, when the less popular files are requested again, the data retrieval latency will remain relatively small since there is no need for CloudFront to request files from the origin server.

AWS needs two “cache layers” because of the technology it uses. As you see on the diagram, POPs use Solid State Drive (SSD) while RECs use Elastic Block Storage. SSDs have faster read and write throughputs than EBS since EBS is a network-attached storage. This is why SSDs are the preferred choice for serving files directly to users.





How to secure data at rest on POPs and RECs?

There is no need to configure CloudFront. The SSD and EBS that AWS uses for POP and REC are encrypted. It means that your data at rest is encrypted as well.

How about Encryption in transit?

There are two methods in deploying HTTPS connections on CloudFront: via **Viewer Protocol Policy** or **Origin Protocol Policy**.

Viewer Protocol Policy describes the connection protocol and policy **between the client (or viewer) and CloudFront**.

It supports **HTTP and HTTPS, Redirect HTTP to HTTPS**, and **HTTPS Only**.


Origin Protocol Policy describes the connection protocol policy **between CloudFront and the Origin Server**.

It supports **HTTP Only, HTTPS Only**, and **Match Viewer**.

An Origin Server can be any of the following:

- HTTP Server on an EC2 instance
- Elastic Load Balancer
- MediaPackage Origins
- MediaStore Containers
- Amazon S3 Buckets

Origin Protocol Policy **does not** apply at S3 website endpoints. This is because S3 website endpoints only support HTTP connections.




Custom Domain Name

CloudFront uses its own SSL certificate to provide an HTTPS CloudFront domain name by default. If you wish to use a custom domain name, you must use your own SSL certificate. Make sure that the domain listed on the certificate matches the alternate domain name that you want to use. You can request one from the ACM in the N. Virginia Region or use an imported certificate stored on IAM.

Field Encryption

Field Encryption refers to the process of encrypting data on certain data fields. Field Encryption adds an extra protection layer specifically for confidential data like security number, card number, phone number, or any personally identifiable information.

You can configure CloudFront to encrypt specific data as soon as it reaches the edge location. The Field Encryption uses public-key cryptography which needs two separate keys: *public* and *private* keys. You must generate your own RSA key pair. Upload the public key on CloudFront and specify the data field that you want to encrypt.



Geo Restriction

CloudFront also supports Geo Restriction in case you want to deliver your content to specific locations only. You can either blacklist or whitelist countries on Geo Restriction settings.

Security Specialty Exam Notes:

CloudFront uses encrypted SSD and EBS volumes for POP and REC respectively.

If you need a custom domain name, use a custom SSL certificate. Ensure that the domain name listed on the certificate matches the custom domain name that you will use.

Enable HTTPS on Viewer Protocol Policy and Origin Protocol Policy if you want end-to-end encryption.

To use Field Encryption, create an RSA key pair and upload the public key to CloudFront. Specify the data field that you want to encrypt.

Use Geo Restriction to restrict access to your content for users in specific countries.

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudFront/latest/DeveloperGuide/SecurityAndPrivateContent.html>
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudFront/latest/DeveloperGuide/data-protection-summary.html>
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudFront/latest/DeveloperGuide/data-protection-summary.html#data-protection-sum>


Using Elastic Load Balancer For Encrypting Traffic

There are three ways to use the Elastic Load Balancer to protect the data coming from a source to its destination:

SSL Termination / SSL Offloading

SSL Termination or SSL offloading refers to the process of offloading the encryption/decryption of data sent via SSL traffic from a web server to a dedicated server. In AWS, instead of burdening your backend server to process SSL traffic, we can move that responsibility to an Elastic load balancer. By doing so, you'd reduce the workload of your EC2 instances and save on compute resources.

To begin, make sure you install an SSL server certification on your load balancer. Then, configure your ELB to listen to a secure protocol (HTTPS/SSL). Client's request will now be decrypted at the load balancer. The ELB will send back the unencrypted data across the EC2 instances on the port specified on the ELB's listener configuration.




SSL Termination and Re-encryption

In cases where you are required to send all data in transit via HTTPS, you can optionally configure your ELB to terminate requests and re-encrypt them before sending to your back-end servers. To employ this method, you have to install an SSL certificate first to your ELB. The ELB uses the SSL certificate to authenticate both the client and back-end server's requests. Modify your load balancer protocol to listen to HTTPS traffic on port 443. Likewise, change your instance protocol to listen to HTTPS traffic.


Load Balancer Protocol	Load Balancer Port	Instance Protocol	Instance Port
HTTPS (Secure HTTP) ▼	443	HTTPS (Secure HTTP) ▼	443
<input type="button" value="Add"/>			

By doing this, the communication from your ELB to your back-end server is now automatically encrypted.



End-to-End Encryption

End-to-End Encryption is the process of securing data traffic from both ends of a communication channel, preventing any third-parties (e.g. load balancers) from reading the data unencrypted. To do this in AWS, we simply have to set both the load balancer and instance protocol to TCP. We will not install any TLS/SSL certificate on the load balancer since the requests are not terminated nor decrypted at the load balancer. The ELB lets the requests pass through as it is. To enable encrypted communication between the back-end server and the client, we have to install the TLS/SSL certificate on the back-end server.



Security Specialty Exam Notes:

Note that the ALB can only listen to HTTP and HTTPS traffic. If you're using a custom security protocol that requires a different port, you should consider using the Classic Load Balancer or Network Load Balancer.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/elastic-load-balancer-ssl-support-options/>
<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/compute/maintaining-transport-layer-security-all-the-way-to-your-container-using-the-network-load-balancer-with-amazon-ecs/>
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticloadbalancing/latest/classic/elb-listener-config.html>
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticloadbalancing/latest/classic/elb-add-or-delete-listeners.html>

Recovering the Data of an Encrypted Amazon EBS Volume if You Lose the CMK

Consider this scenario: *Due to poor team communication, one of your colleagues has inadvertently scheduled a deletion for a CMK used for encrypting a critical EBS volume. What can you do to recover the data from the encrypted volume?*

In order to solve this problem, we need to know some basic concepts first about EBS encryption and how it works.

EBS Encryption

- Data stored at rest on an encrypted volume, disk I/O, and snapshots created from it are all encrypted.
- Provides encryption for data in-transit from EC2 to EBS since encryption occurs on the servers that hosts EC2 instances.
- The following types of data are encrypted:
 - Data at rest inside the volume
 - All data moving between the volume and the instance
 - All snapshots created from the volume
 - All volumes created from those snapshots
- Uses AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) master keys when creating encrypted volumes and any snapshots created from your encrypted volumes.
- Volumes restored from encrypted snapshots are automatically encrypted.

How does EBS encryption work?

EBS uses a data key derived from a CMK to encrypt data as it gets stored on-disk. The good thing about this is that you don't have to worry about generating and managing data keys since EBS already supervises these operations behind the scenes.

The real issue lies on how EBS manages those data keys. To view encrypted data in plaintext, we need to decrypt it. And to decrypt it, we need the data key.

The question is, where does EBS store and retrieve the data key? Is it on an S3 bucket? Is it in a Parameter Store? — none of these. EBS stores the data key in its volume metadata. When the EBS is detached from an instance, the data key inside its metadata remains in encrypted form. Once it is attached to an instance, the EBS uses your CMK to decrypt the encrypted data key. The resulting data key in plaintext form is persisted in the hypervisor memory. And that plaintext data key is what EBS uses to encrypt disk I/O to the volume. Your CMK is the only key that can decrypt your encrypted data key. Once the CMK is deleted, it cannot be recovered.

So, how do we retrieve data from an encrypted EBS volume that we can no longer decrypt?



Well, first of all you need to identify if the EBS volume is still attached to an instance. If it still is, then it's your lucky day. What you can do is to create another EBS volume. Mount the new EBS to the same instance where your encrypted EBS is attached. Then migrate the data from the old EBS to the new EBS volume.

This kind of situation highlights the importance of detection and alerting systems and why they should not be taken for granted. Imagine if you learned about the deleted CMK months after. In the worst-case scenario, if a system failure hits your EBS, you won't be able to restore the snapshots taken from your encrypted EBS volume. They're as good as gone.

Security Specialty Exam Notes:

You can't recover a deleted CMK.

To recover files from encrypted EBS volume, create a new EBS volume and mount it to the same instance where the encrypted EBS is attached. Then, migrate the files from the old EBS to the new EBS.

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/EBSEncryption.html#migrate-data-encrypted-unencrypted>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/AmazonEBS.html>

Vault Locking in Amazon S3 Glacier

A Glacier Vault can be described as a container for your archived objects in S3 Glacier. To begin using Amazon S3 Glacier, you need a vault. Creating and deleting vaults can be easily done in the AWS Management Console, but interacting with them requires you to use the APIs. For example, let's say you want to upload images or log files to your vault. To do so, you would either use the AWS CLI or write code that would upload these objects.

Large corporations often have compliance requirements with how they store their data. To meet these requirements, you can use a feature in S3 Glacier called a Vault Lock. S3 Glacier Vault Lock allows you to create a vault lock policy that specifies how your archives will be handled. You can specify controls such as "write once read many" (WORM) in a vault lock policy and lock the policy from future edits. Once locked, the policy can no longer be changed.

You can include a bunch of controls in a vault lock policy, such as data retention based on duration or tags. These policies are written similarly as IAM Policies which follow JSON formatting. You can set one vault lock policy for each vault.

How To Lock Your Glacier Vault Using Glacier CLI command

1. Initiate the lock by attaching a vault lock policy to your vault.

To begin, call the `initiate-vault-lock` command and pass the necessary parameters. You need to pass your AWS Account Id and vault name after the `--account-id` and `--vault-name` parameter respectively. Both parameters take a string value. The `--policy` parameter takes a json value. Save your vault policy as a json file. Enter the file's path after the `--policy` parameter.

```
aws glacier initiate-vault-lock --account-id [AccountId] --vault-name [VaultName] --policy file://examplePolicy.json
```

This command will set the lock to an in-progress state and return a lock ID. While in the in-progress state, **you have 24 hours to validate your vault lock policy before the lock ID expires.**



Vault Lock policy will expire in about 23 hours


If you do not complete the Vault Lock process in the next 23 hours, your Vault Lock policy will automatically be deleted. [Learn more.](#)

2. Use the lock ID to complete the locking process.

To do so, call the `complete-vault-lock` and pass the necessary parameters. The first two parameters are identical to the first step. This time, we're passing the lock Id on the `--lock-id` parameter.

```
aws glacier complete-vault-lock --account-id [AccountId] --vault-name [VaultName] --lock-id [LockId]
```

You can verify the lock state of your vault on the Glacier Console.




How To Abort Your Vault Lock Operation

In cases where you need to revise your vault lock policy, you can abort the pending operation. A small caveat though: **the revision must be done within the 24-hour timeframe.**

Call the `abort-vault-lock` command. This time, you only have to pass your AWS account id and the name of the vault associated with your vault lock policy. As a result, the state of your vault lock will revert to "Not locked". You can now start revising your vault policy. After making changes, you need to call the `initiate-vault-lock` operation again.

```
aws glacier abort-vault-lock --account-id [AccountId] --vault-name [VaultName]
```

You can use the vault locking's simplified workflow below for your reference.



References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/amazonglacier/latest/dev/vault-lock.html>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/amazonglacier/latest/dev/api-InitiateVaultLock.html>



Data Protection in Amazon Kinesis Data Analytics

Amazon Kinesis Data Analytics is a serverless service that analyzes streaming data, gains actionable insights, and responds to business and customer needs in real-time. You can quickly build SQL queries and Java applications using built-in templates and operators for common processing functions to organize, transform, aggregate, and analyze data at any scale.

Amazon Kinesis Data Analytics can have Kinesis Data Stream and Kinesis Firehose as its **streaming data source**. It uses Amazon S3 as its **reference data source**. Streaming data source is the data that continually moves while the reference data source refers to the static data store on an S3 bucket. Typically, you use static data to supplement the data coming from the streaming data source.

Important Data Protection Concepts:

- Encryption of all data in transit from the streaming data source is enabled by default and cannot be disabled in Kinesis Data Analytics.
- Incoming data to the Kinesis Data Stream can be encrypted using the **StartStreamEncryption** API.
- All data in transit are **NOT** automatically encrypted by default in Amazon Kinesis Data Firehose.
- Your application's code and reference data are encrypted at rest.
- Kinesis Data Analytics does **NOT** support CMKs as it uses service-managed keys.

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kinesisanalytics/latest/dev/data-protection.html>
<https://aws.amazon.com/kinesis/data-analytics/>



Protecting Your S3 Bucket

Amazon S3 is a versatile object storage solution that boasts virtually unlimited storage capacity. You can expect that your files will be durably stored in S3 given that AWS provides an SLA for this service. When creating your S3 bucket, AWS provides you with a unique bucket URL that you can use to access your S3 bucket directly from the public Internet, if you have public access enabled.

Amazon S3 is a service that is not used within a VPC. This means that traffic does not pass through VPC resources such as Internet gateways or NAT gateways. This also means that, for security, we cannot use security groups and network access control lists to control who can access what objects in our bucket.


This section looks into implementing security in Amazon S3.

Using VPC endpoints to whitelists sources

In the other chapters, we talked about restricting access to private EC2 instances by whitelisting trusted sources using a proxy server like Squid. This time, we'll see how whitelisting can be done on an S3 bucket.

Let's say you're hosting a web application on an EC2 instance that downloads files from an S3 bucket based on client's requests. By default, your download requests are routed through an Internet gateway and use the public Internet to connect to Amazon S3. With VPC endpoint, you can privately connect your VPC to Amazon S3. You add a gateway entry in your VPC's route table to communicate between your AWS resources, such as Amazon EC2 instances. Your S3 request passes through the gateway instead of the public Internet. The VPC endpoint is a regional service. You must create the endpoint in the same region as the VPC you want to link it to.

As you can see in the diagram below, it would be difficult to whitelist sources without a VPC endpoint. The response from Amazon S3 would have to travel back to the Internet gateway then to the proxy server and finally back to your back-end server. Then, you would need to send the requested file back to the client. With the VPC endpoint, you have a direct internal connection to the S3 bucket, and the traffic flow is much simpler and straightforward.



VPC endpoints for S3 are secured through VPC endpoint access policies, which allows you to set which S3 buckets the endpoints should and should not have access to. By default, any user or service within the VPC using credentials from any AWS account has access to any Amazon S3 resource. Use these together with S3 bucket policies to further refine access control over your buckets and objects.

We can whitelist sources on Amazon S3 by using the **"Condition"** block on the bucket policy. For example, we want to explicitly allow the **"12.11.12.11/32"** IP address and the **"vpce-5555666"** vpc endpoint to perform all S3 operations on all the objects inside the **"examplebucket"** bucket. We can achieve that by adding the Condition operators: **"StringEquals"** & **"IpAddress"** and plugging their corresponding values.

```
{
  "Statement": [{
    "Sid": "VPCE and SourceIP",
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Principal": "*",
    "Action": "s3:*",
    "Resource": [
      "arn:aws:s3:::examplebucket/*"
    ],
    "Condition": {
      "StringEquals": {
        "aws:sourceVpce": "vpce-5555666"
      },
      "IpAddress": {
        "aws:SourceIp": "12.11.12.11/32"
      }
    }
  ]
}
```

Encryption at rest

Encryption at rest refers to the encryption of objects as it gets stored on an S3 bucket. In S3, we can either enable the default encryption or write our own code by calling the correct KMS API commands. You can enable the default encryption of a bucket on the S3 console. Default encryption supports SSE-S3 and SSE-KMS. Once enabled, all objects sent to your bucket are encrypted automatically.

Encryption in transit


Amazon S3 permits HTTP and HTTPS requests by default. HTTP, as we all know, is an insecure protocol and is rarely used nowadays. Naturally, you'd want to protect your data not only at rest but also in transit. In order to do so, we use a similar method in whitelisting through the **"Conditional"** block. But this time we'll make use of the **"aws:SecureTransport"** Conditional operator. This operator is a boolean type which only accepts 2 values (*true or false*).

```
{
  "Statement": [{
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Principal": "*",
    "Action": "s3:*",
    "Resource": [
      "arn:aws:s3:::examplebucket/*"
    ],
    "Condition": {
      "Bool": {
        "aws:SecureTransport": "True"
      }
    }
  }]
}
```

This bucket policy will only allow HTTPS requests to all the objects inside the “examplebucket” bucket. All HTTP requests will be denied.

S3 API Object-level logging

By default, CloudTrail captures bucket-level API operations and sends logs to an S3 bucket of your choice. In most cases, this won't be of much help debugging an issue as most data events come from object-level APIs. You can find object-level logging on the S3 console under the properties tab. There, you can find different selections for S3 bucket properties including object-level logging. Enabling this will allow CloudTrail to record object-level API actions such as **GetObject** and **PutObject**. Take note that this will incur additional costs.





Amazon Macie for Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

Amazon Macie is a fully managed service that uses machine learning to classify sensitive data such as personally identifiable information (PII) or intellectual property, regulatory documents, API keys, and secret keys.

Amazon Macie allows you to achieve the following:

- Identify and protect various data types, including PII, PHI, regulatory documents, API keys, and secret keys.
- Verify compliance with automated logs that allow for instant auditing.
- Identify changes to policies and access control lists.
- Observe changes in user behavior and receive actionable alerts.
- Receive notifications when data and account credentials leave protected zones.
- Detect when large quantities of business-critical documents are shared internally and externally.

You can use Macie to analyze S3 buckets in your account to discover usage patterns on any sensitive files that you have. Macie will give alerts if it detects unauthorized access or accidental data leaks.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/block-s3-traffic-vpc-ip/>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/dev/bucket-encryption.html>

<https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/s3-bucket-policy-for-config-rule/>


<https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2017/08/introducing-amazon-macie/>

AWS CHEAT SHEETS

AWS Security & Identity Services

Amazon Cognito

- A user management and authentication service that can be integrated to your **web or mobile applications**. Amazon Cognito also enables you to authenticate users through an **external identity provider** and provides **temporary security credentials** to access your app's backend resources in AWS or any service behind Amazon API Gateway. Amazon Cognito works with external identity providers that support SAML or OpenID Connect, social identity providers (Facebook, Twitter, Amazon, Google, Apple) and you can also integrate your own identity provider.
- An Amazon Cognito ID token is represented as a **JSON Web Token (JWT)**. Amazon Cognito uses JSON Web Tokens for token authentication.
- How It Works



User Pools

- User pools are user directories that provide sign-up and sign-in options for your app users.



- Users can sign in to your web or mobile app through Amazon Cognito, or federate through a third-party identity provider (IdP).
- You can use the aliasing feature to enable your users to sign up or sign in with an email address and a password or a phone number and a password.
- User pools are each created in one AWS Region, and they store the user profile data only in that region. You can also send user data to a different AWS Region.
- A User Pool is like a *directory* of users.
- Manage Users
 - After you create a user pool, you can create, confirm, and manage users accounts.
 - Amazon Cognito User Pools groups lets you manage your users and their access to resources by mapping IAM roles to groups.
 - User accounts are added to your user pool in one of the following ways:
 - The user signs up in your user pool's client app, which can be a mobile or web app.
 - You can import the user's account into your user pool.
 - You can create the user's account in your user pool and invite the user to sign in.
 - Sign up authflow below


- **Identity Pools**

- Use this feature if you want to federate users to your AWS services.
- Identity pools enable you to grant your users temporary AWS credentials to access AWS services, such as Amazon S3 and DynamoDB.
- Identity pools support anonymous guest users, as well as the following identity providers:
 - Amazon Cognito user pools
 - Social sign-in with Facebook, Google, and Login with Amazon
 - OpenID Connect (OIDC) providers
 - SAML identity providers
 - Developer authenticated identities
- To save user profile information, your identity pool needs to be integrated with a user pool.
- Amazon Cognito Identity Pools can support unauthenticated identities by providing a unique identifier and AWS credentials for users who do not authenticate with an identity provider.
- The permissions for each authenticated and non-authenticated user are controlled through IAM roles that you create.
- Once you have an OpenID Connect token, you can then trade this for temporary AWS credentials via the *AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity* API call in AWS Security Token Service (STS). This call is no different than if you were using Facebook, Google+, or Login with Amazon directly, except that you are passing an Amazon Cognito token instead of a token from one of the other public providers.


- **Common Use Cases**

- Enable your users to authenticate with a user pool.

- After a successful user pool sign-in, your web or mobile app will receive user pool tokens from Amazon Cognito. You can use those tokens to control access to your server-side resources.
- Access resources with API Gateway and Lambda with a User Pool. API Gateway validates the tokens from a successful user pool authentication, and uses them to grant your users access to resources including Lambda functions, or your own API.



- After a successful user pool authentication, your app will receive user pool tokens from Amazon Cognito. You can exchange them for temporary access to other AWS services with an identity pool.



- Enable your users access to AWS services through an identity pool. In exchange, the identity pool grants temporary AWS credentials that you can use to access other AWS services.
- Grant your users access to AWS AppSync resources with tokens from a successful Amazon Cognito authentication (from a user pool or an identity pool).
- Amazon Cognito is also commonly used together with AWS Amplify, a framework for developing web and mobile applications with AWS services.

Amazon Cognito Sync

- Store and sync data across devices using Cognito Sync.
- You can programmatically trigger the sync of data sets between client devices and the Amazon Cognito sync store by using the `synchronize()` method in the AWS Mobile SDK. The `synchronize()` method reads the **latest version** of the data available in the Amazon Cognito sync store and compares it to the local, cached copy. After comparison, the `synchronize()` method writes the latest updates as necessary to the local data store and the Amazon Cognito sync store.



- The Amazon Cognito Sync store is a key/value pair store linked to an Amazon Cognito identity. There is no limit to the number of identities you can create in your identity pools and sync store.
- Each user information store can have a maximum size of 20MB. Each data set within the user information store can contain up to 1MB of data. Within a data set you can have up to 1024 keys.
- With Cognito Streams, you can push sync store data to a Kinesis stream in your AWS account.
- Advanced Security Features
 - When Amazon Cognito detects unusual sign-in activity, such as sign-in attempts from new locations and devices, it assigns a risk score to the activity and lets you choose to either prompt users for additional verification or block the sign-in request.
 - Users can verify their identities using SMS or a Time-based One-time Password (TOTP) generator.
 - When Amazon Cognito detects users have entered credentials that have been compromised elsewhere, it prompts a password change.
- Integration with AWS Lambda
 - You can create an AWS Lambda function and then trigger that function during user pool operations such as user sign-up, confirmation, and sign-in (authentication) with a Lambda trigger.
 - Amazon Cognito invokes Lambda functions synchronously. When called, your Lambda function must respond within 5 seconds. If it does not, Amazon Cognito retries the call. After 3 unsuccessful attempts, the function times out.
 - You can create a Lambda function as a backend to Cognito that serves auth challenges to users signing in.
- Pricing
 - If you are using Cognito Identity to create a User Pool, you pay based on your monthly active users (MAUs) only. A user is counted as a MAU if, within a calendar month, there is an identity operation related to that user, such as sign-up, sign-in, token refresh or password change.
 - The Cognito Your User Pool feature has a free tier of 50,000 MAUs for users who sign in directly to Cognito User Pools or through social identity providers, and 50 MAUs for users federated through SAML 2.0 based identity providers.
 - You pay an additional fee when you enable advanced security features for Amazon Cognito.
 - Amazon Cognito uses Amazon SNS for sending SMS messages for Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) and phone number verification, so there are associated SNS costs as well.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/cognito/>

<https://aws.amazon.com/cognito/faqs/>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cognito/latest/developerguide/what-is-amazon-cognito.html>

[Overview of Amazon Cognito User Pools and Federated Identities](#)



Amazon Detective

- The service automatically collects log data from your AWS resources and uses machine learning, statistical analysis, and graph theory to build a linked set of data that enables you to easily conduct faster and more efficient security investigations.
- Can be integrated with AWS security services like Amazon GuardDuty, Amazon Macie, and AWS Security Hub as well as partner security products to identify potential security issues, or findings.
- Amazon Detective can analyze trillions of events from multiple data sources such as VPC Flow Logs, AWS CloudTrail, and Amazon GuardDuty, and automatically creates a unified, interactive view of your resources, users, and the interactions between them over time. This allows you to identify the underlying reasons for the findings, drill down into relevant historical activities, and quickly determine the root cause of a security concern.
- Amazon Detective's prebuilt data aggregations, summaries, and context help you to quickly analyze and determine the nature and extent of possible security issues.
- Concepts
 - Investigation - The process of performing triage on suspicious or interesting activity, determining the scope, getting to its underlying source or cause, and then determining how to proceed.
 - Behavior graph - A linked set of data generated from incoming source data that is associated with one or more AWS accounts. Each behavior graph uses the same structure of findings, entities, and relationships.
 - Management account - The AWS account that owns a behavior graph and that uses the behavior graph for investigation. The management account invites member accounts to contribute their data to the behavior graph. Management accounts can also view data usage for the behavior graph, and remove member accounts from the behavior graph.
 - Member account - An AWS account that a management account invited to contribute data to a behavior graph. Member accounts can respond to the behavior graph invitation and remove their account from the behavior graph. They have no other access to the behavior graph.
 - **Finding** - A security issue detected by Amazon GuardDuty.
 - **Entity** - An item extracted from the incoming data. Each entity has a type, which identifies the type of object it represents. Examples include IP addresses, Amazon EC2 instances, and AWS users.
 - For each entity, the source data is also used to populate entity properties. Property values can be extracted directly from source records or aggregated across multiple records.
 - **Relationship** - Activity that occurs between individual entities. Relationships are also extracted from the incoming source data.
 - Similar to an entity, a relationship has a type, which identifies the types of entities involved and the direction of the connection. An example of a relationship type is an IP address connecting to an Amazon EC2 instance.



- Profile - For a finding or an entity, a single page that provides a collection of data visualizations plus supporting guidance.
 - For findings, profiles help analysts to determine whether the finding is of genuine concern or a false positive.
 - For entities, profiles provide supporting details for an investigation into a finding or for a general hunt for suspicious activity.
- Scope time - The time window that is used to scope the data displayed on finding and entity profiles. The default scope time for a finding profile reflects the first and last times when the suspicious activity was observed. The default scope time for an entity profile is the previous 24 hours.
- Amazon Detective needs to be enabled on a **per region** basis and enables you to quickly analyze activity across all your accounts within each region.
- Amazon Detective is a **multi-account service** that aggregates data from monitored member accounts under a single management account within the same region. You can configure multi-account monitoring deployments in the same way that you configure management and member accounts in Amazon GuardDuty and AWS Security Hub.
 - If you cannot use the same management accounts across all of the services, then after you enable Detective, you can optionally create a cross-account role.
- If you are using Amazon GuardDuty, Amazon Detective will automatically ingest and process two weeks of historical log data upon activation.
- The management account for a behavior graph can disable Amazon Detective. When you disable Detective, the behavior graph and its associated Detective data are deleted. Deleted behavior graphs cannot be restored.
- Amazon Detective is able to analyze IAM role sessions by processing VPC flow records and CloudTrail management events from across a customer's enabled accounts, collating data about activity performed under an IAM Role into role sessions. This lets you visualize and understand the actions that users and apps have performed using the assumed roles.
- Amazon Detective vs Amazon GuardDuty vs AWS Security Hub
 - Amazon GuardDuty is a **threat detection service** that continuously monitors for malicious activity and unauthorized behavior to protect your AWS accounts and workloads.
 - With Security Hub, you have a **single place that aggregates, organizes, and prioritizes your security alerts, or findings**, from multiple AWS services, such as Amazon GuardDuty, Amazon Inspector, and Amazon Macie, as well as from AWS Partner solutions.
 - Amazon Detective simplifies the **process of investigating security findings and identifying the root cause**.
- Limits
 - You can maintain up to a year of aggregated findings for analysis
- Common Use Cases
 - Triage security findings
 - Incident investigation



- Hunting for hidden security threats

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/detective/>

<https://aws.amazon.com/detective/faqs/>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/detective/latest/adminguide/what-is-detective.html>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/detective/latest/userguide/detective-investigation-about.html>



Amazon GuardDuty

- An intelligent threat detection service. It analyzes billions of events across your AWS accounts from AWS CloudTrail (AWS user and API activity in your accounts), Amazon VPC Flow Logs (network traffic data), and DNS Logs (name query patterns).
- GuardDuty is a regional service.
- Threat detection categories
 - **Reconnaissance** – Activity suggesting reconnaissance by an attacker, such as unusual API activity, intra-VPC port scanning, unusual patterns of failed login requests, or unblocked port probing from a known bad IP.
 - **Instance compromise** – Activity indicating an instance compromise, such as cryptocurrency mining, backdoor command and control activity, malware using domain generation algorithms, outbound denial of service activity, unusually high volume of network traffic, unusual network protocols, outbound instance communication with a known malicious IP, temporary Amazon EC2 credentials used by an external IP address, and data exfiltration using DNS.
 - **Account compromise** – Common patterns indicative of account compromise include API calls from an unusual geolocation or anonymizing proxy, attempts to disable AWS CloudTrail logging, changes that weaken the account password policy, unusual instance or infrastructure launches, infrastructure deployments in an unusual region, and API calls from known malicious IP addresses.
- Amazon GuardDuty provides three severity levels (Low, Medium, and High) to allow you to prioritize response to potential threats.
- CloudTrail Event Source
 - Currently, GuardDuty only analyzes CloudTrail management events. (Read about types of CloudTrail trails for more information)
 - GuardDuty processes all CloudTrail events that come into a region, including global events that CloudTrail sends to all regions, such as AWS IAM, AWS STS, Amazon CloudFront, and Route 53.
- VPC Flow Logs Event Source
 - VPC Flow Logs capture information about the IP traffic going to and from Amazon EC2 network interfaces in your VPC.
- DNS Logs Event Source
 - If you use AWS DNS resolvers for your EC2 instances (the default setting), then GuardDuty can access and process your request and response DNS logs through the internal AWS DNS resolvers. Using other DNS resolvers will not provide GuardDuty access to its DNS logs.
- GuardDuty vs Macie
 - Amazon GuardDuty provides broad protection of your AWS accounts, workloads, and data by helping to identify threats such as attacker reconnaissance, instance compromise, and account compromise. Amazon Macie helps you protect your data in Amazon S3 by helping you classify what data you have, the value that data has to the business, and the behavior associated with access to that data.



- GuardDuty Findings
 - GuardDuty generates **findings** when it detects unexpected and potentially malicious activity in your AWS environment. These are viewable via Console, GuardDuty CLI or API operations.
 - A Finding's summary includes:
 - **Finding type** – a concise yet readable description of the potential security issue.
 - **Severity** – a finding's assigned severity level of either High, Medium, or Low.
 - **Region** – the AWS region in which the finding was generated.
 - **Count** – the number of times GuardDuty generated the finding after you enabled GuardDuty in your AWS account.
 - **Account ID** – the ID of the AWS account in which the activity took place that prompted GuardDuty to generate this finding.
 - **Resource ID** – the ID of the AWS resource against which the activity took place that prompted GuardDuty to generate this finding.
 - **Threat list name** - the name of the threat list that includes the IP address or the domain name involved in the activity that prompted GuardDuty to generate the finding.
 - **Last seen** – the time (your local timezone if checked through console, and UTC if checked through CLI or API) at which the activity took place that prompted GuardDuty to generate this finding.
 - A finding's **Resource affected** section includes:
 - **Resource role** – a value that usually is set to **Target** because the affected resource can be a potential target of an attack.
 - **Resource type** – the type of the affected resource. This value is either **AccessKey** or **Instance**.
 - **Instance ID** – the ID of the EC2 instance involved in the activity that prompted GuardDuty to generate the finding.
 - **Port** – the port number for the connection used during the activity that prompted GuardDuty to generate the finding.
 - **Access key ID** – access key ID of the user engaged in the activity that prompted GuardDuty to generate the finding.
 - **Principal ID** – the principal ID of the user engaged in the activity that prompted GuardDuty to generate the finding.
 - **User type** – the type of user engaged in the activity that prompted GuardDuty to generate the finding.
 - **User name** – The name of the user engaged in the activity that prompted GuardDuty to generate the finding.
 - A finding's **Action** section includes:
 - **Action type** – the finding activity type. This value can be one of the following: NETWORK_CONNECTION, AWS_API_CALL, PORT_PROBE, or DNS_REQUEST.
 - **API** – the name of the API operation that was invoked and thus prompted GuardDuty to generate this finding.
 - **Service name** – the name of the AWS service (GuardDuty) that generated the finding.



- **Connection direction** – the network connection direction observed in the activity that prompted GuardDuty to generate the finding. The values can be INBOUND, OUTBOUND, and UNKNOWN.
- **Protocol** – the network connection protocol observed in the activity that prompted GuardDuty to generate the finding.
- A finding's **Actor** section includes:
 - **Location** – location information of the IP address involved in the activity that prompted GuardDuty to generate the finding.
 - **Organization** – ISP organization information of the IP address involved in the activity that prompted GuardDuty to generate the finding.
 - **IP address** – the IP address involved in the activity that prompted GuardDuty to generate the finding.
 - **Port** – the port number involved in the activity that prompted GuardDuty to generate the finding.
 - **Domain** – the domain involved in the activity that prompted GuardDuty to generate the finding.
- A finding's **Details** section includes:
 - **ThreatPurpose** - describes the primary purpose of a threat or a potential attack. Can have the following values:
 - **Backdoor** - this value indicates that the attack has compromised an AWS resource and is capable of contacting its home command and control (C&C) server to receive further instructions for malicious activity.
 - **Behavior** - this value indicates that GuardDuty is detecting activity or activity patterns that are different from the established baseline for a particular AWS resource.
 - **Cryptocurrency** - this value indicates that GuardDuty is detecting software that is associated with cryptocurrencies.
 - **Pentest** - sometimes owners of AWS resources or their authorized representatives intentionally run tests against AWS applications to find vulnerabilities, like open security groups or access keys that are overly permissive. These pen tests are done in an attempt to identify and lock down vulnerable resources before they are discovered by attackers.
 - **Persistence** - this value indicates that a principal in your AWS environment is exhibiting behavior that is different from the established baseline. Such as a principal has no prior history of updating network configuration settings, or updating policies or permissions attached to AWS users or resources.
 - **Policy** - this value indicates that your AWS account is exhibiting behavior that goes against recommended security best practices.
 - **PrivilegeEscalation** - this value informs you that a specific principal in your AWS environment is exhibiting behavior that can be indicative of a privilege escalation attack.



- **Recon** - this value indicates that a reconnaissance attack is underway, scoping out vulnerabilities in your AWS environment by probing ports, listing users, database tables, and so on.
- **ResourceConsumption** - this value indicates that a principal in your AWS environment is exhibiting behavior that is different from the established baseline. Such as a principal has no prior history of launching EC2 instances.
- **Stealth** - this value indicates that an attack is actively trying to hide its actions and its tracks.
- **Trojan** - this value indicates that an attack is using Trojan programs that silently carry out malicious activity. Sometimes this software takes on an appearance of a legitimate program. Sometimes users accidentally run this software. Other times this software might run automatically by exploiting a vulnerability.
- **UnauthorizedAccess** - this value indicates that GuardDuty is detecting suspicious activity or a suspicious activity pattern by an unauthorized individual.
- **ResourceTypeAffected** - describes which AWS resource is identified in this finding as the potential target of an attack. Currently, only EC2 instances and principals (and their credentials) can be identified as affected resources in GuardDuty findings.
- **ThreatFamilyName** - describes the overall threat or potential malicious activity that GuardDuty is detecting.
- **ThreatFamilyVariant** - describes the specific variant of the **ThreatFamily** that GuardDuty is detecting. Attackers often slightly modify the functionality of the attack, thus creating new variants.
- **Artifact** - describes a specific resource that is owned by a tool that is used in the attack.
- You can create filters for your GuardDuty findings.
 - A *suppression rule* is a filter used to automatically archive new findings. After you create a suppression rule, new findings that match the criteria defined in the rule are automatically archived.
- GuardDuty supports exporting active findings to CloudWatch Events and, optionally, to an Amazon S3 bucket. New Active findings that GuardDuty generates are automatically exported within about 5 minutes after the finding is generated.
- Trusted IP Lists and Threat Lists
 - **Trusted IP lists** consist of IP addresses that you have **whitelisted for secure communication** with your AWS infrastructure and applications. GuardDuty does not generate findings for IP addresses on trusted IP lists.
 - At any given time, you can have only one uploaded trusted IP list per AWS account per region.
 - **Threat lists** consist of known **malicious** IP addresses. GuardDuty generates findings based on threat lists.
 - At any given time, you can have up to six uploaded threat lists per AWS account per region.
- Pricing



Pricing is based on the quantity of AWS CloudTrail Events analyzed (per 1,000,000 events) and the volume of Amazon VPC Flow Log and DNS Log data analyzed (per GB).

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/guardduty/>

<https://aws.amazon.com/guardduty/faqs/>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/what-is-guardduty.html>

https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=7&v=o2Yalsps5LY




Amazon Inspector

- An automated security assessment service that helps you test the network accessibility of your EC2 instances and the security state of your applications running on the instances.
- Inspector uses IAM *service-linked roles*.

Features

- Inspector provides an engine that analyzes system and resource configuration and monitors activity to determine what an assessment target looks like, how it behaves, and its dependent components. The combination of this telemetry provides a complete picture of the assessment target and its potential security or compliance issues.
- Inspector incorporates a built-in library of rules and reports. These include checks against best practices, common compliance standards and vulnerabilities.
- Automate security vulnerability assessments throughout your development and deployment pipeline or against static production systems.
- Inspector is an API-driven service that uses an optional *agent*, making it easy to deploy, manage, and automate.



Security Assessments

Concepts

- **Inspector Agent** - A software agent that you can install on all EC2 instances that are included in the assessment target, the security of which you want to evaluate with Inspector.
- **Assessment run** - The process of discovering potential security issues through the analysis of your assessment target's configuration and behavior against specified rules packages.
- **Assessment target** - A collection of AWS resources that work together as a unit to help you accomplish your business goals. Inspector assessment targets can consist only of EC2 instances.
- **Assessment template** - A configuration that is used during your assessment run, which includes
 - Rules packages against which you want Inspector to evaluate your assessment target,



- The duration of the assessment run,
- Amazon SNS topics to which you want Inspector to send notifications about assessment run states and findings,
- Inspector-specific attributes (key-value pairs) that you can assign to findings generated by the assessment run that uses this assessment template.
- After you create an assessment template, you can't modify it.
- **Finding** - A potential security issue discovered during the assessment run of the specified target.
- **Rule** - A security check performed during an assessment run. When a rule detects a potential security issue, Inspector generates a finding that describes the issue.
- **Rules package** - A collection of rules that corresponds to a security goal that you might have.
- **Telemetry** - EC2 instance data collected by Inspector during an assessment run and passed to the Inspector service for analysis.
- The telemetry data generated by the Inspector Agent during assessment runs is formatted in JSON files and delivered in near-real-time over TLS to Inspector, where it is encrypted with a per-assessment-run, ephemeral KMS-derived key and securely stored in an S3 bucket dedicated for the service.

Rules Packages and Rules

- Inspector compares the behavior and the security configuration of the assessment targets to selected security *rules packages*.
- *Rules* are grouped together into distinct rules packages either by category, severity, or pricing.
- Each rule has an assigned severity level
 - **High, Medium, and Low** levels all indicate a security issue that can result in compromised information confidentiality, integrity, and availability within your assessment target.
 - The **Informational** level simply highlights a security configuration detail of your assessment target.
- The findings generated by **rules in the Network Reachability package** show whether your ports are reachable from the internet through an internet gateway, a VPC peering connection, or a VPN through a virtual gateway. These findings also highlight network configurations that allow for potentially malicious access, such as mismanaged security groups, ACLs, IGWs, and so on.

Assessment Reports

- A document that details what is tested in the assessment run, and the results of the assessment.
- You can view the following types of assessment reports:
 - **Findings report** - this report contains the following information:
 - Executive summary of the assessment
 - EC2 instances evaluated during the assessment run
 - Rules packages included in the assessment run
 - Detailed information about each finding, including all EC2 instances that had the finding



- **Full report** - this report contains all the information that is included in a findings report, and additionally provides the list of rules that passed on all instances in the assessment target.

Pricing

- Pricing is based on two dimensions
 - The number of EC2 instances included in each assessment
 - The type(s) of rules package you select: host assessment rules packages and/or the network reachability rules package

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/inspector/latest/userguide>

<https://aws.amazon.com/inspector/pricing/>

<https://aws.amazon.com/inspector/faqs/>



Amazon Macie

- A security service that uses machine learning to automatically discover, classify, and protect sensitive data in AWS. Macie recognizes sensitive data such as personally identifiable information (PII) or intellectual property.
- Amazon Macie allows you to achieve the following:
 - Identify and protect various data types, including PII, PHI, regulatory documents, API keys, and secret keys
 - Verify compliance with automated logs that allow for instant auditing
 - Identify changes to policies and access control lists
 - Observe changes in user behavior and receive actionable alerts
 - Receive notifications when data and account credentials leave protected zones
 - Detect when large quantities of business-critical documents are shared internally and externally
- Concepts
 - An **Alert** is a notification about a potential security issue that Macie discovers. Alerts appear on the Macie console and provide a comprehensive narrative about all activity that occurred over the last 24 hours.
 - Basic alerts – Alerts that are generated by the security checks that Macie performs. There are two types of basic alerts in Macie:
 - Managed (curated by Macie) basic alerts that you can't modify. You can only enable or disable the existing managed basic alerts.
 - Custom basic alerts that you can create and modify to your exact specifications.
 - Predictive alerts – Automatic alerts based on activity in your AWS infrastructure that deviates from the established normal activity baseline. More specifically, Macie continuously monitors IAM user and role activity in your AWS infrastructure and builds a model of the normal behavior. It then looks for deviations from that normal baseline, and when it detects such activity, it generates automatic predictive alerts.
 - **Data source** is the origin or location of a set of data.
 - AWS CloudTrail event logs and errors, including Amazon S3 object-level API activity. You can't modify existing or add new CloudTrail events to the list that Macie manages. You can enable or disable the supported CloudTrail events, thus instructing Macie to either include or exclude them in its data security process.
 - Amazon S3 objects. You can integrate Macie with your S3 buckets and/or specify S3 prefixes
 - **User**, in the context of Macie, a user is the AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) identity that makes the request.
- There are certain file formats that Macie does not support, such as wav files.
- Once Macie begins monitoring your data, it uses several **automatic content classification methods** to identify and prioritize your sensitive and critical data and to accurately assign business value to your

data. Each classification has a designated risk level between 1 and 10, with 10 being the highest risk and 1 being the lowest. These methods include:

- **Content Type Classification** - Macie uses an identifier that is embedded in the file header of your data objects. Macie can assign only one content type to an object. You can't modify existing or add new content types. You can only enable or disable any existing content types, thus enabling or disabling Macie to assign them to your objects during the classification process.
- **File Extension Classification** - Macie offers a set of managed file extensions. Macie can assign only one file extension to an object. You can't modify existing or add new file extensions. You can enable or disable any existing file extensions, thus enabling or disabling Macie to assign them to your objects during the classification process.
- **Theme Classification** - Object classification by theme is based on keywords that Macie searches for as it examines the contents of data objects. Macie can assign one or more themes to an object. You can't modify existing or add new themes. You can enable or disable any existing themes, thus enabling or disabling Macie to assign them to your objects during the classification process.
- **Regex Classification** - Macie offers a set of managed regexes. Object classification by regex is based on specific data or data patterns that Macie searches for as it examines the contents of data objects. Macie can assign one or more regexes to an object. You can't modify existing or add new regexes. You can enable or disable any existing regexes, thus enabling or disabling Macie to assign them to your objects during the classification process.
- **PII Classification** - Object classification by personally identifiable information (PII) is based on recognizing any personally identifiable artifacts based on industry standards such as NIST-80-122 and FIPS 199.
- **Support Vector Machine–Based Classifier** - It classifies content inside your S3 objects (text, token n-grams, and character n-grams) that Macie monitors and their metadata features (document length, extension, encoding, headers) to accurately classify documents based on content.
- You can use the **Research** tab in the Macie console to construct and run queries in the query parser and conduct in-depth investigative research of your data and activity that Macie monitors.
- If you disable Macie, the following actions occur:
 - It no longer has access to the resources in the management account and all member accounts. You must add member accounts again if you decide to reenable Macie.
 - It stops processing the resources in the management account and all member accounts. After Macie is disabled, the metadata that Macie collected while monitoring the data in your management and member accounts is deleted. Within 90 days from disabling Macie, all of this metadata is expired from the Macie system backups.
- Pricing
 - You are charged based on the amount of content classified, and the amount of AWS CloudTrail events assessed by Amazon Macie for anomalies (both Management API activity and Amazon S3 object-level API activity).



- Amazon Macie stores the generated metadata of classified S3 objects for 30 days at no additional cost. Additional monthly fees will be incurred if you choose the optional Extended Data Retention feature.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/macie/>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/macie/latest/userguide/what-is-macie.html>

<https://aws.amazon.com/macie/faq/>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LCjX2rsQ2wA>



AWS Artifact

- A self-service central repository of AWS' security and compliance reports and select online agreements.
- An **audit artifact** is a piece of evidence that demonstrates that an organization is following a documented process or meeting a specific requirement (business compliant).
- **AWS Artifact Reports** include the following:
 - ISO,
 - Service Organization Control (SOC) reports,
 - Payment Card Industry (PCI) reports,
 - and certifications that validate the implementation and operating effectiveness of AWS security controls.
- **AWS Artifacts Agreements** include
 - the Nondisclosure Agreement (NDA)
 - the Business Associate Addendum (BAA), which typically is required for companies that are subject to the HIPAA Act to ensure that protected health information (PHI) is appropriately safeguarded.
- **All AWS Accounts with AWS Artifact IAM permissions have access to AWS Artifact.** Root users and IAM users with admin permissions can download all audit artifacts available to their account by agreeing to the associated terms and conditions. You will need to grant IAM users with non-admin permissions access to AWS Artifact.
- To use organization agreements in AWS Artifact, your organization must be enabled for **all features**.
- **AWS Artifact Agreements**
 - AWS Artifact Account Agreements apply only to the individual account you used to sign into AWS.
 - AWS Artifact Organization Agreements apply to all accounts in an organization created through AWS Organizations, including the organization's management account and all member accounts. Only the management account in an organization can accept agreements in AWS Artifact Organization Agreements.
 - Management accounts and member accounts of an Organization can have AWS Artifact Account Agreements and AWS Artifact Organization Agreements of the same type in place at the same time.
 - If you have accounts in separate organizations that you want covered by an agreement, you must log in to each organization's management account and accept the relevant agreements through AWS Artifact Organization Agreements.
 - Terminating the organization agreement does not terminate the account agreement.
 - When a member account is removed from an organization (e.g. by leaving the organization, or by being removed from the organization by the management account), any organization agreements accepted on its behalf will no longer apply to that member account.
- **Business Associate Addendum (BAA)**
 - You can accept the AWS BAA for your individual account, or if you are a management account in an organization, you can accept the AWS BAA on behalf of all accounts in your organization.



- Upon accepting the AWS BAA in AWS Artifact Agreements, you will instantly designate your AWS account(s) for use in connection with protected health information (PHI) and HIPAA.
- If you terminate an online BAA under the Account agreements tab in AWS Artifact, the account you used to sign into AWS will immediately cease to be a HIPAA Account, unless it was also covered by an organization BAA.
- If you are a user of a management account and terminate an online BAA in AWS Artifact, all accounts within your organization will immediately be removed as HIPAA Accounts, unless they were covered by individual account BAAs.
- If you have both an account BAA and an organization BAA in place at the same time, the terms of the organization BAA will apply instead of the terms of the account BAA.
- AWS Australian Notifiable Data Breach Addendum (ANDB Addendum)
 - Using the management account of your organization you can use the Organization agreements tab in AWS Artifact Agreements to accept an ANDB Addendum on behalf of all existing and future member accounts in your organization.
 - When both the account ANDB Addendum and organizations ANDB Addendum are accepted, the organizations ANDB Addendum will apply instead of the account ANDB Addendum.
 - If you terminate an account ANDB Addendum under the Account agreements tab in AWS Artifact, the AWS account you used to sign into AWS Artifact will not be covered by an ANDB Addendum with AWS, unless it is also covered by an organizations ANDB Addendum.
 - If you are a user of a management account and terminate an organizations ANDB Addendum within the Organization agreements tab in AWS Artifact, the AWS accounts in that AWS organization will not be covered by an ANDB Addendum with AWS, unless they are covered by an account ANDB Addendum
- Most errors you receive from AWS Artifact can be resolved by adding the necessary IAM permissions.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/artifact/>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/artifact/latest/ug/what-is-aws-artifact.html>

<https://aws.amazon.com/artifact/faq/>



AWS Certificate Manager

- A service that lets you easily provision, manage, and deploy public and private SSL/TLS certificates for use with AWS services and your internal connected resources. SSL/TLS certificates are used to secure network communications and establish the identity of websites over the Internet as well as resources on private networks.
- ACM is integrated with the following services:
 - Elastic Load Balancing
 - Amazon CloudFront - To use an ACM certificate with CloudFront, you must request or import the certificate in the US East (N. Virginia) region.
 - AWS Elastic Beanstalk
 - Amazon API Gateway
 - AWS CloudFormation
- AWS Certificate Manager manages the renewal process for the certificates managed in ACM and used with ACM-integrated services.
- You can import your own certificates into ACM, however you have to renew these yourself.
- Concepts
 - ACM Certificates are X.509 version 3 certificates. Each is valid for **13 months**.
 - When you request an ACM certificate, you must validate that you own or control all of the domains that you specify in your request.
 - **Each ACM Certificate must include at least one fully qualified domain name (FQDN)**. You can add additional names if you want to.
 - You can create an ACM Certificate containing a wildcard name (*.example.com) that can protect several sites in the same domain (subdomains).
 - You cannot download the private key for an ACM Certificate.
 - The first time you request or import a certificate in an AWS region, ACM creates an AWS-managed customer master key (CMK) in AWS KMS with the alias aws/acm. This CMK is unique in each AWS account and each AWS region. ACM uses this CMK to encrypt the certificate's private key.
 - You cannot add or remove domain names from an existing ACM Certificate. Instead you must request a new certificate with the revised list of domain names.
 - You cannot delete an ACM Certificate that is being used by another AWS service. To delete a certificate that is in use, you must first remove the certificate association.
 - Applications and browsers trust public certificates automatically by default, whereas an administrator must explicitly configure applications to trust private certificates.
- Types of Certificates For Use With ACM
 - **Public certificates**
 - ACM manages the renewal and deployment of public certificates used with ACM-integrated services.



- You cannot install public ACM certificates directly on your website or application, only for integrated services.
- **Private certificates**
 - ACM Private CA provides three ways to create and manage private certificates. 1) You can choose to delegate private certificate management to ACM. When used in this way, ACM can automatically renew and deploy private certificates used with ACM-integrated services. 2) You can export private certificates from ACM and use them with EC2 instances, containers, on-premises servers, and IoT devices. ACM Private CA automatically renews these certificates and sends an Amazon CloudWatch notification when the renewal is completed. You can write client-side code to download renewed certificates and private keys and deploy them with your application. 3) ACM Private CA gives you the flexibility to create your own private keys, generate a certificate signing request (CSR), issue private certificates from your ACM Private CA, and manage the keys and certificates yourself. You are responsible for renewing and deploying these private certificates.
- **Imported certificates**
 - If you want to use a third-party certificate with ACM integrated services, you may import it into ACM using the AWS Management Console, AWS CLI, or ACM APIs. ACM does not manage the renewal process for imported certificates. You are responsible for monitoring the expiration date of your imported certificates and for renewing them before they expire. You can use the AWS Management Console to monitor the expiration dates of imported certificates and import a new third-party certificate to replace an expiring one.
- **CA certificates**
 - ACM private CA can issue certificates to identify private certificate authorities. These certificates allow CA administrators to create a private CA hierarchy, which provides strong security and restrictive access controls for the most-trusted root CA at the top of the trust chain, while allowing more permissive access and bulk certificate issuance for subordinate CAs lower in the chain.

ACM Private Certificate Authority

- ACM PCA allows you to create a private certificate authority (CA) and then use ACM to issue private certificates.
- With ACM Private CA, you can create complete CA hierarchies, including root and subordinate CAs. A CA hierarchy provides strong security and restrictive access controls for the most-trusted root CA at the top of the trust chain, while allowing more permissive access and bulk certificate issuance for subordinate CAs lower in the chain.
- A private CA handles the issuance, validation, and revocation of private certificates within a private network. It is comprised of two major components: The first is the **CA certificate**, a cryptographic building block upon which certificates can be issued. The second is a **set of run-time services** for maintaining revocation information through the **Certificate Revocation List (CRL)**.



- Benefits of a Private CA
 - Create certificates with any subject name you want.
 - Create certificates with any expiration date you want.
 - Use any supported private key algorithm and key length.
 - Use any supported signing algorithm.
 - Configure certificates in bulk using templates.
- Automatic renewal is not available for ACM Private CA certificates for which ACM does not create the private key and certificate signing request (CSR).
- You cannot copy private CAs between Regions. To use private CAs in more than one Region, you must create your CAs in those Regions.

Domain Verification for Certificates

- Before the Amazon certificate authority can issue a certificate for your site, AWS Certificate Manager must verify that you own or control all of the domain names that you specified in your request. You can choose either **email validation** or **DNS validation** when you request a certificate.
- For DNS validation, ACM uses **CNAME (Canonical Name) records to validate** that you own or control a domain.
- In the DNS validation console page, ACM will provide you a CNAME record that you must add to your DNS database, whether it be Route 53 or other hosts.
- For email validation, ACM sends email to the 3 contact addresses listed in WHOIS and to 5 common system addresses for each domain that you specify. To validate it, one of the recipients must click on the approval link.

Pricing

- There is no additional charge for provisioning public or private SSL/TLS certificates you use with ACM-integrated services, such as Elastic Load Balancing and API Gateway.
- You are billed for each active ACM Private CA per month pro-rated
- For private certificates, ACM Private CA allows you to pay monthly for the service and certificates you create. You pay less per certificate as you create more private certificates.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/certificate-manager/>

<https://aws.amazon.com/certificate-manager/faqs/>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/acm/latest/userguide/acm-overview.html>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/acm-pca/latest/userguide/PcaWelcome.html>



AWS Directory Service

For Microsoft Active Directory

- Also known as **AWS Managed Microsoft AD**, the service enables your directory-aware workloads and AWS resources to use **managed Active Directory** in the AWS Cloud.
- The service is built on actual Microsoft Active Directory and powered by Windows Server 2012 R2.
- AWS Managed Microsoft AD is your best choice if you need actual Active Directory features to support AWS applications or Windows workloads, including Amazon RDS for Microsoft SQL Server. It's also best if you want a standalone AD in the Cloud that supports Office 365 or you need an LDAP directory to support your Linux applications.
- Concepts
 - AWS Managed Microsoft AD provides multiple directory choices for customers who want to use existing Microsoft AD or Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)–aware applications in the cloud.
 - When you create a directory, AWS Directory Service creates two domain controllers and adds the DNS service on your behalf. The domain controllers are created in different subnets in a VPC
 - When creating a directory, you need to provide some basic information such as a fully qualified domain name (FQDN) for your directory, Administrator account name and password, and the VPC you want the directory to be attached to.
 - AWS does not provide Windows PowerShell access to directory instances, and it restricts access to directory objects, roles, and groups that require elevated privileges.
 - AWS Managed Microsoft AD does not allow direct host access to domain controllers via Telnet, Secure Shell (SSH), or Windows Remote Desktop Connection.
 - When you create an AWS Managed Microsoft AD directory, you are assigned an organizational unit (OU) and an administrative account with delegated administrative rights for the OU.
 - AWS Managed Microsoft AD directories are deployed across **two Availability Zones in a region** by default and connected to your Amazon VPC.
 - You cannot configure the storage, CPU, or memory parameters of your AWS Managed Microsoft AD directory.
- Active Directory Schema
 - A **schema** is the definition of attributes and classes that are part of a distributed directory and is similar to fields and tables in a database. Schemas include a set of rules which determine the type and format of data that can be added or included in the database.
 - Attributes, classes and objects are the basic elements that are used to build object definitions in the schema.
 - Each schema attribute, which is similar to a field in a database, has several properties that define the characteristics of the attribute.
 - The classes are analogous to tables in a database and also have several properties to be defined.

- Each class and attribute must have an Object ID that is unique for all of your objects. Software vendors must obtain their own Object ID to ensure uniqueness.
- Some attributes are linked between two classes with forward and back links, such as groups. A group shows you the members of the group; while a member shows what groups it belongs to.
- Features
 - AWS Managed Microsoft AD is deployed in HA and across multiple Availability Zones. You can also scale out your directory by deploying additional domain controllers.
 - AWS Managed Microsoft AD runs on AWS managed infrastructure with monitoring that automatically detects and replaces domain controllers that fail.
 - Data replication and automated daily snapshots are configured for you.
 - You can integrate AWS Managed Microsoft AD easily with your existing Active Directory by using **Active Directory trust relationships**.
 - Allows seamless domain join for new and existing Amazon EC2 for Windows Server instances.
 - AWS Managed Microsoft AD can also provide a single directory for all kinds of workloads (EC2, RDS, WorkSpaces, etc).
 - The service supports schema extensions that you submit to the service in the form of a LDAP Data Interchange Format (LDIF) file.
 - You can configure Amazon SNS to receive email and text messages when the status of your AWS Directory Service changes.
 - You can configure SAML 2.0–based authentication with cloud applications using AWS Directory Service.
 - You can use AWS Managed Microsoft AD as a resource forest that contains primarily computers and groups with trust relationships to your on-premises directory. This enables your users to access AWS applications and resources with their on-premises AD credentials.
- Microsoft AD Prerequisites
 - A VPC with at least two subnets. Each of the subnets must be in a different Availability Zone.
 - The necessary ports for the domain controllers that AWS Directory Service creates for you should be open to allow them to communicate with each other.
 - The VPC must have default hardware tenancy.
 - AWS Directory Service does not support using NAT with Active Directory.
- Two Editions of AWS Managed Microsoft AD
 - Both Standard Edition and Enterprise Edition can be used as your organization's primary directory to manage users, devices, and computers.
 - You also can use both editions to create resource forests and extend your on-premises AD to the AWS Cloud. **Resource forests** use a trust relationship with your on-premises AD to enable you to access AWS applications and resources with your on-premises AD credentials.
 - Both editions also support the creation of additional domain controllers to improve the redundancy and performance of your managed directory.
 - Unique to Standard Edition

- Optimized to be a primary directory for small and midsize businesses with up to 5,000 employees.
 - Provides you enough storage capacity to support up to approximately 30,000 directory objects, such as users, groups, and computers.
- Unique to Enterprise Edition
 - Designed to support enterprise organizations with up to approximately 500,000 directory objects.
- Seamless Domain Joins
 - **Seamless domain join** is a feature that allows you to join your Amazon EC2 for Windows Server instances seamlessly to a domain, at the time of launch and from the AWS Management Console. You can join instances to AWS Managed Microsoft AD that you launch in the AWS Cloud.
 - You cannot use the seamless domain join feature from the AWS Management Console for **existing EC2 for Windows Server** instances, but you can join existing instances to a domain using the EC2 API or by using PowerShell on the instance.
- Security and Monitoring
 - AWS Managed Microsoft AD is both HIPAA and PCI DSS compliant.
 - Manage users and devices by using native Active Directory Group Policy objects (GPOs).
 - AWS Managed Microsoft AD uses the same Kerberos-based authentication as Active Directory to deliver Single Sign-On (SSO).
 - AWS Managed Microsoft AD supports federation access for users and groups to the AWS Management Console.
 - Amazon EBS volumes used in the directory service are encrypted.
- Pricing
 - You pay only for the type and size of the managed directory that you use.
 - AWS Managed Microsoft AD allows you to use a directory in one account and share it with multiple accounts and VPCs. There is an hourly sharing charge for each additional account to which you share a directory.

Active Directory Connector

- A **proxy service** that provides an easy way to connect compatible AWS applications, such as Amazon WorkSpaces, Amazon QuickSight, and Amazon EC2 for Windows Server instances, to your existing on-premises Microsoft Active Directory.
- AD Connector is your best choice when you want to use your existing on-premises directory with compatible AWS services.
- Features
 - When users log in to the AWS applications, AD Connector forwards sign-in requests to your on-premises Active Directory domain controllers for authentication.



- You can also join your EC2 Windows instances to your on-premises Active Directory domain through AD Connector using seamless domain join.
- AD Connector is NOT compatible with RDS SQL Server.
- AD Connector comes in two sizes, small and large.
- You can spread application loads across multiple AD Connectors to scale to your performance needs. There are no enforced user or connection limits.
- AD Connector Prerequisites
 - You need to have a VPC with at least two subnets. Each of the subnets must be in a different Availability Zone.
 - The VPC must be connected to your existing network through a virtual private network (VPN) connection or AWS Direct Connect.
 - The VPC must have default hardware tenancy.
 - Your user accounts must have Kerberos pre-authentication enabled.

Simple AD

- A **standalone Microsoft Active Directory-compatible** directory from AWS Directory Service that is powered by **Samba 4**.
- You can use Simple AD as a standalone directory in the cloud to support Windows workloads that need basic AD features, compatible AWS applications, or to support Linux workloads that need LDAP service.
- Features
 - Simple AD supports basic Active Directory features such as user accounts, group memberships, joining a Linux domain or Windows based EC2 instances, Kerberos-based SSO, and group policies.
 - AWS provides monitoring, daily snapshots, and recovery as part of the service.
 - Simple AD is compatible with the following AWS applications: Amazon WorkSpaces, Amazon WorkDocs, Amazon QuickSight, and Amazon WorkMail.
 - You can also sign in to the AWS Management Console with Simple AD user accounts.
 - Simple AD does NOT support multi-factor authentication, trust relationships, DNS dynamic update, schema extensions, communication over LDAPS, PowerShell AD cmdlets, or FSMO role transfer.
 - Simple AD is NOT compatible with RDS SQL Server.
 - Simple AD is available in two sizes:
 - Small - Supports up to 500 users
 - Large - Supports up to 5,000 users
- Simple AD Prerequisites
 - Your VPC should have at least two subnets. For Simple AD to install correctly, you must install your two domain controllers in separate subnets that must be in a different Availability Zone. In addition, the subnets must be in the same Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) range.



- The necessary ports for the domain controllers that AWS Directory Service creates for you should be open to allow them to communicate with each other.
 - The VPC must have default hardware tenancy.
- When you create a directory with Simple AD, AWS Directory Service performs the following tasks on your behalf:
 - Sets up a Samba-based directory within the VPC.
 - Creates a directory administrator account with the user name 'Administrator' and the specified password. You use this account to manage your directory.
 - Creates a security group for the directory controllers.
 - Creates an account that has domain admin privileges.
- Simple AD forwards DNS requests to the IP address of the Amazon-provided DNS servers for your VPC. These DNS servers will resolve names configured in your Route 53 private hosted zones

Amazon Cloud Directory

- A **cloud-native directory** that can store hundreds of millions of application-specific objects with multiple relationships and schemas. Use Amazon Cloud Directory if you need a **highly scalable directory store** for your application's **hierarchical data**.
- You can organize directory objects into multiple hierarchies to support many organizational pivots and relationships across directory information.
- Concepts
 - A schema is a collection of facets that define what objects can be created in a directory and how they are organized.
 - A schema also enforces data integrity and interoperability.
 - A single schema can be applied to more than one directory at a time.
 - Amazon Cloud Directory supports uploading of a compliant **JSON file for schema creation**.
 - A directory is a schema-based data store that contains specific types of objects organized in a multi-hierarchical structure.
 - Before you can create a directory in Amazon Cloud Directory, AWS Directory Service requires that you first apply a schema to it. A directory cannot be created without a schema and typically has one schema applied to it.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/directoryservice/features/?nc=sn&loc=2>

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/clouddirectory/latest/developerguide/what_is_cloud_directory.html

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/directoryservice/latest/admin-guide/what_is.html

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/clouddirectory/latest/developerguide/what_is_cloud_directory.html



AWS Fargate

- A serverless compute engine for containers that works with both Amazon Elastic Container Service (ECS) and Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service (EKS).
- With Fargate, no manual provisioning, patching, cluster capacity management, or any infrastructure management required.
- Use Case
 - Launching containers without having to provision or manage EC2 instances.
 - If you want a managed service for container cluster management.
- Configurations
 - Amazon ECS task definitions for Fargate require that you specify CPU and memory at the task level (task definition).
 - Amazon ECS task definitions for Fargate support the ulimits parameter to define the resource limits to set for a container.
 - Amazon ECS task definitions for Fargate support the awslogs, splunk, firelens, and fluentd log drivers for the log configuration.
 - When provisioned, each Fargate task receives the following storage:
 - 10 GB of Docker layer storage
 - An additional 4 GB for volume mounts.
 - Task storage is ephemeral.
 - If you have a service with running tasks and want to update their platform version, you can update your service, specify a new platform version, and choose Force new deployment. Your tasks are redeployed with the **latest** platform version.
 - If your service is scaled up without updating the platform version, those tasks receive the platform version that was specified on the service's current deployment.
- Network
 - Amazon ECS task definitions for Fargate require that the network mode is set to awsvpc. The awsvpc network mode provides each task with its own elastic network interface.
- Compliance
 - PCI DSS Level 1, ISO 9001, ISO 27001, ISO 27017, ISO 27018, SOC 1, SOC 2, SOC 3, and HIPAA
 - AWS Fargate is not yet available in AWS GovCloud.
- Pricing
 - You pay for the amount of vCPU and memory resources consumed by your containerized applications.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/fargate/>

<https://aws.amazon.com/fargate/faqs/>

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/AWS_Fargate.html



AWS Identity and Access Management (AWS IAM)

- Control who is authenticated (signed in) and authorized (has permissions) to use resources.
- AWS account **root user** is a single sign-in identity that has complete access to all AWS services and resources in the account.
- **Features**
 - You can grant other people permission to administer and use resources in your AWS account without having to share your password or access key.
 - You can grant different permissions to different people for different resources.
 - You can use IAM features to securely provide credentials for applications that run on EC2 instances which provide permissions for your applications to access other AWS resources.
 - You can add two-factor authentication to your account and to individual users for extra security.
 - You can allow users to use **identity federation** to get temporary access to your AWS account.
 - You receive AWS CloudTrail log records that include information about **IAM identities** who made requests for resources in your account.
 - You use an **access key** (an access key ID and secret access key) to make programmatic requests to AWS. An Access Key ID and Secret Access Key can only be uniquely generated once and must be regenerated if lost.
 - IAM has been validated as being compliant with Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard (DSS).
 - IAM is *eventually consistent*. IAM achieves high availability by replicating data across multiple servers within Amazon's data centers around the world.
 - IAM and AWS Security Token Service (STS) are offered at no additional charge.
 - Your unique account sign-in page URL:
https://My_AWS_Account_ID.signin.aws.amazon.com/console/
 - You can use IAM tags to add custom attributes to an IAM user or role using a tag key–value pair.
 - You can generate and download a credential report that lists all users on your AWS account. The report also shows the status of passwords, access keys, and MFA devices.
- **Infrastructure Elements**
 - **Principal**
 - An entity that can make a request for an action or operation on an AWS resource. Users, roles, federated users, and applications are all AWS principals.
 - Your AWS account root user is your *first principal*.
 - **Request**
 - When a principal tries to use the AWS Management Console, the AWS API, or the AWS CLI, that principal sends a *request* to AWS.
 - Requests includes the following information:
 - **Actions or operations** – the actions or operations that the principal wants to perform.



- **Resources** – the AWS resource object upon which the actions or operations are performed.
- **Principal** – the user, role, federated user, or application that sent the request. Information about the principal includes the policies that are associated with that principal.
- **Environment data** – information about the IP address, user agent, SSL enabled status, or the time of day.
- **Resource data** – data related to the resource that is being requested.
- **Authentication**
 - To authenticate from the console as a user, you must sign in with your user name and password.
 - To authenticate from the API or AWS CLI, you must provide your access key and secret key.
- **Authorization**
 - AWS uses values from the *request context* to check for policies that apply to the request. It then uses the policies to determine whether to allow or deny the request.
 - Policies types can be categorized as *permissions policies* or *permissions boundaries*.
 - *Permissions policies* define the permissions for the object to which they're attached. These include identity-based policies, resource-based policies, and ACLs.
 - *Permissions boundary* is an advanced feature that allows you to use policies to limit the maximum permissions that a principal can have.
 - To provide your users with permissions to access the AWS resources in their own account, you need **identity-based policies**.
 - **Resource-based policies** are for granting cross-account access.
 - Evaluation logic rules for policies:
 - By default, **all requests are denied**.
 - An *explicit allow* in a permissions policy overrides this default.
 - A *permissions boundary* overrides the allow. If there is a permissions boundary that applies, that boundary must allow the request. Otherwise, it is implicitly denied.
 - An explicit deny in any policy overrides any allows.
- **Actions or Operations**
 - Operations are defined by a service, and include things that you can do to a resource, such as viewing, creating, editing, and deleting that resource.
- **Resource**
 - An object that exists within a service. The service defines a set of actions that can be performed on each resource.
- **Users**
 - **IAM Users**



- Instead of sharing your root user credentials with others, you can create individual **IAM users** within your account that correspond to users in your organization. IAM users are not separate accounts; they are users within your account.
- Each user can have its own password for access to the AWS Management Console. You can also create an individual access key for each user so that the user can make programmatic requests to work with resources in your account.
- By default, a brand new IAM user has **NO permissions** to do anything.
- Users are global entities.
- **Federated Users**
 - If the users in your organization already have a way to be authenticated, you can federate those user identities into AWS.
- **IAM Groups**
 - An IAM group is a collection of IAM users.
 - You can organize IAM users into IAM groups and attach access control policies to a group.
 - A user can belong to multiple groups.
 - Groups cannot belong to other groups.
 - Groups do not have security credentials, and cannot access web services directly.
- **IAM Role**
 - A role does not have any credentials associated with it.
 - An IAM user can assume a role to temporarily take on different permissions for a specific task. A role can be assigned to a federated user who signs in by using an external identity provider instead of IAM.
 - **AWS service role** is a role that a service assumes to perform actions in your account on your behalf. This service role must include all the permissions required for the service to access the AWS resources that it needs.
 - **AWS service role for an EC2 instance** is a special type of service role that a service assumes to launch an EC2 instance that runs your application. This role is assigned to the EC2 instance when it is launched.
 - **AWS service-linked role** is a unique type of service role that is linked directly to an AWS service. Service-linked roles are predefined by the service and include all the permissions that the service requires to call other AWS services on your behalf.
 - An instance profile is a container for an IAM role that you can use to pass role information to an EC2 instance when the instance starts.
- Users or groups can have multiple policies attached to them that grant different permissions.

When to Create IAM User	When to Create an IAM Role
You created an AWS account and you're the only person who works in your account.	You're creating an application that runs on an Amazon EC2 instance and that application makes requests to AWS.
Other people in your group need to work in your AWS account, and your group is using no other identity mechanism.	You're creating an app that runs on a mobile phone and that makes requests to AWS.
You want to use the command-line interface to work with AWS.	Users in your company are authenticated in your corporate network and want to be able to use AWS without having to sign in again (federate into AWS)

 Tutorials Dojo

• Policies

- Most permission policies are JSON policy documents.
- The IAM console includes *policy summary tables* that describe the access level, resources, and conditions that are allowed or denied for each service in a policy.
- The *policy summary table* includes a list of services. Choose a service there to see the *service summary*.
- This *summary table* includes a list of the actions and associated permissions for the chosen service. You can choose an action from that table to view the *action summary*.
- To assign permissions to federated users, you can create an entity referred to as a **role** and define permissions for the **role**.
- **Identity-Based Policies**
 - Permissions policies that you attach to a principal or identity.
 - **Managed policies** are standalone policies that you can attach to multiple users, groups, and roles in your AWS account.
 - **Inline policies** are policies that you create and manage and that are embedded directly into a single user, group, or role.
- Resource-based Policies**
 - Permissions policies that you attach to a resource such as an Amazon S3 bucket.
 - Resource-based policies are only inline policies.



- **Trust policies** - resource-based policies that are attached to a role and define which principals can assume the role.
- **AWS Security Token Service (STS)**
 - Create and provide trusted users with temporary security credentials that can control access to your AWS resources.
 - Temporary security credentials are short-term and are not stored with the user but are generated dynamically and provided to the user when requested.
 - By default, AWS STS is a global service with a single endpoint at <https://sts.amazonaws.com>.
- **Assume Role Options**
 - AssumeRole - Returns a set of temporary security credentials that you can use to access AWS resources that you might not normally have access to. These temporary credentials consist of an access key ID, a secret access key, and a security token. Typically, you use *AssumeRole* within your account or for cross-account access.
 - You can include multi-factor authentication (MFA) information when you call *AssumeRole*. This is useful for cross-account scenarios to ensure that the user that assumes the role has been authenticated with an AWS MFA device.
 - AssumeRoleWithSAML - Returns a set of temporary security credentials for users who have been authenticated via a SAML authentication response. This allows you to link your enterprise identity store or directory to role-based AWS access without user-specific credentials or configuration.
 - AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity - Returns a set of temporary security credentials for users who have been authenticated in a mobile or web application with a web identity provider. Example providers include Amazon Cognito, Login with Amazon, Facebook, Google, or any OpenID Connect-compatible identity provider.
- **STS Get Tokens**
 - GetFederationToken - Returns a set of temporary security credentials (consisting of an access key ID, a secret access key, and a security token) for a federated user. You must call the GetFederationToken operation using the long-term security credentials of an IAM user. A typical use is in a proxy application that gets temporary security credentials on behalf of distributed applications inside a corporate network.
 - GetSessionToken - Returns a set of temporary credentials for an AWS account or IAM user. The credentials consist of an access key ID, a secret access key, and a security token. You must call the GetSessionToken operation using the long-term security credentials of an IAM user. Typically, you use GetSessionToken if you want to use MFA to protect programmatic calls to specific AWS API operations.
- **Best Practices**
 - Lock Away Your AWS Account Root User Access Keys
 - Create Individual IAM Users
 - Use Groups to Assign Permissions to IAM Users
 - Use AWS Defined Policies to Assign Permissions Whenever Possible
 - Grant Least Privilege



- Use Access Levels to Review IAM Permissions
- Configure a Strong Password Policy for Your Users
- Enable MFA for Privileged Users
- Use Roles for Applications That Run on Amazon EC2 Instances
- Use Roles to Delegate Permissions
- Do Not Share Access Keys
- Rotate Credentials Regularly
- Remove Unnecessary Credentials
- Use Policy Conditions for Extra Security
- Monitor Activity in Your AWS Account

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/introduction.html>

<https://aws.amazon.com/iam/faqs/>



AWS Organizations

- It offers policy-based management for multiple AWS accounts.

Features

- With Organizations, you can create groups of accounts and then apply policies to those groups.
- Organizations provides you a policy framework for multiple AWS accounts. You can apply policies to a group of accounts or all the accounts in your organization.
- AWS Organizations enables you to set up a single payment method for all the AWS accounts in your organization through **consolidated billing**. With consolidated billing, you can see a combined view of charges incurred by all your accounts, as well as take advantage of pricing benefits from aggregated usage, such as volume discounts for EC2 and S3.
- AWS Organizations, like many other AWS services, is **eventually consistent**. It achieves high availability by replicating data across multiple servers in AWS data centers within its region.

Administrative Actions in Organizations

- Create an AWS account and add it to your organization, or add an existing AWS account to your organization.
- Organize your AWS accounts into groups called *organizational units* (OUs).
- Organize your OUs into a hierarchy that reflects your company's structure.
- Centrally manage and attach policies to the entire organization, OUs, or individual AWS accounts.

Concepts

- An **organization** is a collection of AWS accounts that you can organize into a hierarchy and manage centrally.
- A **management account** is the AWS account you use to create your organization. You cannot change which account in your organization is the management account.
 - From the management account, you can create other accounts in your organization, invite and manage invitations for other accounts to join your organization, and remove accounts from your organization.
 - You can also attach policies to entities such as administrative roots, organizational units (OUs), or accounts within your organization.
 - The management account has the role of a payer account and is responsible for paying all charges accrued by the accounts in its organization.
- A **member account** is an AWS account, other than the management account, that is part of an organization. A member account can belong to only one organization at a time. The management account has the responsibilities of a payer account and is responsible for paying all charges that are accrued by the member accounts.



- An **administrative root** is the starting point for organizing your AWS accounts. The administrative root is the top-most container in your organization's hierarchy. Under this root, you can create OUs to logically group your accounts and organize these OUs into a hierarchy that best matches your business needs.
- An **organizational unit** (OU) is a group of AWS accounts within an organization. An OU can also contain other OUs enabling you to create a hierarchy.
- A **policy** is a "document" with one or more statements that define the controls that you want to apply to a group of AWS accounts.
 - **Service control policy** (SCP) is a policy that specifies the services and actions that users and roles can use in the accounts that the SCP affects. SCPs are similar to IAM permission policies except that they don't grant any permissions. Instead, SCPs are *filters* that allow only the specified services and actions to be used in affected accounts
- AWS Organizations has two available feature sets:
 - All organizations support **consolidated billing**, which provides basic management tools that you can use to centrally manage the accounts in your organization.
 - If you enable **all features**, you continue to get all the consolidated billing features plus a set of advanced features such as service control policies.
- You can remove an AWS account from an organization and make it into a standalone account.
- Organization Hierarchy
 - Including root and AWS accounts created in the lowest OUs, your hierarchy can be five levels deep.
 - Policies inherited through hierarchical connections in an organization.
 - Policies can be assigned at different points in the hierarchy.

Pricing

- This service is free.

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/>

<https://aws.amazon.com/organizations/features/>

<https://aws.amazon.com/organizations/faqs/>



AWS Resource Access Manager

- A service that enables you to easily and securely share AWS resources with any AWS account or, if you are part of AWS Organizations, with Organizational Units (OUs) or your entire Organization. If you share resources with accounts that are outside of your Organization, then those accounts will receive an invitation to the Resource Share and can start using the shared resources upon accepting the invitation.
 - Only the master account can enable sharing with AWS Organizations.
 - The organization must be enabled for all features.
- RAM eliminates the need to create duplicate resources in multiple accounts. You can create resources centrally in a multi-account environment, and use RAM to share those resources across accounts in three simple steps:
 1. Create a Resource Share
 2. Specify resources
 3. Specify accounts
- You can stop sharing a resource by deleting the share in AWS RAM.
- Services you can share with AWS RAM

Service	Resource
Amazon Aurora	DB Clusters
AWS CodeBuild	Projects, Report Groups
Amazon EC2	Capacity Reservations, Dedicated Hosts, Subnets, Traffic mirror targets, Transit gateways
Amazon EC2 Image Builder	Components, Images (AMI), Image recipes
AWS License Manager	License configurations
AWS Resource Groups	Resource groups
Amazon Route 53	Forwarding rules

- Security
 - Use IAM policies to secure who can access resources that you shared or received from another account.
- Pricing
 - There is no additional charge for using AWS RAM.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/ram/>

<https://aws.amazon.com/ram/faqs/>



AWS Secrets Manager

- A secret management service that enables you to easily rotate, manage, and retrieve database credentials, API keys, and other secrets throughout their lifecycle.
- Features
 - AWS Secrets Manager encrypts secrets at rest using encryption keys that you own and store in AWS Key Management Service [customer managed keys]. When you retrieve a secret, Secrets Manager decrypts the secret and transmits it securely over TLS to your local environment.
 - You can rotate secrets on a schedule or on demand by using the Secrets Manager console, AWS SDK, or AWS CLI.
 - Secrets Manager natively supports rotating credentials for databases hosted on Amazon RDS and Amazon DocumentDB and clusters hosted on Amazon Redshift.
 - You can extend Secrets Manager to rotate other secrets, such as credentials for Oracle databases hosted on EC2 or OAuth refresh tokens, by using custom AWS Lambda functions.
- A secret consists of a set of credentials (user name and password), and the connection details used to access a secured service.
- A secret also contains **metadata** which include:
 - Basic information includes the name of the secret, a description, and the Amazon Resource Name (ARN) to serve as a unique identifier.
 - The ARN of the AWS KMS key Secrets Manager uses to encrypt and decrypt the protected text in the secret. If you don't provide this information, Secrets Manager uses the default AWS KMS key for the account.
 - Information about how frequently to rotate the key and what Lambda function to use to perform the rotation.
 - A user-provided set of tags. You can attach tags as key-value pairs to AWS resources for organizing, logical grouping, and cost allocation.
- A secret can contain **versions**:
 - Although you typically only have one version of the secret active at a time, multiple versions can exist while you rotate a secret on the database or service. Whenever you change the secret, Secrets Manager creates a new version.
 - Each version holds a copy of the encrypted secret value.
 - Each version can have one or more *staging labels* attached identifying the stage of the secret rotation cycle.
- Supported Secrets
 - Database credentials, on-premises resource credentials, SaaS application credentials, third-party API keys, and SSH keys.
 - You can also store JSON documents.
- To retrieve secrets, you simply replace secrets in plain text in your applications with code to pull in those secrets programmatically using the Secrets Manager APIs.
- Secrets can be cached on the client side, and updated only during a secret rotation.



- During the secret rotation process, Secrets Manager tracks the older credentials, as well as the new credentials you want to start using, until the rotation completes. It tracks these different versions by using *staging labels*.
- How Secret Rotation Works
 - The rotation function contacts the secured service authentication system and creates a new set of credentials to access the database. Secrets Manager stores these new credentials as the secret text in a new version of the secret with the `AWSPENDING` staging label attached.
 - The rotation function then tests the `AWSPENDING` version of the secret to ensure that the credentials work, and grants the required level of access to the secured service.
 - If the tests succeed, the rotation function then moves the label `AWSCURRENT` to the new version to mark it as the default version. Then, all of the clients start using this version of the secret instead of the old version. The function also assigns the label `AWSPREVIOUS` to the old version. The version that had `AWSPREVIOUS` staging label now has no label, and therefore deprecated.

Network Setup for Secret Rotation

- When rotating secrets on natively supported services, Secrets Manager uses CloudFormation to build the rotation function and configure the network connection between the two.
 - If your protected database service **runs in a VPC and is not publicly accessible**, then the CloudFormation template configures the **Lambda rotation function to run in the same VPC**. The rotation function can communicate with the protected service **directly within the VPC**.
 - If you run your protected service as a **publicly accessible resource**, in a VPC or not, then the CloudFormation template configures the **Lambda rotation function not to run in a VPC**. The Lambda rotation function communicates with the protected service **through the publicly accessible connection point**.
- By default, the Secrets Manager endpoints run on the public Internet. If you run your Lambda rotation function and protected database or service in a VPC, then you must perform one of the following steps:
 - **Add a NAT gateway to your VPC**. This enables traffic that originates in your VPC to reach the public Secrets Manager endpoint.
 - **Configure Secrets Manager service endpoints directly within your VPC**. This configures your VPC to intercept any request addressed to the public regional endpoint, and redirect the request to the private service endpoint running within your VPC.

You can create two secrets that have different permissions

- User Secret - can be used to connect to linked services, but it cannot be rotated. The user will have to wait for the master secret to be rotated and propagated for it to change.
- Master Secret - has sufficient permissions to rotate secrets of linked services. This scenario is typically used when you have users that are actively using the old secret, and you do not want to break operations after you rotate the secret. You can have your users update their clients first before using the newly rotated credentials.

Security

- By default, Secrets Manager does not write or cache the secret to persistent storage.



- By default, Secrets Manager only accepts requests from hosts that use the open standard Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Perfect Forward Secrecy.
- You can control access to the secret using AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) policies.
- You can tag secrets individually and apply tag-based access controls.
- You can configure VPC endpoints to keep traffic between your VPC and Secrets Manager within the AWS network.
- Secrets Manager does not immediately delete secrets. Instead, Secrets Manager immediately makes the secrets inaccessible and scheduled for deletion after a recovery window of a **minimum of seven days**. Until the recovery window ends, you can recover a secret you previously deleted.
- By using the CLI, you can delete a secret without a recovery window.

Compliance

- Secrets Manager is HIPAA, PCI DSS and ISO, SOC, FedRAMP, DoD SRG, IRAP, and OSPAR compliant.

Pricing

- You pay based on the number of secrets stored and API calls made per month.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/secrets-manager/>

<https://aws.amazon.com/secrets-manager/faqs/>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/userguide/intro.html>



AWS Security Hub

- AWS Security Hub provides a **comprehensive view** of your **security state** within AWS and your **compliance** with security industry standards and best practices.
- Features
 - You now have a single place that **aggregates, organizes, and prioritizes your security alerts**, or findings, across multiple accounts, AWS partner tools, and AWS services such as Amazon GuardDuty, Amazon Inspector, Amazon Macie, AWS IAM Access Analyzer, AWS Firewall Manager, and AWS Audit Manager.
 - AWS Security Hub works with AWS Organizations to simplify security posture management across all of your existing and future AWS accounts in an organization.
 - You can run automated, continuous account-level configuration and compliance checks based on industry standards and best practices, such as the Center for Internet Security (CIS) AWS Foundations Benchmark. These checks provide a compliance score and identify specific accounts and resources that require attention.
 - AWS Security Hub compliance checks also leverage configuration items recorded by AWS Config.
 - Integrated dashboards consolidate your security findings across accounts to show you their current security and compliance status.
 - You can send security findings to ticketing, chat, email, or automated remediation systems through integration with Amazon CloudWatch Events.
 - All findings are stored for at least 90 days within AWS Security Hub.
- Security Hub receives and processes only those findings from the same Region where you enabled Security Hub in your account.
- Concepts
 - AWS Security Finding Format - A standardized format for the contents of findings that Security Hub aggregates or generates.
 - Control - A safeguard or countermeasure prescribed for an information system or an organization designed to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information and to meet a set of defined security requirements. A security standard consists of controls.
 - Custom action - A Security Hub mechanism for sending selected findings to CloudWatch Events.
 - Finding - The observable record of a compliance check or security-related detection.
 - Insight - A collection of related findings defined by an aggregation statement and optional filters. An insight identifies a security area that requires attention and intervention.
 - Compliance standards - Sets of controls that are based on regulatory requirements or best practices.
 - You can disable specific compliance controls that are not relevant to your workloads.
- Compliance standard vs. Control vs. Compliance check



- A compliance standard is a collection of controls based on regulatory frameworks or industry best practices. Security Hub conducts automated compliance checks against controls. Each compliance check consists of an evaluation of a rule against a single resource. A single control may involve multiple resources and a compliance check is performed against each resource.
- AWS Security Hub uses a **service-linked role** that includes the permissions and trust policy that Security Hub requires to detect and aggregate findings, and to configure the requisite AWS Config infrastructure needed to run compliance checks. In order for Security Hub to run **compliance checks** in an account, you must have **AWS Config enabled** in that account.
- Pricing
 - AWS Security Hub is priced based on the **quantity of compliance checks** and the **quantity of finding ingestion events**.
 - Pricing is on a monthly per account, per region basis.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/>

<https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/faqs/>



AWS Shield

- A managed Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) protection service that safeguards applications running on AWS.

Shield Tiers and Features

- **Standard**
 - All AWS customers benefit from the automatic protections of Shield Standard.
 - Shield Standard provides always-on network flow monitoring which inspects incoming traffic to AWS and detect malicious traffic in real-time.
 - Uses several techniques like deterministic packet filtering, and priority based traffic shaping to automatically mitigate attacks without impact to your applications.
 - When you use Shield Standard with CloudFront and Route 53, you receive comprehensive availability protection against all known infrastructure attacks.
 - You can also view all the events detected and mitigated by AWS Shield in your account.
- **Advanced**
 - Shield Advanced provides enhanced detection, inspecting network flows and also monitoring application layer traffic to your Elastic IP address, Elastic Load Balancing, CloudFront, or Route 53 resources.
 - It handles the majority of DDoS protection and mitigation responsibilities for **layer 3**, **layer 4**, and **layer 7** attacks.
 - You have 24x7 access to the AWS DDoS Response Team. To contact the DDoS Response Team, customers will need the Enterprise or Business Support levels of AWS Premium Support.
 - It automatically provides additional mitigation capacity to protect against larger DDoS attacks. The DDoS Response Team also applies manual mitigations for more complex and sophisticated DDoS attacks.
 - It gives you complete visibility into DDoS attacks with near real-time notification via CloudWatch and detailed diagnostics on the “AWS WAF and AWS Shield” Management Console.
 - Shield Advanced comes with “DDoS cost protection”, a safeguard from scaling charges as a result of a DDoS attack that cause usage spikes on your AWS services. It does so by providing service credits for charges due to usage spikes.
 - It is available globally on all CloudFront and Route 53 edge locations.
 - With Shield Advanced you will be able to see the history of all incidents in the trailing 13 months.

Pricing

- **Shield Standard** provides protection at no additional charge.



- **Shield Advanced**, however, is a paid service. It requires a 1-year subscription commitment and charges a monthly fee, plus a usage fee based on data transfer out from CloudFront, ELB, EC2, and AWS Global Accelerator.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/shield/features/>

<https://aws.amazon.com/shield/pricing/>

<https://aws.amazon.com/shield/faqs/>



AWS WAF

- A web application firewall that helps protect web applications from attacks by allowing you to configure rules that **allow, block, or monitor (count) web requests** based on conditions that you define.
- These conditions include:
 - IP addresses
 - HTTP headers
 - HTTP body
 - URI strings
 - SQL injection
 - cross-site scripting.

Features

- WAF lets you create rules to filter web traffic based on conditions that include IP addresses, HTTP headers and body, or custom URIs.
- You can also create rules that block common web exploits like SQL injection and cross site scripting.
- For application layer attacks, you can use WAF to respond to incidents. You can set up proactive rules like *Rate Based Blacklisting* to automatically block bad traffic, or respond immediately to incidents as they happen.
- WAF provides real-time metrics and captures raw requests that include details about IP addresses, geo locations, URIs, User-Agent and Referers.
- **AWS WAF Security Automations** is a solution that automatically deploys a single web access control list (web ACL) with a set of AWS WAF rules designed to filter common web-based attacks. The solution supports log analysis using Amazon Athena and AWS WAF full logs.

Conditions, Rules, and Web ACLs

- You define your conditions, combine your conditions into rules, and combine the rules into a web ACL.
- **Conditions** define the basic characteristics that you want WAF to watch for in web requests.
- You combine conditions into **rules** to precisely target the requests that you want to allow, block, or count. WAF provides two types of rules:
 - **Regular rules** - use only conditions to target specific requests.
 - **Rate-based rules** - are similar to regular rules, with a rate limit. Rate-based rules count the requests that arrive from a specified IP address every five minutes. The rule can trigger an action if the number of requests exceed the rate limit.
- **WAF Managed Rules** are an easy way to deploy pre-configured rules to protect your applications common threats like application vulnerabilities. All Managed Rules are automatically updated by AWS Marketplace security Sellers.



- After you combine your conditions into rules, you combine the rules into a **web ACL**. This is where you define an action for each rule—allow, block, or count—and a default action, which determines whether to allow or block a request that doesn't match all the conditions in any of the rules in the web ACL.

Pricing

- WAF charges based on the number of web access control lists (web ACLs) that you create, the number of rules that you add per web ACL, and the number of web requests that you receive.

References:

<https://aws.amazon.com/waf/features/>


<https://aws.amazon.com/waf/pricing/>

<https://aws.amazon.com/waf/faqs/>

Comparison of AWS Services

AWS Key Management Service (KMS) vs. AWS CloudHSM

AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) lets you create, store, and manage customer master keys (CMKs) securely. A *customer master key (CMK)* is a logical representation of a master key. KMS uses CMKs to generate *data keys* that are used to encrypt data of any size.



With KMS, you can use *AWS Managed Key*, *Customer Managed Key*, and *Custom Key Store*. There is also a key rotation policy available for CMKs. AWS KMS integrates with several AWS Services like S3, RDS, EBS, and more.

AWS CloudHSM

A *hardware security module (HSM)* is a specialized security device that manages cryptographic keys, performs encryption and decryption functions for digital signatures, authentication, and other cryptographic functions. AWS brought this solution to the cloud as *AWS CloudHSM*.

AWS CloudHSM is a cloud-based hardware security module (HSM) that enables you to quickly generate and use your encryption keys on the AWS Cloud. Since this is a managed hardware, you don't have to worry about the administrative tasks of maintaining an HSM. With AWS CloudHSM, hardware provisioning, software patching, high availability, and backups are all automated. When you use the AWS CloudHSM service, you create a *CloudHSM Cluster*. These clusters reside inside a VPC and spread across multiple Availability Zones in a region.

CloudHSM is used to accomplish the following:

- Offload the SSL/TLS Processing for Web Servers
- Protect the Private Keys for an Issuing Certificate Authority (CA)
- Enable Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) for Oracle Databases



KMS and CloudHSM Integration

You can create a Custom Key Store on Cloud HSM, which you can use to store your CMK on KMS instead of using the standard KMS key store.

When to use AWS KMS?

AWS KMS allows you to have centralized management of your CMK. You can assign Key Administrators, users, and roles to your CMK when creating it. You can also track your KMS logs through Amazon Cloudwatch Event and AWS CloudTrail.

CMK is primarily used to generate and encrypt/decrypt your data keys, but it can also encrypt/decrypt small data (up to 4096 bytes). AWS KMS does not store or manage data keys, and you cannot use KMS to encrypt or decrypt with data keys. To do this, you need to use the AWS Encryption SDK.

AWS KMS CMKs are backed by FIPS-validated hardware service modules (HSMs) that KMS manages.

When to use AWS CloudHSM?

AWS CloudHSM provides you with a FIPS 140-2 Level 3 overall validated single-tenant HSM cluster in your Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (VPC).

It is ideal to use CloudHSM if you want full control of your HSMs that generate and store your encryption keys. This includes creating HSM users and policies. The encryption keys that you generate and use with CloudHSM are accessible only by the HSM users that you specify. You have exclusive control over how your keys are used via an authentication mechanism independent from AWS. You also create the symmetric keys and asymmetric key pairs that the HSM stores.

In case you need to manage and store your data keys but do not need to manage the HSM, you can use AWS Key Management Service instead.

References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/crypto/latest/userguide/awscryp-choose-kms.html>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/crypto/latest/userguide/awscryp-choose-hsm.html>

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cloudhsm/latest/userguide/use-cases.html>

Application Load Balancer vs Network Load Balancer vs Classic Load Balancer vs Gateway Load Balancer

Feature	Application Load Balancer	Network Load Balancer	Classic Load Balancer	Gateway Load Balancer
Protocols	HTTP, HTTPS	TCP, UDP, TLS	TCP, SSL/TLS, HTTP, HTTPS	IP
Platforms	VPC	VPC	EC2-Classic, VPC	VPC
Healthchecks	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cloudwatch Metrics	✓	✓	✓	✓
Logging	✓	✓	✓	✓
Zonal Failover	✓	✓	✓	✓
Connection Draining (deregistration delay)	✓		✓	
Load Balancing to multiple ports on the same instance	✓	✓		✓
IP addresses as targets	✓	✓ (TCP, TLS)		✓
Load balancer deletion protection	✓	✓		✓
Configurable idle connection timeout	✓		✓	
Cross-zone load balancing	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sticky sessions	✓	✓	✓	✓
Static IP		✓		
Elastic IP address		✓		
Preserve Source IP address		✓		✓
Resource-based IAM permissions	✓	✓	✓	✓
Tag-based IAM permissions	✓	✓		✓
Slow start	✓			
Web sockets	✓	✓		✓
PrivateLink Support		✓ (TCP, TLS)		✓ (GWLBE)

Feature	Application Load Balancer	Network Load Balancer	Classic Load Balancer	Gateway Load Balancer
Source IP address CIDR- based routing	✓			
Layer 7				
Path-based routing	✓			
Host-based routing	✓			
Native HTTP/2	✓			
Redirects	✓			
Fixed response	✓			
Lambda functions as targets	✓			
HTTP header-based routing	✓			
HTTP method-based routing	✓			
Query string parameter-based routing	✓			
Security				
SSL offloading	✓	✓	✓	
Server Name Indication (SNI)	✓	✓		
Back-end server encryption	✓	✓	✓	
User authentication	✓			
Custom Security Policy			✓	

Common features between the load balancers:

- Has instance health check features
- Has built-in CloudWatch monitoring
- Logging features
- Support zonal failover



- Support cross-zone load balancing (evenly distributes traffic across registered instances in enabled AZs)
- Resource-based IAM permission policies
- Tag-based IAM permissions
- Flow stickiness - all packets are sent to one target and return the traffic that comes from the same target.



Symmetric vs. Asymmetric CMKs

Even before the Internet, the security, privacy, and integrity of information have always been the top concern of institutions like banks, hospitals, and universities. Nobody wants their personal information (name, address, credit card number, etc.) to be exposed in public for anyone to use. Imagine signing up on your favorite social media website, and after a few days, somewhere on the globe has been using your profile and pretending to be you without you knowing! Or maybe you've been using your credit card for shopping online and suddenly, your bank is sending you email reports for fraudulent activities on your account. That would be a creepy and scary world to live in.

The unfortunate truth is that no matter how secure you might think your system is, it will never be one hundred percent secure. There will always be loopholes, and as computers get even more powerful, common attacks like brute force will still be a valid threat. For this reason, tremendous efforts have been made to improve and mitigate scenarios where sensitive data are compromised. Encryption proves to be the most effective solution in battling data breaches.

What is Encryption?

Encryption is the process of converting the information (**plaintext**) into secret code (**ciphertext**) to hide its original meaning. It is used to protect the data so that only authorized users can read it.


It uses the concept of "keys" which are used to encrypt and decrypt the sensitive information from one end to another. The idea is, without these keys, one cannot simply decrypt and read the hidden information.

There are two types of encryption:

Symmetric encryption - uses a single key for both encryption and decryption. The shared key must be sent together with the encrypted data in order for other parties to read it.

Because of the simplicity of the process, it is usually faster than asymmetric encryption and is efficient in encrypting large amounts of data.

Symmetric Encryption Disadvantage:



The main disadvantage of using a symmetric key is the difficulty of transporting the shared key. It is difficult in the sense that attacks, like man-in-the-middle attack, could easily obtain both the key and the encrypted data. Since a single key is used for both encryption and decryption, the man behind the attack would be able to decrypt the information sent over the network.

Asymmetric encryption - it uses a mathematically related public and private key for encryption and decryption. The public key is used for encrypting data and can never be used for decryption. The private key is only used for decrypting data. The private key stays on the user while both the public key and the encrypted data is sent to other parties. This kind of method makes the sharing of public keys a lot easier because even if someone has managed to steal the data with the public key, he won't be able to decrypt the information.

Since this type of encryption uses a more complex algorithm than symmetric encryption, asymmetric is used for systems that use small data. It is usually used for establishing secure connections like TLS and SSH. It is also slower than symmetric encryption and is inefficient for encrypting large data.

Symmetric and Asymmetric Keys In AWS Key Management System:

Customer Master Keys

Customer Master Keys (CMK) is the term used on AWS that refers to the "root key" or "master key". This is the primary resource that is managed by AWS KMS. You control the lifecycle of the CMK as well as who can use or manage it.



Three types of CMKs:

- **Customer Managed CMK**
 - You can view the CMK's metadata
 - You can manage the CMK
 - It is used only for your account
 - Automatic rotation is optional
- **AWS managed CMK**
 - You can view the CMK's metadata but you cannot manage it.
 - It is used only for your account
 - Automatic rotation is required
- **AWS owned CMK**
 - These are CMKs that an AWS Service owns and manages for use in multiple AWS accounts.
 - You do not need to create or manage the AWS owned CMKs.
 - The key rotation strategy for an AWS owned CMK is determined by the AWS service that creates and manages the CMK.

CMK supports both **symmetric** and **asymmetric encryption**. Although integrated in AWS Cloud, the concepts behind the encryption are still the same as the one explained above.

Symmetric CMK

- Represents a 256-bit encryption key that **never leaves AWS KMS unencrypted**.
- **A Symmetric CMK type is created by default** when you call the create-key API without specifying value for `--customer-master-key-spec`.
 - The `--customer-master-key-spec` parameter lets you define the CMK specification. You can either choose symmetric or asymmetric.



- AWS services that are integrated with AWS KMS (Amazon DynamoDB, Amazon S3, Amazon Relational Database Service, etc.) use symmetric CMK to encrypt and decrypt data and **do not support asymmetric CMK**.
- You can **import your own key material into a symmetric CMK** and create symmetric CMKs in custom key stores.
 - Note that imported key material is supported **only for symmetric CMKs**.

Asymmetric CMK

- **Private Key**
 - The private key is created in AWS KMS and never leaves AWS KMS unencrypted.
 - The private **can only be used by calling AWS KMS**.
- **Public Key**
 - The public key can be used **within or outside** of AWS KMS.

Two types of asymmetric CMK:

- **RSA CMKs**
 - Can be used for **encryption and decryption or signing and verification**. You can never use RSA CMK for both purposes at the same time.
- **Elliptic Curve (ECC) CMKs**
 - Elliptic curve key pair used for **signing and verification**

Use Case

- **Symmetric**
 - Use symmetric if you are encrypting data within the AWS service. Since AWS services integrated with AWS KMS only support Symmetric CMK, there is no sense to use asymmetric CMK.
 - Symmetric encryption is commonly used when encrypting data at rest. AWS uses symmetric encryption when you're encrypting objects stored in an S3 bucket or enabling encryption for your EBS volumes.
- **Asymmetric**



- Since you can use the public key outside of AWS KMS in asymmetric, it is a good choice if you are building applications for users who cannot call AWS KMS. The easy process of creating key pairs is one of the main benefits of it.
- Applicable for data signing and verification. You can use asymmetric CMK to authenticate documents by using a digital signature. Digital signing is used to ensure the integrity of data that passes between networks. Suppose that a contract form is sent to you from your client. And you must ensure that the information within the contract is all true and has not been altered by third-parties. If you have the right key, you can cryptographically verify that the contract is indeed sent from your client.

.References:

<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/symmetric-asymmetric.html>
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/symm-asymm-compare.html>



FINAL REMARKS AND TIPS

That's a wrap! Thank you once again for choosing our Study Guide and Cheat Sheets for the AWS Certified Security Specialty (SCS-C01) exam. The [Tutorials Dojo](#) team spent a considerable amount of time and effort to produce this content to help you pass the AWS exam.

We also recommend that before taking the actual SCS-C01 exam, allocate some time to check your readiness by taking our [AWS practice test course](#) in the Tutorials Dojo Portal. This will help you identify the topics that you need to improve on and help reinforce the concepts that you need to fully understand in order to pass this certification test. It also has different training modes that you can choose from such as Timed mode, Review mode, Section-Based tests, and Final test plus bonus flashcards. In addition, you can read the technical discussions in our forums or post your queries if you have one. If you have any issues, concerns or constructive feedback on our eBook, feel free to contact us at support@tutorialsdojo.com.

On behalf of the Tutorials Dojo team, we wish you all the best on your upcoming AWS Certified Security Specialty exam. May it help advance your career, as well as increase your earning potential.

With the right strategy, hard work, and unrelenting persistence, you can definitely make your dreams a reality! You can make it!

Sincerely,
Jon Bonso, Carlo Acebedo, and the Tutorials Dojo Team

ABOUT THE AUTHORS



Jon Bonso (9x AWS Certified)

Born and raised in the Philippines, Jon is the Co-Founder of **Tutorials Dojo**. Now based in Sydney, Australia, he has over a decade of diversified experience in Banking, Financial Services, and Telecommunications. He's 8x AWS Certified and has worked with various cloud services such as Google Cloud and Microsoft Azure. Jon is passionate about what he does and dedicates a lot of time creating educational courses. He has given IT seminars to different universities in the Philippines for free and has launched educational websites using his own money and without any external funding.



Carlo Acebedo (2x AWS Certified)

Carlo is a registered Electronics Engineer and a Certified Cloud Professional who's passionate in the field of Cloud Computing and Web Development. He's a self-learner who enjoys building solutions in the Cloud. His interests are serverless computing, machine learning, technical writing, and reading blogs.